ALBERT GHAZZAWIEH AND INSTALLATION CORP. & CONSTRUCTION, LLC
v.
JONY IGLESIAS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A proposal for settlement that conditions acceptance on payment within the relevant 30-day service period does not violate section 768.79, Florida Statutes, or rule 1.442 because tender of payment and written acceptance can be made simultaneously.
[1] A proposal for settlement conditioned upon payment within the relevant service period does not improperly shorten the time for acceptance if payment and acceptance can be…
[2] A proposal for settlement is not invalid solely because it requires payment within the statutory time period for acceptance.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter prevailing at trial, Iglesias obtained an award of attorney's fees pursuant to proposals for settlement that included language conditioning the …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Settlement Proposals cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
After prevailing at trial, Jony Iglesias (Plaintiff below) obtained an award of attorney's fees pursuant to his proposals for settlement. The proposals for settlement included language that "[t]his proposal is conditioned upon payment of this settlement proposal within the relevant 30–day service period." Appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion to strike the proposals for settlement. We affirm.
In their initial brief, Appellants articulate a single basis in support of their argument that the proposals for settlement did not strictly conform to the requirements set forth in section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2017), and Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. Specifically, Appellants contend that the proposals for settlement improperly shortened the 30–day time period for acceptance of a proposal for settlement provided in section 768.79(4), Florida
Statutes (2017), and rule 1.442(f)(1). We reject that argument. As Iglesias correctly observes, a tender of payment and a written acceptance of the proposal for settlement could have been made simultaneously. Thus, we conclude that the proposals for settlement served below did not shorten the time period for acceptance.
Our affirmance of the trial court's order should not be construed as a determination that the proposals for settlement at issue strictly complied with section 768.79 and rule 1.442. Rather, our opinion reflects a rejection of the sole argument made on appeal by Appellants on the issue.
AFFIRMED.
EVANDER, EISNAUGLE and WOZNIAK, JJ., concur.