IRVING STONE, APPELLANT,
v.
FREDA K. STONE, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1963-03-05
No. 62-348
Before PEARSON, TILLMAN, C. J., and BARKDULL and PIENDRY, JJ.
151 So. 2d 301 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1963) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

A husband appeals a decree awarding separate maintenance to his wife under Florida law. The appellate court reverses the decree, finding that although the husband failed to provide support before announcing his departure, the wife's subsequent refusal to reconcile based on health reasons meant she was no longer living apart from him through his fault as required by statute.


Holding

The court held that the husband's failure to make provision before his announced departure from the country satisfied the support requirement. However, the court reversed the decree because the wife's refusal to reconcile based on health reasons, coupled with the husband's repeated offers of unconditional reconciliation after the complaint was filed, meant the wife was not living apart through the husband's fault as required by statute.


Key Quotes

“if the husband at the time of the institution of a suit under § 65.10, Fla.Stat, F.S.A., is not withholding support, such action is not maintainable”

Establishes the requirement that the husband must be failing to support his wife at the time the action is filed

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Facts & Procedural History

The husband and wife, both of substantial means, maintained homes in Toronto and Miami Beach. The wife had received a regular weekly allowance of $150…

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Opinion of the Court
PEARSON, TILLMAN, Chief Judge.

PEARSON, TILLMAN, Chief Judge.

The husband appeals a decree for maintenance of his wife entered pursuant to § 65.10, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. which is entitled “Alimony unconnected with causes of divorce.” 1 He contends that the findings *302of the chancellor (1) that he failed to support his wife and (2) that she was living apart from him through his fault are without support in the record.

A reading of the record in the light most favorable to the conclusions reached by the chancellor establishes that both plaintiff and defendant are people of substantial means. The husband owns a home in Toronto, Canada, but it was their custom to spend the winter season at Miami Beach in a home owned by the wife. Since the time of her marriage to defendant, plaintiff had been receiving a weekly sum of $150 for household expenses. By the wife’s testimony she received a regular allowance check on November 20, 1961, just prior to her departure from Toronto for the couple’s winter home in Miami Beach. This was the last time the regular weekly sum was paid. At this time she also received an extra $100 as expenses for opening the Miami Beach house.

Severe arguments ensued soon after the couple arrived in Miami Beach. On December 2, 1962, the defendant, having previously announced his intention to leave permanently, moved from the house with all of his belongings. Three days later, on December 5th, plaintiff’s complaint was filed and personal service was had upon defendant at a hotel on Miami Beach. Subsequently, he returned to Canada.

The period of time between the husband’s abandonment of the marital home and the service of the complaint in this action was indeed short, and the courts do not look with favor on a race to the courthouse in marital disputes. Further, both this Court and the Supreme Court of Florida have held that if the husband at the time of the institution of a suit under § 65.10, Fla.Stat, F.S.A., is not withholding support, such action is not maintainable. The Supreme Court so held in Close v. Close, 158 Fla. 636, 29 So.2d 625; and this Court held similarly in Perry v. Perry, Fla.App. 1957, 97 So.2d 152. See also Poerschke v. Poerschke, Fla.App.1959, 114 So.2d 30.

In the instant case the husband announced his intention of leaving his wife and terminating the relationship. His further announcement of an intention to leave the country, coupled with the fact that he removed all of his belongings from the home, provides a sufficient basis for the chancellor’s finding that the action of the wife was not so hasty as to preclude her from relief. Therefore, on the question of the husband’s failure to support, we hold that the husband’s failure to make provision before his announced departure from the country was sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute.

Appellant’s second point urges that his offers of reconciliation made after the filing of the complaint show that his wife is not living apart from him through his fault. Section 65.10, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., provides that a wife may obtain separate maintenance under the conditions set forth if she is living with her husband or living apart from him through his fault. In Carson, Florida Law of the Family, Marriage and Divorce 196 (1950), is found the following statement:

“In the one case, that is, suits brought under Section 65.09 of F.S.A. (where grounds for divorce must exist) it is not necessary that the court find that the wife is willing to live with the husband; but in the other case, Section 65.10 of F.S.A., where the provision is that they must be living apart through his fault, it must appear that she is willing to live with him.” [Emphasis supplied.] 2

*303Since plaintiff-wife is not living with her husband, we must determine whether or not she is living apart from him through his fault.

The record contains sufficient, competent evidence to support a finding that plaintiff did not refuse an offer of reconciliation at the time the suit for separate maintenance was filed and was not at that time living apart from her husband through fault of hers. However, the record discloses that subsequent to the filing of the complaint for separate maintenance by the wife, her husband made repeated offers of unconditional reconciliation. At the hearing on the matter, plaintiff was asked whether she was willing to reconcile with her husband. Her refusal was based on her statement that she was not able to do so because she was not well. Considering this in conjunction with the requirement of the statute, it does not appear that plaintiff-appellee is living apart from her husband through his fault. Under the circumstances, it appears that where .a husband desires a reconciliation with his ■estranged wife, the fact that she does not ■consider herself well enough 'to do so takes it out of the category of living apart through his fault. The action not meeting the requirements of the statute under which it was brought (§ 65.10, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.) the decree of the chancellor is reversed except that portion dealing with attorney’s fees which was not involved in this appeal.

Reversed.

ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

Upon the filing of petitions for rehearing by both appellant and appellee, the Court heard argument upon these petitions. After further consideration, we adhere to the opinion of this Court heretofore filed.

BARKDULL, Judge

(dissenting in part).

I would concur with the majority in denying the appellee’s petition, but would grant the appellant’s petition for rehearing.

Other
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Upon the filing of petitions for rehearing by both appellant and appellee, the Court heard argument upon these petitions. After further consideration, we adhere to the opinion of this Court heretofore filed.

Dissent
BARKDULL, Judge

BARKDULL, Judge

(dissenting in part).

I would concur with the majority in denying the appellee’s petition, but would grant the appellant’s petition for rehearing.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Wood v. Wood, 166 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
    …TURGIS, C. J., and RAWLS, J., con-cur. . Cited to support this contention is Poerschke v. Poerschke, Fla.App.1959, 114 So. 2d 30 in which the named factors were said to be those involved in Section 65.09. . In Accord: Stone v. Stone, Fla.App.1963, 151 So. 2d 301, and Perry v. Perry, Fla.App.1957, 97 So. 2d 152.…
  • Lolan Beers v. The Pub. Health Tr. OF Dade Cnty., 468 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
    …act”); Schwarz, 166 So. 2d at 496 (“a husband is not liable for the necessities of the wife where the separation is occasioned by the fault of the wife”). See also Preston; Pitts v. Pitts, 412 So. 2d 404, 405 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Stone v. Stone, 151 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); Bloom. [*1004] Perhaps the majority’s concern is with the term “abandonment” itself and not the concept behind the defense. In my view, the establishment of abandonment would necessarily encompass a consideration of all the equit…
    1 / 3
  • Paris v. Kanella Paris, 232 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Anders v. Anders, 153 Fla. 54, 13 So. 2d 603 (1943); Stone v. Stone, Fla.App.1963, 151 So. 2d 301; Poland v. Poland, Fla.App.1959, 112 So. 2d 588; and Perry v. Perry, Fla.App.1957, 97 So. 2d 152.…

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