CLARA B. SULLIVAN, APPELLANT,
v.
SWIFT & COMPANY, AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's summary decrees, dismissing the appellant's rescission claim and granting the appellee's foreclosure counterclaim. The court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding duress.
No, there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding duress that would permit the appellant to rescind the mortgage or defeat the foreclosure.
“Reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the appellant, which we are required to do in reviewing summary decrees or judgments”
Establishes the standard of review for summary judgments.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant sought to rescind a mortgage, alleging duress. The appellee counterclaimed for foreclosure of the same mortgage. The trial judge entered…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Duress cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant seeks review of adverse summary decrees of the trial judge, dismissing her complaint for recision of a mortgage and granting the appellee’s counterclaim for foreclosure of said mortgage.
Reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the appellant, which we are required to do in reviewing summary decrees or judgments [see: Pritchard v. Peppercorn and Peppercorn, Inc., Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 769; Humphrys v. Jarrell, Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 404], it appears that there was no genuine issue of a material fact which would as a matter of law permit the appellant to rescind or defeat the mortgage in question upon the ground of duress. See: Jones v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., Fla.App.1959, 109 So.2d 582; *31Duncan Plastering Company v. Giffen Building Specialties, Inc., Fla.App.1962, 138 So.2d 532.
Therefore, the actions of the chancellor are affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Sork v. United Benefit Fire Ins. Co., 161 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)…ppellants, as we are required to do in reviewing summary judgments or decrees [see: Pritchard v. Peppercorn and Peppercorn, Inc., Fla.1957, 96 So. 2d 769; Humphrys v. Jarrell, Fla. App.1958, 104 So. 2d 404; Sullivan v. Swift & Company, Fla.App.1963, 153 So. 2d 30], it appears there was no genuine issue of a material fact which would, as a matter of law, allow the appellants to escape liability in the instant case. The rights of the parties at this stage arise out of the [*56] indemnity agreement, which clear…
-
Smith v. Baker, 206 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)…egree of certainty required for entry of summary judgment that a sale had been made and completed. Reversed. WALDEN, C. J., and WHITE, JOSEPH S., Associate Judge, concur. CROSS, J., dissents with opinion. . Sullivan v. Swift & Co., Fla.App.1963, 153 So. 2d 30; Rothenberg v. Leevans Corp., Fla.App.1963, 155 So. 2d 839. . P.R.O.P. 1.510(c), 31 P.S.A. . Palmer v. R. S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., Fla.1955, 81 So. 2d 635; McAfee v. Killingsworth, Fla.1957, 98 So. 2d 738. . Butler v. Thomson, 1876, 92 U.S.…
Authorities Cited
- Humphrys v. Jarrell, 104 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Pritchard v. Peppercorn & Peppercorn, Inc., 96 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1957)
- Boyd L. Jones, Jr. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 109 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
- Duncan Plastering Co., Inc. v. Giffen Bldg. Specialties, Inc., 138 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)