AMERICAN FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
SUNNY SOUTH AIRCRAFT SERVICE, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1963-03-13
No. 31870
ROBERTS, C. J., and DREW, O’CON-NELL and HOBSON (Ret.), JJ., concur..
151 So. 2d 276 Florida Supreme Court (1963) Positive Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court resolved conflicting precedent on the mental state required for theft/larceny, holding that intent to permanently deprive the owner of property is an essential element, which can be shown either by direct intent to steal or by intentional conduct creating an unreasonable risk of permanent loss. The Court upheld the District Court of Appeal's reversal of a trial court judgment that found no theft when a passenger forced a pilot to fly to Cuba at gunpoint.


Holding

Intent to steal—the intention to permanently deprive the owner of his property—is an essential element of larceny. This intent exists when a person takes another's property without consent with intent to permanently deprive the owner, or when a person intentionally deals with another's property without consent in a manner creating an unreasonable risk of permanent loss, because every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act.


Key Quotes

“The intention to steal, and that is, feloniously to deprive the owner permanently of his property at the time of the taking, is an essential element in the crime of larceny, and whether such intent existed is a question of fact to be determined by the jury from all the facts of the case.”

Establishes that intent to permanently deprive is an essential element of larceny determined by the jury

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Facts & Procedural History

A qualified pilot leased an aircraft from American Fire and Casualty Company for a charter flight from Fort Lauderdale to Orlando. A passenger forced …

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Opinion of the Court
CALDWELL, Justice.

CALDWELL, Justice.

The petition for writ of certiorari seeks review of the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District,1 alleging direct conflict with decisions of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, and this Court in the following cases: Canada v. State, 139 So.2d 753 (Fla.App.2nd 1962); Williams v. State, 117 So.2d 548 (Fla.App.2nd 1960) ; Groover v. State, 82 Fla. 427, 90 So. 473, 26 A.L.R. 373 (1921); Phoenix Assur. Co., Limited, of London v. Eppstein, 73 Fla. 991, 75 So. 537, L.R.A.1917F, 540 (1917). There is conflict and we have jurisdiction.

The facts of the case appear to be that St. Elmo Raymond Montayne, a qualified pilot, leased the aircraft in question from the appellant corporation for the purpose of transporting a passenger on a charter flight from Fort Lauderdale to Orlando. After becoming airborne, the passenger forced the pilot at gunpoint to depart from the flight plan and to proceed to a directed location in the interior of Cuba. A landing was made in a pasture. The passenger alighted and gave the pilot a telephone number to call upon his return, informing him the people at that number would pay him. The pilot took off to return to the United States. After gaining an altitude of approximately 4,000 feet he was overtaken by a Cuban military aircraft which attacked and damaged the plane by gunfire. He escaped and made a forced landing. Rebel forces hid him and the plane for several days, after which he took off and returned to his point of departure in Broward County.

The trial judge held there was no intent to commit theft at the time possession was taken, there being no evidence to indicate that anyone intended to permanently deprive the plaintiff of the ownership of the aircraft. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed and remanded, holding that: 2

“The trial judge concluded that no theft was established because he viewed the facts to be such as to show an absence of intent on the part of the passenger to permanently deprive the plaintiff of its ownership of the aircraft. Appellant contends correctly that the proper rule to be applied is that a theft results where a natural consequence of the taking is an unreasonable risk of permanent loss to the owner. Thus, in Groover v. State, 82 Fla. 427, 90 So. 473, at 475, 26 A.L.R. 373, the Supreme Court of Florida said: ‘Any taking that may result by a natural and immediate consequence in the entire loss and deprivation of the property to the owner is larceny.’ ”

The troublesome point in this cause is the quality of intent required to support an *278allegation of theft. The conflict between the language of the District Court in the cause under review and that of the Groover,3 Phoenix,4 Canada 5 and Williams6 cases should be reconciled.

No useful purpose can be served by a rehash of the textbook and case discussion on this point. In the Phoenix decision the rule is stated in absolute terms which obviously conflict with the rule announced in the Groover case. It is our conclusion that the substance of the definition followed in the several cases which seemingly conflict but, nevertheless, tend to the same end, should be held to mean that the intention to steal, that is to feloniously deprive the owner permanently of his property, a question of fact to be determined by the jury, is an essential element in the crime of larceny. A taking of the personal property of another, without his consent, with the intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof, or the intentional dealing with the property of another, without his consent, in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of permanent loss, constitutes an intent to steal.

This doctrine recognizes the principles (1) that the intent to steal, animo furandi, requires an intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property and (2) that every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence of his act.

The conclusion of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, is approved and the. writ of certiorari is discharged.

ROBERTS, C. J., and DREW, O’CON-NELL and HOBSON (Ret.), JJ., concur..


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Dunmann, 427 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1983)
    …42 has left section 812.041 with no valid field of operation.* [*169] The intent to permanently deprive an owner of property has previously been recognized as an element of larceny. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sunny South Aircraft Service, Inc., 151 So. 2d 276 (Fla.1963); Hilty v. State, 386 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), review denied, 392 So. 2d 1379 (Fla.1981). Indeed, the intent to permanently deprive has been noted as the distinction between larceny of an automobile and the temporary unauthorized us…
  • Reid v. The Fla. Real Est. Comm'n & George J. Saunders, 188 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
    …andi to sustain a finding of guilt. Maddox v. State, Fla.1948, 38 So. 2d 58; Helton v. State, 1938, 135 Fla. 458, 185 So. 864; Flint v. State, 1940, 143 Fla. 259, 196 So. 619; American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sunny South Aircraft Service, Inc., Fla.1963, 151 So. 2d 276; Rosengarten v. State, Fla.App.1964, 166 So. 2d 183. And the felonious intent must exist at the actual time of the taking. Groover v. State, 1921, 82 Fla. 427, 90 So. 473, 26 A.L.R. 373; Helton v. State, supra. A person otherwise sane and competent…
  • Rosengarten v. State, 171 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
    …enies there included. In short, none of the alternative larcenies were involved in the prior Rosengarten decision and neither were these alternatives involved in the case of American Fire & Casualty Company v. Sunny South Aircraft Service, Fla.1963, 151 So. 2d 276. Affirmed. ANDREWS and KANNER, (RET.) JJ., concur.…

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