RALPH GRAHAM AND NICHOLE RENE GRAHAM

v.

CHERYL BATTEY AND ROLAND TUCKER

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED RALPH GRAHAM AND NICHOLE RENE GRAHAM,

Appellants,

v.

Case No. 5D21-2451 LT Case No. 2020-CA-002177 CHERYL BATTEY AND ROLAND TUCKER, Appellees.

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Opinion filed September 16, 2022 Nonfinal Appeal from the Circuit Court for Osceola County, Robert J. Egan, Judge. Megan L. Garcia and Kene Henry Anusionwu, of Law Offices of K.H.A., Windermere, for Appellants. Ryan James Vescio and Alexander S. Douglas, II, of Shuffield, Lowman & Wilson, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees. EDWARDS, J.

Appellants, Ralph and Nichole Graham, appeal the non-final order granting a temporary injunction in favor of Appellee, Cheryl Battey.¹ This Court has jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B). For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including entry of an amended temporary injunction which shall, inter alia, require Appellee to post an appropriate injunction bond.

Background Facts

The underlying lawsuit concerns the use and occupancy of a piece of property with a main house and a smaller in-law house. Appellee is the record title owner of the property as shown in a recorded deed. Appellants are the son-in-law and daughter of Appellee. At one time, the parties apparently enjoyed good relationships. There were discussions and vague oral agreements regarding Appellants being allowed to live in the main house in return for, inter alia, contributing to the purchase of the property and contributing to the monthly mortgage payments. Appellee was to live in the in-law house and was to receive water and electricity from the main house. There was no written document spelling out the terms of any of these

Standard of Review

“The standard of review of trial court orders on requests for temporary injunctions is a hybrid. To the extent the trial court’s order is based on factual findings, we will not reverse unless the trial court abused its discretion; however, any legal conclusions are subject to de novo review.” Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243, 1258 (Fla. 2017) (citation omitted). A trial court’s factual findings on the elements of a temporary injunction are reviewed for competent, substantial evidence. Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Florigrown, LLC, 317 So. 3d 1101, 1110 (Fla. 2021) (citation omitted).

Analysis

“The issuance of a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted sparingly.” Yardley v. Albu, 826 So. 2d 467, 470 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). “A temporary injunction may be entered if the party seeking the injunction establishes the following criteria: (1) the likelihood of irreparable harm; (2) the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law; (3) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) considerations of the public interest.” Id. “Because the entering of a temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, strict compliance with the provisions of [Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610] is required.” Id. Thus, “compliance with the rule requires the trial court to set forth sufficient factual findings to support each of the criterion [sic] that must be established to entitle the party to a preliminary injunction.” Id. Where a temporary injunction is generally supported by facts and law, the court of appeal can affirm it in part while remanding with instructions to strike, add, or revise terms and conditions to cure any noncompliance. Coscia v. Old Fla. Plantation, Ltd., 828 So. 2d 488, 490 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); see also Animal Rts. Found. of Fla., Inc. v. Siegel, 867 So. 2d 451, 463 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (Sawaya, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If part of a temporary injunction is improper and the remaining portions of the injunction are proper, the appellate court may affirm the injunction and strike the improper provisions.” (citing Coscia, 828 So. 2d at 488)).

We hold that the trial court’s order contains sufficient factual findings as to the first two elements as to certain conduct. Specifically, it found that Appellants’ continued interruption of water and electrical services to Appellee in the in-law house would constitute irreparable harm for which there is no legal remedy. Appellee offered evidence to the trial court that Appellants had intentionally switched off her electricity and put a lock on the water system controls without giving Appellee a key. Given the circumstances here, namely that Appellee had no other source of electricity or potable water, depriving her of those necessities of modern life would result in irreparable harm. To that extent, the temporary injunction is affirmed. The temporary injunction also prohibits Appellants from interfering with Appellee’s ingress and egress to the property and more specifically to the common areas. Appellants do not argue a lack of competent, substantial evidence to support Appellee’s claim and the court’s order. Instead, they first argue that Appellee has no right to access the main house or property even if she were determined to be the landlord. Second, they argue that the injunction lacks the necessary specificity as to exactly what ingress and egress is covered. The trial court’s temporary injunction essentially grants Appellee the right to access the common areas of the property without interference from Appellants. The injunction does not grant Appellee access to the interior of the main house. Further, the trial court’s order notes that Appellants replaced the locks on the main house to exclude Appellee therefrom and specifically permits maintenance of that status quo. Accordingly, we affirm the temporary injunction to the extent it protects Appellee’s rights of ingress and egress.

The trial court also enjoined Appellants from making material alterations to the main house and property. The trial court’s findings that Appellants, without Appellee’s consent, changed locks on the main house, removed locks from and otherwise damaged gates on the property, materially altered the main house by attaching cameras to its exterior, removed or cut shrubbery, and failed to maintain the swimming pool are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Under the facts and circumstances developed here, the loss or damage occasioned by each act listed by the trial court is the epitome of things that can be replaced or repaired. Locks can be replaced, gates can be rehung, cameras can be removed with attachment points filled and painted, the swimming pool can be repaired or renewed, and the shrubs can be replaced as needed. Therefore, there was no competent, substantial evidence of irreparable harm caused by those material alterations. See Stand Up for Animals, Inc. v. Monroe Cnty., 69 So. 3d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“[I]rreparable harm for the purposes of an injunction is not established where the harm can be compensated for adequately by money damages.” (citation omitted)). Furthermore, the trial court’s order enjoining Appellants from materially altering the property fails to specify exactly what action is prohibited. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(c) provides that an injunction “shall describe in reasonable detail the act or acts restrained without reference to a pleading or another document . . . .” In an often cited opinion, the Second District succinctly explained rule 1.610(c)’s requirements: An injunctive order should never be broader than is necessary to secure the injured party, without injustice to the adversary, relief warranted by the circumstances of the particular case. An injunctive order should be adequately particularized, especially where some activities may be permissible and proper. Such an order should be confined within reasonable limitations and phrased in such language that it can with definiteness be complied with, and one against whom the order is directed should not be left in doubt as to what he is required to do. Florio v. State ex rel. Epperson, 119 So. 2d 305, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960) (internal citations omitted). We hold that the trial court’s prohibition on material alterations could leave Appellants in doubt about what is required of them and also note that the trial court’s order enjoining Appellants from committing waste suffers from the same lack of specificity.³ Thus, on remand, the trial court is ordered to strike from the temporary injunction the prohibition on Appellants making material alterations to the

DCA 2002).5

Indeed, the order granting the temporary injunction makes no mention of a bond. Nevertheless, the lack of a bond does not invalidate the injunction as Appellants claim. See Ralicki v. 998 SW 144 Ct. Rd, LLC, 254 So. 3d 1155, 1157 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (“Contrary to [the appellants’] position, though, the failure to set a bond does not invalidate the injunction.” (citing Offshore Marine Towing, Inc. v. Sea Tow Servs. Int’l, Inc., 778 So. 2d 510