ELCIN SIBRUN
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. 4th DCA | 2020-09-30
No. 19-1629
Bauer, Jr., J., Levine, C.J., Gerber, J., Kuntz, J.
308 So. 3d 996 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2020)

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Holding

A trial court cannot consider a defendant's lack of remorse or refusal to accept responsibility as a sentencing factor, and resentencing before a different judge is required even if such consideration was only one of several factors.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court commits reversible error by considering a defendant's lack of remorse or refusal to accept responsibility as a sentencing factor, and resentencing before a…

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Key Quotes

“a court cannot consider a defendant's 'protestations of innocence and failure to show remorse in determining what sentence to impose.'”

Court citing its own precedent from Donaldson v. State and Pierre v. State

Facts & Procedural History

Sibrun was convicted of lewd or lascivious battery on a minor and seven counts of electronic transmission of material harmful to a minor. At sentencin…

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Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM.

Elcin Sibrun appeals his convictions and sentences for one count of lewd or lascivious battery on a person older than twelve years old but less than sixteen years old and seven counts of electronic transmission of material harmful to a minor. Sibrun raises five issues on appeal and, except for one, we affirm without comment.

For the fifth issue, Sibrun argues that the circuit court erred when it considered his lack of remorse in sentencing him. At sentencing, the court stated that based on Sibrun’s testimony, the presentence investigation report, and letters from supporters, Sibrun had “not accepted any responsibility” or shown “any type of remorse or acceptance of guilt,” which “matter[ed]” to the court.

We have held that a court cannot consider a defendant’s “protestations of innocence and failure to show remorse in determining what sentence to impose.” Donaldson v. State, 16 So. 3d 314, 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citations omitted); see also Pierre v. State, 259 So. 3d 859, 861–62 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). 1 We have also held that “[r]e-sentencing is required even if a defendant’s refusal to admit guilt was but one of several factors considered by the court in imposing sentence.” James v. State, 264 So. 3d 982, 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (quoting Johnson v. State, 948 So. 2d 1014, 1017 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)). Those decisions control our disposition in this case. We must reverse Sibrun’s sentences and remand for resentencing before a different judge. See id. (citation omitted).

We also note that the First District recently reached a contrary result. See Davis v. State, 268 So. 3d 958, 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (en banc), rev. granted, No. SC19-716, 2019 WL 2427789 (Fla. June 11, 2019) (“We hold that a trial judge does not violate a defendant’s due process rights by merely considering the defendant’s lack of remorse or refusal to accept responsibility. We hold that lack of remorse and refusal to accept responsibility can be valid sentencing considerations when sentencing within the statutory range, and we recede from our cases that suggest otherwise.”). We certify conflict with the First District’s decision in Davis.

Reversed and remanded for resentencing; conflict certified.

LEVINE, C.J., GERBER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

2

Footnotes
1 In St. Val v. State, 958 So. 2d 1146, 1146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), this Court rejected the contention that a sentencing judge may never take a defendant’s lack of remorse into consideration when imposing sentence. But the facts in that case are not relevant here. The consideration of remorse is appropriate in other circumstances, see, e.g., § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla. Stat. (2019), but those circumstances are also not present in this case.

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