FRANK JEROME EVANS
v.
STATE
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When a trial court determines that an initial Rule 3.850 postconviction relief motion is legally insufficient, it abuses its discretion by denying the motion without granting the defendant at least one opportunity to amend.
[1] When a trial court determines that an initial Rule 3.850 postconviction relief motion is legally insufficient, the court must enter a nonfinal, nonappealable order allowi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when a defendant's initial rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief is determined to be legally insufficient for failure to meet either the rule's or other pleading requirements, the trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to allow the defendant at least one opportunity to amend the motion”
From Spera v. State, cited with approval by the court
Frank Jerome Evans, after his conviction and sentence for aggravated battery became final, filed a postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Crimina…
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MILLER, J.
UPON CONFESSION OF ERROR
After his conviction and sentence for aggravated battery became final,
appellant, Frank Jerome Evans, filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging a myriad of claims, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Evans v.
State, 255 So. 3d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. While the motion remained pending, Evans timely sought to amend, asserting two new claims. See
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(e) (“A motion may . . . be amended at any time prior to either the entry of an order disposing of the motion or the entry of an order pursuant to subdivision (f)(5) or directing that an answer to the motion be filed pursuant to (f)(6),
whichever occurs first.”). Citing facial insufficiency, the court denied the original motion, along with the motion for leave to amend and a subsequent motion for rehearing, by way of separate orders.
Upon the State’s proper and commendable confession of error, along with our own independent review of the record, we discern error in the failure below to adhere to “the procedure outlined in Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2007) when determining that an initial motion for post-conviction relief is legally insufficient.”
Juarez v. State, 215 So. 3d 89, 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). Under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850(f)(2), “[i]f the motion is insufficient on its face, and the motion is timely filed under this rule, the court shall enter a nonfinal, nonappealable order allowing the defendant [sixty] days to amend the motion.”
2 Here, the summary denial of relief, without granting leave to amend,
constituted an abuse of discretion. See Spera, 971 So. 2d at 761 (“[W]hen a defendant’s initial rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief is determined to be legally insufficient for failure to meet either the rule’s or other pleading requirements, the trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to allow the defendant at least one opportunity to amend the motion.”). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
3
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2007)
- Gerson Juarez v. State, 215 So. 3d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
- Evans v. State, 255 So. 3d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)