VIRGINIA GIBLIN, PETITIONER,
v.
THE CITY OF CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a police officer's stop and detention of Giblin within Coral Gables constituted a lawful arrest as a matter of law, making her false imprisonment claim fail. The court's decision addresses the requirements for a lawful arrest and whether the absence of formal verbal notification of arrest intent defeats an otherwise valid arrest.
The court held that as a matter of law, the arrest in Coral Gables was lawful. The officer effected an arrest when he compelled Giblin to stop the vehicle and undertook to keep her in custody, independent of any formal verbal admonition. The question of whether an arrest was lawfully made is a legal question for the court, not a jury question.
“When detention by an officer follows immediately on commission of an overt act of criminality or illegality, the offender must be aware, without formality, of his purpose to arrest.”
Establishes that formal verbal communication of arrest intent is not required when detention follows immediately on criminal conduct
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGiblin was apprehended by a police officer in Coral Gables who compelled her to stop a vehicle she was driving and detained her pending resolution of …
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This cause has been certified to us by the District Court of Appeal, Third District, as one which passes upon a question of great public interest.1 Such certification extends our scope of review of this controversy to a determination of whether the opinion and judgment of the district court is correct.2
The opinion and dissenting opinion in the district court3 set forth the salient facts out of which this controversy arose. Un*562der our expanded scope of review on certified causes, however, we have carefully •considered the disclosures of the record with respect to the facts and our conclusions hereafter stated are predicated upon not only the acceptance of those facts stated in the district court’s opinion which we find in all material particulars correct but also on independent examination of the testimony of the parties appearing in the record here.
The essential facts relating to the apprehension of petitioner in Coral Gables require a finding that she was legally arrested within the corporate limits of the City of Coral Gables and retaken upon escape and immediate pursuit under authority •of Section 901.22. We cannot agree with Judge Pearson’s views expressed in his dissent that the question of whether an arrest was lawfully made was a question to be decided by the jury. It is true, of course, that some of the testimony is in controversy. Uncontroverted material evidence, however, establishes that, as a matter of law, the arrest in Coral Gables was legal. The alleged conflict, as to whether the arresting officer’s parting admonition was directed to petitioner or her husband as they left the original scene, is patently insufficient to raise a jury issue as to whether an arrest was effected at this time in view of the conceded circumstances surrounding their apprehension and detention at the outset. The requirement of communication of the “intention or purpose * * * to effect an arrest” 4 is never construed, so far as we can determine, in a strict or literal sense in a situation such as that at bar.5 In the most technical treatment of the subject the authorities note that “there is no required form of words to announce the purpose to arrest,” and upon the theory that “the law does not require the doing of useless things” it is held that when detention by an officer follows immediately on commission of an overt act of criminality or illegality, the offender must be aware, without formality, of his purpose to arrest.6 The sufficiency of constructive rather than manual apprehension is, of course, well established.
In the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt that when the police officer compelled petitioner to stop the vehicle she was driving and undertook to keep her in his custody at least pending his decision on their dispute, there was effected “an apprehension of such person sufficient to be considered an arrest.” 7 The arrest was, then, as a matter of law effected independent of the officer’s admonitions upon petitioner’s departure with her husband. The record presents no other issue of fact requiring jury determination, and the action for false imprisonment necessarily fails.
The judgment of the district court reversing and remanding the cause for entry of a judgment for the respondent City upon its motion for directed verdict was, for the above reasons, proper and the writ should be discharged.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, C. J., and DREW, O’CON-NELL and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.
THOMAS and THORNAL, JJ., concur specially.
TERRELL, J., dissents.
(concurring).
I concur in the opinion and judgment. I would prefer resting the judgment on the theory announced by the Majority of the District Court of Appeal. However, I find no reason to differ with the disposition of the case announced by the Majority of this Court.
THOMAS, J., concurs.
[*563] THORNAL, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the opinion and judgment. I would prefer resting the judgment on the theory announced by the Majority of the District Court of Appeal. However, I find no reason to differ with the disposition of the case announced by the Majority of this Court.
THOMAS, J., concurs.
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Cited By (11 total)
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State v. Hiram Cazes Parnell, 221 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1969)…te court’s decision may be interpreted as holding that there was no arrest of the defendant’s wife, it is in direct conflict with the decisions of this court in Melton v. State, Fla. 1954, 75 So. 2d 291, and Giblin v. City of Coral Gables, Fla.1963, 149 So. 2d 561. These cases stand for the proposition that [*131] an arrest is "legally made when there is a purpose or intention to effect an arrest, an actual or constructive seizure or detention is made by a person having present power to control the person arr…1 / 2
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State v. Padilla, 235 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)…s to make an arrest at the time their automobile was originally stopped. Melton v. State, Fla.1954, 75 So. 2d 291. These parties were at that time not in custody of the officers but were merely detained. Cf. Giblin v. City of Coral Gables, Fla.1963, 149 So. 2d 561. In People v. Davis, 260 Cal.App.2d 186, 67 Cal.Rptr. 54 (1968), the court said: “It is well established that a police officer in the discharge of his duties may detain and question a person when the circumstances are such as would indicate to a r…
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State v. Whitley, 846 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…ctor, the officer does not have to specifically tell the detained person that he or she is under arrest; all that is required is that the officer’s conduct inform the person that he or she is under arrest. See Kearse; Giblin v. City of Coral Gables, 149 So. 2d 561 (Fla.1963); State v. Rivas[-]Marmol, 679 So. 2d 808, 809 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (citing State v. Coron, 411 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)); see also Elliot v. State, 704 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding that charge of resisting an arrest req…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (U.S. 1959)
- Royal Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1959)
- Griffin v. State, 474 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1985)
- Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1954)
- City OF Coral Gables v. Giblin, 127 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)