WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY, ETC.
v.
NORMANDY SHORES APARTMENT CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.

Fla. 3d DCA | 2022-12-07
No. 22-0260
Scales, J., Lindsey, J., Bokor, J., Moore, J.
Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2022)

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Synopsis

Wilmington Trust Company's successive Rule 1.540(b)(4) motion was properly denied because successive motions attempting to relitigate issues already adjudicated by prior post-judgment orders are not cognizable.


Holding

A successive Rule 1.540(b)(4) motion is not cognizable if it attempts to relitigate an issue already adjudicated by a prior post-judgment order.


Headnotes

[1] A successive Rule 1.540(b)(4) motion is not cognizable when it attempts to relitigate an issue already adjudicated by a prior post-judgment order; the proper remedy for d…

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Facts & Procedural History

Wilmington Trust Company filed a successive Rule 1.540(b)(4) motion in a Miami-Dade County court case, which the trial court denied.…

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Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Wilmington Trust Company1 seeks review of a January 6, 2022 order denying what the trial court correctly characterized as appellant’s successive Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(4) motion. We affirm because a successive rule 1.540(b)(4) motion is not cognizable by the trial court if the successive motion attempts to relitigate an issue adjudicated by a prior post-judgment order. See Parkhomchuck v. AIY, Inc., 338 So. 3d 397, 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“[I]f the appellants were dissatisfied with the trial court’s ruling on their first rule 1.540(b) motion, ‘their remedy was by appeal, not be [sic] filing successive motions to vacate containing the same general grounds or even new ones, which could have been raised in the first motion.’” (quoting Intercoastal Marina Towers, Inc. v. Suburban Bank, 506 So. 2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987))). 2 Affirmed.

2

Footnotes
1 As Successor to the Bank of New York Mellon, as Successor to JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, as Trustee for C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-CB3. 2 Because a successive rule 1.540(b)(4) motion is not cognizable, the trial court could have stricken, rather than denied, appellant’s successive motion. We do not, in this opinion, determine which adjudication method is the better practice.

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