PABLO DIAZ
v.
STATE
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A trial court properly imposes minimum mandatory sentences under the PRR Act when the State proves by a preponderance of evidence that a defendant committed one of the enumerated offenses within three years of release from a state correctional facility.
[1] A defendant qualifies for sentencing under the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act if the defendant commits one of the enumerated offenses within three years afte…
[2] Imposing a Prisoner Releasee Reoffender sentence is mandatory once the State proves that the defendant qualifies.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Imposing a PRR sentence is mandatory once the State proves that the defendant qualifies.”
The court cited Foulks v. State for the principle that PRR sentencing is mandatory upon proof of qualification.
Pablo Diaz was convicted of aggravated battery and armed kidnapping. The trial court found by preponderance of evidence that Diaz had been released fr…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Opinion filed February 17, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D20-1590 Lower Tribunal No. 03-16995
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Pablo Diaz,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jose L. Fernandez, Judge. Pablo Diaz, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before EMAS, C.J., and FERNANDEZ, and MILLER, JJ. MILLER, J. Pablo Diaz appeals the denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Notwithstanding the facial insufficiency of the motion, in the proceedings below, the State timely filed written notice of its intent to seek enhanced sentencing under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2003), and, after a jury returned a verdict of guilty, a sentencing hearing was convened where the preponderance of the evidence established Diaz had been released from prison for his manslaughter conviction within three years of committing the qualifying offenses of aggravated battery and armed kidnapping. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a)(1); § 775.082(9)(a)(1)(i), Fla. Stat.; § 775.082(9)(a)(1)(k), Fla. Stat.; § 775.087(2)(a)(1)(f), Fla. Stat.; § 775.087(2)(a)(1)(g), Fla. Stat.; Fitzpatrick v. State, 868 So. 2d 615, 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (“[A] defendant qualifies for sentencing under the P[risoner] R[eleasee] R[eoffender Punishment] Act if the defendant commits one of the enumerated offenses, . . . ‘within [three] years after being released from a state correctional facility’ or another qualifying institution.”) (citation omitted). Consequently, the trial court properly imposed the minimum mandatory sentences Diaz challenged by way of his motion.1 See Foulks v. State, 306 So. 3d 1178, 1182 (Fla. 3d
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Fitzpatrick v. State, 868 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Jones v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)