SAMUEL LEE BAKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Baker was convicted of operating a gambling house based on evidence obtained from a search warrant issued on an affidavit signed by R. Brown. The court reversed the conviction, holding that when a defendant challenges whether the affiant actually exists and the State refuses to identify or produce the affiant, the evidence must be suppressed because the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right is violated.
The court held that evidence obtained from a search warrant must be suppressed when the defendant challenges the existence of the affiant, the State refuses to identify or produce the affiant, and no other evidence supports the conviction. The confidential informant privilege does not apply to protect the identity of one who executes an affidavit initiating a criminal proceeding, as this would violate the Sixth Amendment confrontation right.
“There is a fundamental principle of judicial process that one accused of a crime is entitled to be confronted by his accuser.”
Establishes the constitutional foundation for the reversal—the Sixth Amendment confrontation right
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA search warrant was issued based on an affidavit signed by R. Brown pursuant to Florida statute § 933.18. The defendant moved to quash the search war…
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The appellant, defendant in the trial court, appeals a judgment and conviction of operating a gambling house contrary to the statutes of this State.
The affidavit which supported the search warrant in this case was issued upon certain assertions made by one R. Brown, pursuant to the provisions of § 933.18, Fla. Stat., F.S.A.1 By appropriate proceedings, the defendant moved to quash the search warrant and suppress the evidence obtained thereunder, averring that there was in fact no such person and further moved the State Attorney, by an appropriate motion, for a bill of particulars seeking a full disclosure of information relative to the said R. Brown. The several motions were denied by the trial court and the appellant was tried and convicted upon evidence obtained as a result of the aforesaid search warrant.2
There is a fundamental principle of judicial process that one- accused of a *730crime is entitled to be confronted by his accuser. See: U.S.Const. Amend. VI; Fla.Const., Declaration of Rights, § 11, F. S.A. The failure of the trial judge to require the State to disclose such information as it had relative to R. Brown, the individual who signed the affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued, vitiated ail evidence obtained thereunder. The conviction and sentence will be reversed upon the established principle that illegally obtained evidence by virtue of a defective search warrant may not be used to secure a conviction. See Cooper v. State, 106 Fla. 254, 143 So. 217; Hogan v. Carlton, 112 Fla. 442, 150 So. 604; 13 Fla.Jur., Evidence, § 180. Even though the judge who issued the search warrant may have been justified in issuing the warrant upon the affidavit, at the time it was called to the attention of the trial court [both in the motion to quash and suppress and in the motion for a bill of particulars], an issue was made as to the “credibility” of the affiant who set in motion the search and subsequent criminal proceedings. It was then incumbent upon the trial judge to require the State to reveal such facts as it had relative to the said R. Brown. See: Byers v. State, Fla. App.1959, 109 So.2d 382. The State urges that it was protected in failing to disclose any information relative to the affiant; that the trial court was well within its discretion in refusing to compel disclosure because it was averred that the said R. Brown was a confidential informant. See: Chacon v. State, Fla.1957, 102 So.2d 578; Harrington v. State, Fla.App.1959, 110 So. 2d 495; Garcia v. State, Fla.App.1959, 110 So.2d 709; State v. Hardy, Fla.App.1959, 114 So.2d 344. It is true that it has been held in this State that the prosecution may not always be required to reveal the name of a confidential informant, but this rule should not be applicable where a so-called alleged “confidential informant” actually executes the affidavit which is the initial instrument which sets in motion what ultimately results in a criminal proceeding. To expand the rule protecting “confidential informant” to protect one who actually executes an affidavit in accordance with § 933.18, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., supra, would do violence to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions previously referred to.
Therefore, we hold that the evidence obtained upon the search warrant [issued as a result of an affidavit made by the said R Brown] should be suppressed upon the motion made by the defendant, he having traversed the allegation that there was in fact such person, and the State having refused to identify or produce the affiant. The record failing to have any evidence other than that obtained by the aforesaid search warrant, it lacks the necessary ingredients to sustain the conviction of the appellant and, therefore, the judgment and sentence is hereby reversed for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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State v. Zamora, 534 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…e state calls the confidential informant as a witness at trial, Hassberger v. State, 350 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1977), or where the informant executes the affidavit upon which a search warrant is issued for the search of the defendant’s home, Baker v. State, 150 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963), or where the confidential informant is a defense witness at trial, and the defendant seeks to cross examine a police officer concerning the informant’s identity and active involvement in the charged illegal drug transaction, Smit…
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State v. LaBRON, 24 So. 3d 715 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment, places severe restrictions on the privilege of nondisclosure.”) (footnote and citations omitted); (3) if the informant’s affidavit supports the issuance of a search warrant, Baker v. State, 150 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963) (reversing conviction, and holding that trial court’s failure to require state to disclose information concerning individual who signed affidavit for search warrant vitiated evidence obtained under it); or (4) if the informant is…
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City OF Miami v. Jones, 165 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)…the Court that Appellant’s Point III on appeal is well taken, and that the Court below erred in denying Defendant’s motion to produce the name of the alleged informer, alleged lottery ticket itself, and date of alleged purchase; see Baker v. State, 150 So. 2d 729, (1963) Section 909.15, Florida Statute (1961), and the Court being fully advised, it is “CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the judgment of conviction of the Municipal Court of the City of Miami, Florida against the said Appellant-Defendant, C…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Robertson v. State, 94 Fla. 770 (Fla. 1927)
- Harrison v. Simpson, 106 Fla. 254 (Fla. 1932)
- Harrington v. State, 110 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
- Edelmira Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1957)
- State v. Hardy, 114 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
- Gus Garcia v. State, 110 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)
- Caretha Byers v. State, 109 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)
- Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brabham, 112 Fla. 361 (Fla. 1933)
- Alexander v. Dahlberg, 112 Fla. 442 (Fla. 1933)