HORACIO SEQUEIRA
v.
GATE SAFE INC.
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Florida Statute § 218.077(2) preempts political subdivisions from establishing minimum wage requirements that conflict with state or federal wage requirements.
[1] Florida Statute § 218.077(2) expressly preempts political subdivisions from establishing minimum wage requirements that conflict with state or federal wage law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 218.077(2) of the Florida Statutes is a preemption statute that expressly prohibits political subdivisions of the state from establishing a minimum wage contrary to state or federal wage requirements.”
Court citing Ultra Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Clemente to explain the scope of Florida's preemption doctrine.
Horacio Sequeira brought an action against Gate Safe Inc. regarding wage and employment matters. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of …
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PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Ultra Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Clemente, 272 So. 3d 426, 428 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“Section 218.077(2) of the Florida Statutes is a preemption statute that expressly prohibits political subdivisions of the state from establishing a minimum wage contrary to state or federal wage requirements.”); see also Valderrama v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 972 So. 2d 239, 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“A movant for summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Landers v. Milton, 370 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1979)).
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Authorities Cited
- Irving W. Landers et ux. v. Adelle L. Milton, 370 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1979)
- Valderrama v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 972 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)