LYLE SCOTT, PETITIONER,

v.

NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, RESPONDENT

DREW, Justice.

Petitioner seeks review of a district court decision1 on the ground of direct conflict with Mountain v. National Airlines.2

The issue of law common to both cases concerns the legal effect of an employment contract, providing for grievance procedures after discharge for cause, upon an employee’s right of action at law for damages for wrongful discharge. We are convinced by an examination of the Mountain decision that its determination of this issue, hereinafter quoted, was not, as contended by respondent, obiter dictum,3 but was essential to the ultimate conclusion that *238declaratory relief could not in that situation be accorded:

“This proposition [that jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board to make an initial ruling was exclusive and allegation of exhaustion of administrative remedies therefore indispensable] is unquestionably correct if the plaintiff, having been discharged, elects to challenge the validity of his discharge, seeking reinstatement and back pay. Instead of doing this, however, he may elect to accept the action which discharged him as final, thereby ceasing to be an employee * * * and bring suit claiming damages for breach of contract.” (Emphasis supplied.)4

The unmistakable holding of this Court in that case was that an employee under contracts of this nature 5 may elect to sue for wrongful discharge without pursuing his contractual remedies. The conclusion, as a matter of contract construction, was that such an employee has an election of remedies on the inconsistent theories of contest or acceptance of the discharge.6 The decision there, that the employee who sought a declaration of his rights without invoking contract procedures could not obtain such relief in the absence of a clear election, necessarily rests on a determination that the employee had the right of election in that factual situation, where he obviously had not pursued his contractual or administrative remedies. While the opinion does *239not elaborate the distinctions between this situation and those ordinarily requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies,7 it nevertheless holds that a discharged employee must make an election which will close one avenue of relief or the other, thus ruling out the possibility of instituting suit at law after pursuing or exhausting grievance procedures, and negativing the applicability of the “exhaustion” rule.

Respondent in this case seeks to sustain the decision below by citation of authority to show that “By any yardstick — numbers, population, industrial development or prestige of the court- — the 'weight of authority’ requires an employee to pursue the remedies afforded by a collective agreement in lieu of common law action for wrongful discharge.” Whatever differences in contract language, reasoning, or law may have prompted certain decisions, there presently exists a division of authority between the courts, some holding that pursuit of grievance procedures is a condition precedent to suit8 or “that a fair interpretation of the contract is that the provisions with respect to grounds for discharge are confined in their implementation to the plan of arbitrament established by the contract,” 9 others allowing resort to action at law at the outset.10

The decision in the case at bar, placed squarely on the “exhaustion” principle, would align with the cases first cited. But it is by no means clear from a reading of these opinions whether, as implied by reliance on theories of exhaustion of remedies as a condition precedent, the courts intend that suit for damages might be instituted after pursuing all contract remedies or whether in actuality their decision is that contract procedures supplant the remedy at law for damages. Either pronouncement necessarily conflicts with the position taken by this Court in the Mountain case, supra, that the employee has an election of remedies. Since the problem, fundamentally, is one of construing contract terms, and these provisions are in any event susceptible of clarification or restatement to express the parties’ intent, we are not persuaded of the necessity for departure from the construction given these terms by our earlier decision. To the extent therefore that the opinion in this case relegates petitioner to contract grievance procedures-either in lieu of or as a condition precedent to suit, it must stand revised.

We conclude, however, that the complaint was properly dismissed and the affirmance of that order should be sustained for the reason that, by challenging the va*240lidity of his discharge and invoking procedures for hearing under the contract, the employee in this case elected his remedy and could not thereafter assume the inconsistent position required by this suit. Applicability of this doctrine is controlled not by contract clauses which specify the point in grievance procedure at which abandonment is expressly made final and binding, but instead by the initial action taken in challenge rather than acceptance of the discharge. The dismissal of the complaint in this cause is therefore sustained on this ground, and the writ should accordingly be discharged.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL, THOMAS and THORNAL, JJ., concur.