ASHBIL D. GILL
v.
ALEXANDER PARVEZ
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Ashbil Gill and Erma Jacov appealed a default final judgment entered against them in an eviction action filed by landlord Alexander Parvez. The trial court struck the Gills' answer and entered default judgment after they failed to pay accrued rent into the court registry, despite the complaint not alleging nonpayment as a basis for eviction. The court affirmed, finding the trial court properly applied Florida's statutory scheme requiring rent payment or a motion for rent determination when a tenant interposes defenses other than payment.
The court affirmed the trial court's decision to strike the answer and enter a default final judgment. Under Florida Statute § 83.60(2), when a tenant interposes any defense other than payment in a possession action, the tenant must pay accrued rent into the court registry or promptly seek a judicial determination of rent; failure to do so constitutes an absolute waiver of all defenses other than payment and entitles the landlord to immediate default judgment.
[1] In a landlord-tenant possession action, a tenant who asserts any defense other than payment must either pay all accrued rent into the court registry or promptly move for…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if the tenant interposes any defense other than payment, including, but not limited to, the defense of a defective 3-day notice, the tenant shall pay into the registry of the court the accrued rent as alleged in the complaint or as determined by the court and the rent that accrues during the pendency of the proceeding, when due.”
Court quoting Florida Statute § 83.60(2) to explain the statutory requirement triggering the payment obligation
Landlord Alexander Parvez filed an eviction complaint against tenants Ashbil Gill and Erma Jacov based on lease violations and alleged violations of a…
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Opinion filed December 15, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________ No. 3D21-0796 Lower Tribunal No. 21-1719 CC ________________ Ashbil D. Gill, et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
Alexander Parvez, et al., Appellees.
An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Patricia Marino Pedraza, Judge. Ashbil D. Gill, in proper person. No appearance, for appellees. Before SCALES, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ. BOKOR, J.
Ashbill Gill and Erma Jacov (“the Gills”) appeal the entry of a default final judgment entered against them in an eviction action. Additionally, the Gills contend that the trial court erred in granting landlord Alexander Parvez’s motion to strike the answer for failure to pay rent into the registry. Upon review of the record on appeal, we find no error with the trial court’s granting of the motion to strike, entry of default, or default final judgment.
Parvez filed a complaint against the Gills, seeking eviction. See § 83.59(2), Fla. Stat. (2020) (“A landlord, the landlord’s attorney, or the landlord’s agent, applying for the removal of a tenant, shall file in the county court of the county where the premises are situated a complaint describing the dwelling unit and stating the facts that authorize its recovery.”). The complaint alleged violations of the terms of the lease agreement as well as specifically alleging violations of the rules and regulations of the association, including allegations of “Ashbill Gill, Defendant, destroying a tree in the common area, [and] yelling profanity at a neighbor.” However, there was no claim for nonpayment of rent. To the contrary, the complaint explained that “[r]ent is not a factor.”
The Gills answered the complaint, claiming that they were entitled to a cure period.1 Parvez moved to strike the answer and for a default, claiming that the Gills had neither paid the requested rent into the court registry nor moved for a determination of rent to be paid. The trial court granted the motion, and the Gills timely appealed.
The relevant statute explains that in a possession action by a landlord, “if the tenant interposes any defense other than payment, including, but not limited to, the defense of a defective 3-day notice, the tenant shall pay into the registry of the court the accrued rent as alleged in the complaint or as determined by the court and the rent that accrues during the pendency of the proceeding, when due.” § 83.60(2), Fla. Stat. (2020).
While rent was “not a factor” in Parvez’s seeking eviction, the relevant statutory scheme still requires payment of rent as it becomes due, or promptly seeking a determination of rent due from the trial court. Failure to comply “constitutes an absolute waiver of the tenant’s defenses other than 1 Section 83.56(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2020), explains that when a tenant fails to comply with material provisions of their rental agreement, “[i]f such noncompliance is of a nature that the tenant should not be given an opportunity to cure it or if the noncompliance constitutes a subsequent or continuing noncompliance within 12 months of a written warning by the landlord of a similar violation,” the landlord may “deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the noncompliance and the landlord’s intent to terminate the rental agreement by reason thereof.” The notice here appears to seek eviction based on noncompliance without an opportunity to cure.
payment, and the landlord is entitled to an immediate default judgment for removal of the tenant with a writ of possession to issue without further notice or hearing thereon.” Id. The record contains no claim of payment by the Gills. Therefore, without more, we conclude that the striking of pleadings and entry of default and default final judgment complied with the statutory scheme.
Affirmed.