ARCH INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
KUBICKI DRAPER, LLP
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An insurer appealed a summary judgment dismissing its legal malpractice action against counsel hired to represent its insured, claiming lack of standing due to absence of privity. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the Fourth District Court of Appeal's original decision, holding that an insurer with a contractual subrogation provision has standing to maintain a malpractice action against counsel hired to represent its insured when the insurer has a duty to defend.
The insurer has standing to maintain a legal malpractice action against counsel hired to represent its insured where the insurer is contractually subrogated to the insured's rights under the insurance policy and has a duty to defend.
[1] An insurer may pursue a legal malpractice claim against counsel representing the insured by invoking contractual subrogation rights, notwithstanding the absence of a dire…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArch Insurance Company hired Kubicki Draper, LLP to represent its insured in litigation. The insurer subsequently filed a legal malpractice action aga…
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Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Patti Englander Henning, Judge; L.T. Case No. 08 25361 (26).
Benjamin J. Biard and Brittany P. Borck of Winget Spadafora Schwartzberg, LLP, Miami, and Frank A. Shepherd and Lesley-Anne Marks of GrayRobinson, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
Christopher J. Lynch and Steven K. Hunter of Hunter & Lynch, Coral Gables, for appellee.
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA GERBER, J.
In our original opinion, Arch Insurance Co. v. Kubicki Draper, LLP, 266 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (“Arch I”), we affirmed the circuit court’s final judgment granting the appellee law firm’s motion for summary judgment, on the ground that the insurer lacked standing to maintain a legal malpractice action against the law firm hired to represent its insured, because the insurer was not in privity with the law firm. Id. at 1215. We also certified to our supreme court the following question of great public importance: “Whether an insurer has standing to maintain a malpractice action against counsel hired to represent the insured where the insurer has a duty to defend.” Id.
On review, our supreme court rephrased the certified question as follows: “Whether the insurer has standing through its contractual subrogation provision to maintain a malpractice action against counsel hired to represent the insured where the insurer has a duty to defend.” Arch Insurance Co. v. Kubicki Draper, LLP, 46 Fla. L. Weekly S155, 2021 WL 2232083, at *1 (Fla. June 3, 2021) (“Arch II”). After concluding that “the insurer has standing to maintain a legal malpractice action against counsel hired to represent its insured where the insurer is contractually subrogated to the insured’s rights under the insurance policy,” our supreme court answered the rephrased certified question in the affirmative, quashed Arch I, and remanded for proceedings consistent with Arch II. Id. at *5.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court’s final judgment granting the appellee law firm’s motion for summary judgment, and remand for proceedings consistent with Arch II.
Reversed and remanded. FORST and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur. * * *
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- Arch Ins. Co. v. Kubicki Draper, LLP, 266 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)