MOISES SANCHEZ, JR.
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The conviction for incest must be reversed due to two errors: (1) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of more than one act of intercourse without establishing a controverted issue, and (2) the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury that the prosecutrix's testimony was subject to the accomplice testimony rule, which requires that intercourse could not have occurred without her consent.
[1] In a prosecution for incest, evidence of multiple acts of intercourse is reversible error when the defendant does not contest the occurrence of intercourse and the additi…
[2] When a prosecutrix in an incest case testifies to resisting one act of intercourse, the jury must be specifically instructed that such resistance does not exempt her test…
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“”
Court's holding that multiple act evidence was improper and served no controverted issue.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant, a Black man, was accused of incest with his 15-year-old stepdaughter, Lucile Carter, with the alleged offense occurring on August 6, 19…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Burglary Statute Construction cases and more on FLexlaw
MORROW, J.
The appellant was convicted of incest. The prosecutrix is his stepdaughter, Lucile Carter, a girl 15 years of age, according to the evidence. The parties are ne- . groes. The date of the offense is laid August 6,1918, and the prosecutrix testified that about that date appellant had intercourse with her. They were together in a wagon. She said that he told her to get straddle of a board. She told him she didn’t want to, and he hit her on the side of the head with his hand, and pulled her up between his legs and had intercourse with her. She testified also that on ■another occasion, two weeks later, they were in the field together, and he just threw her •'down, pulled up her dress, and had intercourse with her. A baby was born on the last day of the year 1918. The one witness testifying about the birth of the child was an old negro woman who claimed to have had experience in such matters. She expressed the opinion that it was a six-months child. She said it was well developed, parts regular • — face, eyes, nose, eyelashes, toenails, and finger nails — nothing wrong except that it was bloody on the top of the hand; said the finger nails were grown out, but not grown out right.
[1] The appellant introduced no evidence, and developed no facts controverting the testimony of the prosecutrix as to the act of intercourse. We discern no valid reason'for introducing evidence of more than one act of intercourse. This was done over the objection of appellant, and we think was error. It served to establish no controverted issue. Brawshaw v. State, 198 S. W. 942.
[2] The prosecutrix lived with her mother, and the record fails to disclose that she made any complaint or outcry at any time. The trial judge submitted to the jury the questioii as to whether her evidence was tq be governed by the rule of accomplice testimony. The appellant requested a more specific charge. We think this request should have been granted, and the jury instructed in such manner that they would understand that the testimony of the prosecutrix, indicating that she was opposed to the first act of intercourse would not exempt her evidence from the rule of accomplice testimony, but that this rule would operate if from the whole evidence it appeared that the act of intercourse could not have'occurred without her consent. See Wingo v. State, 210 S. W. 548, and cases therein referred to.
The errors pointed out require a reversal of the judgment, which is ordered.