DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES
v.
HUGH FRANCIS QUINN, III
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Hugh Francis Quinn III's license was suspended after he refused a breath test following a traffic stop initiated based on an anonymous tip. The circuit court quashed the suspension, finding the anonymous tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability without independent corroboration. The concurring opinion agrees the circuit court misapplied Navarette v. California but affirms the denial of certiorari due to the limited scope of review available for second-tier petitions.
The court concurs in denying the second-tier petition for writ of certiorari, though the concurring opinion indicates the circuit court misapplied Navarette's standard. While the circuit court's factual application of the law may have been erroneous, certiorari review is restricted and does not extend to cases involving mere misapplication of law to facts.
[1] A writ of certiorari is not available to correct a lower court's misapplication of substantive law to undisputed or disputed facts; such errors are remedied through direc…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a decision made according to the form of the law and the rules prescribed for rendering it, although it may be erroneous in its conclusion as applied to the facts, is not an illegal or irregular act of proceeding remedial by certiorari.”
The concurrence quoting established certiorari doctrine to explain why the petition must be denied despite the circuit court's apparent error.
Police received an anonymous tip and stopped Quinn while operating a motor vehicle. Quinn refused to submit to a breath test, resulting in license sus…
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I concur in the denial of the second-tier petition for writ of certiorari. After the police received an anonymous tip, Hugh Francis Quinn, III, was stopped while operating a motor vehicle. He refused to submit to a breath test and the state suspended his license. The circuit court granted his petition for writ of certiorari and quashed the license suspension after it concluded his refusal to submit to the breath test was not incident to a lawful stop and arrest.
After analyzing Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014), and focusing on cases predating Navarette, the circuit court held that “under the totality of the circumstances . . . the anonymous tip lacked a sufficient indicia of reliability, and, as a result, independent corroboration by law enforcement was necessary to give law enforcement the reasonable suspicion necessary to perform a stop.”
In dissent, Judge Coates concluded that this case fits within Navarette’s holding. He stated that he “would hold that under the totality of the circumstances, the anonymous caller’s tip had a sufficient indicia of reliability as to provide law enforcement with the reasonable suspicion necessary to perform a lawful traffic stop without the need of any independent corroboration.”
I agree with Judge Coates. As Justice Scalia explained in his dissent in Navarette, Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court in Navarette created a “new rule.” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 405 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Grant v. State, 139 So. 3d 415, 418 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (Orfinger, J., concurring) (“[Navarette] may have altered what we previously believed was well settled law governing when law enforcement officers may stop someone based on an anonymous tip.”). At a minimum, Judge Coates was correct that the circuit court’s majority opinion misapplied the new rule announced in Navarette to the facts of this case.
But that is not enough to grant the petition. Our review is restricted and does not allow us to grant a petition for writ of certiorari just because the circuit court incorrectly applied the facts of the case to the law. See, e.g., Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 525 (Fla. 1995) (“[A] decision made according to the form of the law and the rules prescribed for rendering it, although it may be erroneous in its conclusion as applied to the facts, is not an illegal or irregular act of proceeding remedial by certiorari.”).
If this were a direct appeal, I would reach the same conclusion as Judge Coates and affirm the county court’s order. But this is not a direct appeal and our review is limited. So I concur in the court’s denial of the second-tier petition for writ of certiorari.
* * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Leila Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995)
- Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. 2010)
- Navarette v. California., 134 S. Ct. 1683 (U.S. 2014)
- Thaddeus Xavius Grant v. State, 139 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)