EUGENE T. TURNEY, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
MARGARET S. TURNEY, APPELLEE
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A husband can be required to pay a portion of his wife's attorney fees in a divorce action, even if the wife has independent means, provided the husband is financially able and the award is reasonable.
Following a divorce, the trial court ordered the husband to pay two-thirds of the wife's attorney fees. The parties had a significant property settlem…
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The two questions presented on this appeal relate to the liability of the husband for his wife’s attorney fees and the reasonableness of the award.
A suit for divorce was filed by the husband. The wife answered and counterclaimed for divorce. During the pendency of the suit, the parties arrived at a property settlement1 which showed the husband to be worth $880,000 with an annual income of $25,000, and the wife to be worth $460,000 with a $10,000 annual income. The husband withdrew his complaint and the wife was granted a divorce. The decree fixed $9,600 as a reasonable fee for the wife’s attorneys and ordered the husband to pay two-thirds of the fee.
Appellant argues that it is essential that the wife show need, and inability to pay attorney fees, in order to justify requiring the husband to pay such fees. The contention lacks merit. The cases relied on by appellant2 stand for the proposition that it was not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to allow attorney fees to a wife who was able to pay them. Those cases are not to be regarded as authority for the proposition that it would be an abuse of discretion to allow attorney fees to such a wife who could pay them, where she sues or defends a divorce suit in good faith against a husband who is also fully able to pay.3 See Kleinschmidt v. Kleinschmidt, Fla.1953, 66 So.2d 815; 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 222d. In Kleinschmidt, supra, the court affirmed an allowance of attorney fees to a wife whose assets exceeded $200,000 plus a substantial income. In the text of Corpus Juris Secundum as cited above, it was said (at p.972):
“According to some authority, the fact that the wife has sufficient funds to bear the expenses of suit does not as a matter of law require that the court deny an allowance of fees against a husband who is able to pay; and it has been held that notwithstanding the wife is possessed of independent means, the *85question of her right to obtain suit money still rests in the discretion of the court and an allowance may or may not be allowed according to the circumstances. So a wife who in good faith defends a suit for divorce may be entitled to recover counsel fees on the ground that they are ‘necessaries’ regardless of whether she has property sufficient to pay such fees.
“The court need not apply the same standard in determining whether a sum for expenses of suit is necessary as it applies in determining a wife’s right to alimony pendente lite, and it may allow counsel fees although the wife’s financial circumstances are such as not to authorize the allowance of alimony pendente lite.”
The financial abilities of the parties are important factors, to be considered along with other circumstances of the case, in the awarding of fees for a wife’s attorneys in a divorce suit. In the instant case, where the husband was shown to have an estate of more than three quarters of a million dollars and a substantial annual income, it was not an abuse of discretion for the chancellor to require him to pay a large part of the wife’s attorney fees even though she was financially able to pay them herself. Compare Dempsey v. Dempsey, 154 Fla. 728, 19 So.2d 52.
Appellant’s contention that the fee allowed was excessive is not well founded. It was within the range of the testimony presented by the wife, both as to amount and the hours of work on which it was based. The husband offered no evidence thereon. The fee is not shown on the record to be excessive, and the appellant has not carried the burden of demonstrating that the allowance was a clear abuse of discretion. Pross v. Pross, Fla.1954, 72 So.2d 671, 673; Lauderdale v. Lauderdale, Fla.App.1957, 96 So.2d 663, 665.
For the reasons stated the decree appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Cited By (16 total)
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Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…his possession of non-liquid, non-income producing assets. Bencomo v. Bencomo, 195 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 179 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); Arrington v. Arrington, 150 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); Turney v. Turney, 149 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). The wife unquestionably has the financial ability to pay for the fee. The attorneys for the husband spent one hundred working hours preparing the case herein plus twenty more hours of associate and law clerk time. The case was a…
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Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 179 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)…the law, which really is that the award of suit money rests within the discretion of the chancellor. Markland v. Markland, 1945, 155 Fla. 629, 21 So. 2d 145. Squarely in point with the situation here presented is Turney v. Turney, Fla.App. 3, 1963, 149 So. 2d 83, in which the husband sued the wife for divorce with the wife answering and counterclaiming for a divorce. A property settlement reached during the suit showed that the husband was worth $880,000.00 with an annual income of $25,000.00, while the wif…
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Fisher v. Fisher, 184 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, Fla.App.1965, 179 So. 2d 592, 596; Arrington v. Arrington, Fla.App.1963, 150 So. 2d 473; and Turney v. Turney, Fla.App.1963, 149 So. 2d 83. SHANNON, Acting C. J., and HOB-SON and PIERCE, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Floyd v. Addie Hunton Floyd, 91 Fla. 910 (Fla. 1926)
- Pross v. Pross, 72 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1954)
- Lauderdale v. Lauderdale, 96 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957)
- Markland v. Markland, 155 Fla. 629 (Fla. 1945)
- Kleinschmidt v. Kleinschmidt, 66 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1953)
- McFARLIN v. McFARLIN, 75 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1954)
- Shepard v. Shepard, 128 Fla. 72 (Fla. 1937)
- Dempsey v. Dempsey, 154 Fla. 728 (Fla. 1944)