ALBERTO YORDANO CORREDOR
v.
GEORGE NICHOLS
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The Corredors appealed a trial court's final order awarding fees and costs to a court-appointed receiver and his counsel. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the substantive fee awards but reversed and remanded because the trial court improperly entered final judgment directly against nonparty Coffey Burlington instead of against the receiver.
The court affirmed all substantive fee awards but reversed the entry of final judgment against nonparty Burlington because a judgment cannot be entered against a party not to the underlying suit. The court remanded with instructions to enter an amended final judgment in favor of the receiver, Antonio Argiz, from whom compensation for attorney's fees must flow.
[1] A final judgment for a receiver's fees and costs must be entered against the receiver as a party to the receivership proceeding, not against the receiver's counsel who is…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Entering a judgment against a nonparty is fundamental error.”
Court's statement of the legal principle governing the reversal
The Corredors owned property with others that housed Censa International College LLC, a vocational school. After the Corredors filed suit against co-o…
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Opinion filed July 6, 2022. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________ No. 3D21-1296 Lower Tribunal No. 19-17308 ________________ Alberto Yordano Corredor, et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
George Nichols, et al., Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Spencer Eig, Judge. The Ferro Law Firm, P.A., and Simon Ferro, for appellants. Coffey Burlington, P.L., Jeffrey B. Crockett and Paul J. Schwiep, for appellees, Special Master Antonio Argiz and Coffey Burlington, P.L. Before LOGUE, HENDON and GORDO, JJ. GORDO, J.
Albert Corredor Gomez and Alberto Yordano Corredor (the “Corredors”) appeal a trial court’s final order for fees and costs in favor of Coffey Burlington, P.L. (“Burlington”), counsel for the court appointed receiver, Antonio Argiz. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).
We affirm the trial court’s rulings in all respects, except one. We reverse as to the trial court’s entry of final judgment in favor of nonparty Burlington.
The underlying case involved a now defunct, for-profit vocational school, Censa International College LLC (“Censa”) located in Miami Gardens. The property was owned by the Corredors, Yezid Arango and George Nichols. The Corredors filed a complaint against Arango and Nichols1 for a permanent injunction preventing the sale of the property, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty and to quiet title. In response, Arango and Nichols filed a motion to appoint a receiver alleging the Corredors failed to pay the mortgage, allowed the property to go into foreclosure and were using tuition fees for their own self-interests. The trial court granted the motion and appointed Antonio Argiz as the receiver. After default final judgment was entered in favor of the Corredors, the services of the receiver were terminated by agreed order. The receiver filed a motion 1 Included as parties in the underlying suit were Censa and North American International Enterprises, LLC, a special purpose entity of Censa.
for fees and costs incurred by himself, and the court approved professionals retained by him, Morrison Brown Argiz & Farra, LLC (“MBAF”) and Burlington. The trial court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing on the motion for fees and costs and granted the receiver’s motion awarding the receiver and MBAF $65,363.11 in fees and costs and legal fees for Burlington’s work in the amount of $30,215.07. The trial court however, entered final judgment directly in favor of nonparty Burlington for the total amount of the two awards for $95,578.18.
We affirm the entirety of the substantive rulings incorporated in the final judgment, however reverse because “[e]ntering a judgment against a nonparty is fundamental error.” Norville v. Bellsouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 664 So. 2d 16, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). While a receiver is entitled to compensation which includes a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees, Burlington is not a party to the underlying suit despite being the court appointed counsel for the receiver. See Se. Bank, N.A. v. Ingrassia, 562 So. 2d 718, 721 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); In re Fredcris, Inc., 108 So. 2d 901, 904 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959). We therefore solely remand for entry of an amended final judgment in favor of the receiver, Antonio Argiz.
Affirmed in part; Reversed in part, Remanded with instructions.
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Perlman, Bajandas, Yevoli & Albright, P.L. v. Atlas Holding Corp. (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)…ounsel argues the trial court committed fundamental error by entering a judgment against successor counsel as a nonparty and depriving it of due process. We agree. Entry of “a judgment against a nonparty is fundamental error.” Corredor v. Nichols, 342 So. 3d 793, 794-95 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (quoting Norville v. BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 664 So. 2d 16, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). A denial of due process likewise “constitutes fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal.” Chiu v. Well…
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Best Med. Treatments, Inc. (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)…rom it to Best Medical’s counsel. It also cites a recent opinion from this Court affirming the substance of the final judgment but ultimately reversing “because ‘[e]ntering a judgment against a nonparty is fundamental error.’” Corredor v. Nichols, 342 So. 3d 793, 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (quoting Norville v. BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 664 So. 2d 16, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). By contrast, Best Medical argues that the fee order does not violate section 627.428. It asserts there is no clear statutory prohib…
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Gomez v. Philip Morris USA Inc. (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)…nterlocutory order.2 2 We decline to interpret the order under review as a final judgment against the nonparty Gomez children. If we did, we would reverse because “[e]ntering a judgment against a nonparty is fundamental error.” Corredor v. Nichols, 342 So. 3d 793, 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (quoting Norville v. BellSouth Advert. & Publ'g Corp., 664 So. 2d 16, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). In so interpreting the order, we are cognizant of the language on the face of the appealed order stating that “judgment is hereby e…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Milton A. Norville, PH.D. v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publ'g Corp., 664 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- In re Petition for the Involuntary Dissolution of Fredcris, 108 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Se. Bank, N.A. v. Ingrassia, 562 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)