UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

v.

MANUEL V. FEIJOO, M.D., AND MANUEL V. FEIJOO, M.D., P.A., A/A/O ERNESTO MORERA

1 Ernesto Morera, a United insured, was injured in an automobile accident on September 2, 2019, and assigned his benefits to Dr. Feijoo and Manuel V. Feijoo, M.D., P.A. the amount of hours requested arguing that only 9.2 hours were reasonably compensable and filed a motion to waive any expert witness fee or in the alternative sought to preclude taxation of an expert witness fee2. The trial court denied United’s motion, held a fee hearing and ultimately entered final judgment awarding Dr. Feijoo 14.2 hours in attorney’s fees and 4.25 hours of expert witness fees. This appeal followed.

2 We include the amount of hours at issue to highlight that this is more than a de minimis disagreement. We do not foreclose the possibility that a trial court may exercise its discretion to preclude an expert where the disagreement is de minimis and it finds the testimony would not be helpful to its consideration of fees. We express no opinion as to whether that would be permissible under different facts. preparation and testifying in this case was not burdensome.” We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of expert fees where United litigated the case through summary judgment, filed a notice of confession of entitlement to benefits nine months after the complaint was filed and challenged the number of compensable hours requested by the attorney after agreeing to entitlement of attorney’s fees and costs. See Travieso, 474 So. 2d at 1186 (“We hold that pursuant to section 92.231, expert witness fees, at the discretion of the trial court, may be taxed as costs for a lawyer who testifies as an expert as to reasonable attorney’s fees.”); Bystrom v. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 513 So. 2d 742, 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (“[A] trial judge has discretion to determine reasonable expert witness fees and tax these fees as costs.”); Sunshine State Ins. Co. v. Davide, 117 So. 3d 1142, 1145–46 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (finding under an abuse of discretion standard of review, where “there is evidence in the record presented by the expert[] to support the trial court’s conclusion” concerning fees, “we must affirm the order of the trial court” if it “made detailed findings of fact that are supported by competent substantial evidence.”). Importantly, while a challenging party may object to the evidence in support of the hours requested for attorney’s fees and costs, it may not dictate the type of evidence the prevailing party presents to the trial court. See Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So. 2d 351, 352–53 (Fla. 1987) (“[I]t is well settled that the testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable attorney’s fee is necessary to support the establishment of the fee.”); Brake v. Murphy, 736 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“[F]ees cannot be assessed based solely on the testimony of the attorney claiming the fee, but rather expert testimony must be offered substantiating the fee.”). Affirmed.