S. A. LYNCH INVESTMENT CORPORATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, JOSE FERRE AND MIAMI CARIBE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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A downtown Miami hotel owner challenged a zoning variance granted to developers for a 30-story mixed-use building on adjacent property, claiming it would damage its property value and operations. The court held that the owner lacked standing because the alleged injuries were common to the general public rather than peculiar to the individual property owner.
The appellant lacked standing to maintain the suit because the alleged special damages—loss of sunlight, obstructed views, and traffic congestion—were not peculiar to the appellant but rather would be generally sustained by the public in the particular area as a whole.
“The special damages the appellant would allegedly suffer as a result of the construction of the structure contemplated by the appellees Ferre and Caribe Investment would not be peculiar to the appellant. Rather, they would be generally the type and kind of damages which the public in the particular area would sustain as a whole.”
Establishes the court's holding that damages common to the general public do not confer standing on an individual property owner to challenge a zoning variance.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLynch Investment Corporation owned and operated a downtown Miami hotel. Ferre and Miami Caribe Investment Corporation owned property in the same block…
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The appellant is the owner and operator ■of a downtown Miami hotel. The appellees ■Caribe Investment and Ferre are the owners of a piece of property in the block north ■of the appellant’s hotel. By the terms of a comprehensive zoning ordinance, the City of Miami designated the area in which the parties’ property is located as the “Central ■C-3 District.” This zoning permits the ■erection of hotels and office buildings of unlimited height. However, where residential use is contemplated, certain requirements ■as to set-backs, provisions for rear yard, and ■other conditions are imposed. The appel-lees Ferre and Caribe Investment petitioned the City Planning and Zoning Board and ■obtained a recommendation that a variance be granted waiving these requirements and permitting the erection of a building thirty stories in height, of which the first seven floors would be used for office space and the remaining 23 for apartments. The city commission of the City of Miami approved the recommendations of the Planning and Zoning Board and adopted a resolution granting a variance permit.
The appellant brought suit seeking to nullify the variance permit and to restrain the city from issuing a building permit to the appellees or anyone else. The second amended complaint alleged that the appellant would sustain damages different in kind and degree from those suffered by the community as a whole in that (1) the erection of a building taller than the appellant’s hotel would deny appellant the right to sunlight and open space granted it by the comprehensive zoning ordinance, obstruct the view from the restaurant atop the hotel, and generally detract from the desirability and value of the appellant’s facilities; and (2) the concentration of residents and tenants in the appellees’ building would create sanitary problems and unreasonably burden and congest adjacent streets due to the increase in traffic occasioned by the patrons, suppliers and employees of the new structure.
The appellees moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. After hearing, the chancellor granted the motion and entered the order appealed.
The appellant contends that the motion to dismiss should have been denied since the amended complaint states a cause of action. We find this contention to be without merit.
The special damages the appellant would allegedly suffer as a result of the construction of the structure contemplated by the appellees Ferre and Caribe Investment would not be peculiar to the appellant. Rather, they would be generally the type and kind of damages which the public in the particular area would sustain as a whole. We therefore hold that the appellant is without standing to maintain this suit and that its complaint was properly dismissed. Boucher v. Novotny, Fla.1958, 102 So.2d 132; see also Banyan Cafeterias, Inc. v. Faith Lutheran Church of Hialeah, Fla. 1963, 151 So.2d 426; Ashe v. City of Boca *860Raton, Fla.App.1961, 133 So.2d 122; Guernsey v. Haley, Fla.App.1958, 107 So. 2d 184.
The remaining points raised by the appellant are rendered moot by our conclusion that it is without standing to maintain this suit.
Concluding as we have that the order dismissing the complaint was without error, the same should be and is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Renard v. Dade Cnty., 249 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)…. 2d 61; United States Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., Fla.1951, 55 So. 2d 741; 1 Fla.Jur., Administrative Law, § 171. The County relies heavily on the following authorities: S. A. Lynch Investment Corporation v. City of Miami, Fla.App.1963, 151 So. 2d 858; Florida Palm-Aire Corporation v. Delvin, Fla.App.1969, 230 So. 2d 26, contending that without an allegation of special damage the appellant would not be in a position to maintain the circuit court proceedings. First, as indicated above, the appell…
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Fla. Palm-Aire Corp. v. Delvin, 230 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)…C. J., dissents, with opinion. . Hartnett v. Austin, Fla.1956, 93 So. 2d 86; Boucher v. Novotny, Fla.1958, 102 So. 2d 132; Ehvyn v. City of Miami, Fla. App.1959, 113 So. 2d 849. . S. A. Lynch Investment Corporation v. City of Miami, Fla.App.1963, 151 So. 2d 858 (cert. den. 155 So. 2d 695). . McGee v. City of Cocoa, Fla.App.1964, 168 So. 2d 766; Janko v. City of Hialeah, Fla.App.1968, 212 So. 2d 800; Sunset Islands 3 & 4 Ass’n v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App.1968, 214 So. 2d 45. . S. A. Lynch Investment C…1 / 2
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Janko v. City OF Hialeah, 212 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)…that plaintiff’s complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice * * *» The order then cites as authority the cases of Boucher v. Novotny, Fla.1958, 102 So. 2d 132, and S. A. Lynch Investment Corporation v. City of Miami, Fla.App.1963, 151 So. 2d 858, which cases, we agree, require that plaintiff allege special damages. The chancellor was correct in dismissing the complaint. However, we are of the opinion that plaintiff should have been given the opportunity to amend. The court in Petterson v.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Grover v. VAN Heusden, 102 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1958)
- Boucher v. Novotny, 102 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1958)
- Ashe v. City OF Boca Raton, 133 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Guernsey v. Haley, 107 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Banyan Cafeterias, Inc. v. The Faith Lutheran Church OF Hialeah, 151 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1963)