VEDRICK LAMONTE SYMONETTE

v.

STATE

Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed February 24, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D19-1170 Lower Tribunal No. 18-22714

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Vedrick Lamonte Symonette,

Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Diane Ward, Judge. Eugene F. Zenobi, Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Third Region, and Jacqueline Rae Brandt, Assistant Regional Counsel, for appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before LOGUE, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ. GORDO, J. Vedrick Lamonte Symonette appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence in support of his alibi defense.¹ We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(A). Because Symonette failed to properly authenticate and lay the foundation required by the Florida Evidence Code for the documents he sought to introduce, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling and affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Prior to trial, Symonette advised the court that he wished to waive his right to counsel and represent himself. The court conducted an extensive Faretta2 inquiry, granted Symonette’s request to proceed to trial without further continuances and set a trial date. A month before the trial date, Symonette filed a “Notice of Alibi,” stating that he was actually innocent, was ready for trial, and would be calling no witnesses. Twice more before trial, the trial judge offered Symonette appointed counsel and conducted Faretta

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Every American has a constitutional right to represent himself where he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. Personal liberties, such as the right to self-representation, “are not rooted in the law of averages.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834. “The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage.” Id. “[A] defendant does not need to possess the technical legal knowledge of an attorney before being permitted to proceed pro se. . . . ‘[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself.’” State v. Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248, 251 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Hill v. State, 688 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla. 1996)) (internal quotation omitted).

There are, however, “dangers and disadvantages” associated with self-representation. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. “Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” Id. (quoting Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). “And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’” Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). “It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts. But where the defendant will not voluntarily accept representation by counsel, the potential advantage of a lawyer’s training and experience can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly.”⁵ Id. “When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.” Id. at 835. Here, Symonette repeatedly chose to waive his constitutional right to counsel and proceed with self-representation despite the trial court’s statements that there were dangers involved in doing so. His courtappointed standby counsel was present at all times, seated behind him, but Symonette elected to proceed with trying the case himself. In fact, he proceeded to trial against standby counsel’s advice that the case should be continued to conduct further investigation of several issues. When a defendant voluntarily and intelligently decides to undertake his own representation, it is not the trial court’s responsibility to stand in place of his attorney. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183–84 (1984). Indeed, when conducting a Faretta colloquy, the trial court may not even inquire into whether the defendant can “provide himself with a substantively qualitative defense” because the defendant can choose “to sit mute and mount no defense at all.” Bowen, 698 So. 2d at 251 (citation omitted).