COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CENTER, LLC, A/A/O ANGELA COOPER

v.

STAR CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

1 For purposes of this opinion, section 627.736 shall be referred to as the PIP statute. 72, 77 (Fla. 2021). Additionally, the interpretation of a statute is subject to a de novo standard of review. See Gomez v. Vill. of Pinecrest, 17 So. 3d 322, 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

2 As an assignee, CHC was only entitled to the same benefits Cooper had at the time of the assignment. See Union Indemnity Co. v. City of New Smyrna, 130 So. 453, 455 (1930) (finding an assignment conveys no greater right than the assignor had at the time of the assignment). payment did not occur as CHC chose not to deposit two of the checks Star issued to it in fulfillment of payment. Star contends benefits were exhausted pursuant to the statute because it tendered payment to CHC by mailing the checks. Thus, to answer this question, we must determine when benefits are considered “paid” under the PIP statute. “Our statutory analysis begins with the plain meaning of the actual language of the statute, as we discern legislative intent primarily from the text of the statute.” Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So. 3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013). “‘When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning . . . the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.’” City of Bartow v. Flores, 301 So. 3d 1091, 1096 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. New Sea Escape Cruises, Ltd., 894 So. 2d 954, 960 (Fla. 2005)). As correctly noted by the trial court, the term “payment” itself is not defined in the definitions section of the PIP statute. 3 See § 627.732, Fla.

3 We note the trial court conducted a proper analysis of the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “payment.” The Oxford English Dictionary defines “payment” as “[t]he action, or an act, of paying,” “[a] sum of money (or other thing) paid,” “[t]he action, or an act, of rendering to a person anything due, deserved, or befitting, or of discharging an obligation; the thing so rendered.” PAYMENT, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 1955). Payment is also defined as “[p]erformance of an obligation by the delivery of money or some Stat. “In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, [however,] the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts at 167 (2012) (stating a “judicial interpreter [should] consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts,” when interpreting any particular part of the text). “A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme— because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (internal citations omitted). other valuable thing accepted in partial or full discharge of the obligation” and “[t]he money or other valuable thing so delivered in satisfaction of an obligation.” PAYMENT, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). These definitions are consistent with the trial court’s finding—that Star made payment by “delivering” or “rendering” the checks to CHC to discharge its obligation. Upon review, we find the language and statutory scheme of the PIP statute twice provides a definition of when benefits are considered paid. First, in Section 627.736(4), entitled “Payment of Benefits:” (b) Personal injury protection insurance benefits paid pursuant to this section are overdue if not paid within 30 days after the insurer is furnished written notice of the fact of a covered loss and of the amount of same. However: . . . 5. For the purpose of calculating the extent to which benefits are overdue, payment shall be treated as being made on the date a draft or other valid instrument that is equivalent to payment was placed in the United States mail in a properly addressed, postpaid envelope or, if not so posted, on the date of delivery. § 627.736(4)(b)5., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Second, in Section 627.736(10), entitled “Demand Letter:” (d) If, within 30 days after receipt of notice by the insurer, the overdue claim specified in the notice is paid by the insurer together with applicable interest and a penalty of 10 percent of the overdue amount paid by the insurer, subject to a maximum penalty of $250, no action may be brought against the insurer. If the demand involves an insurer’s withdrawal of payment under paragraph (7)(a) for future treatment not yet rendered, no action may be brought against the insurer if, within 30 days after its receipt of the notice, the insurer mails to the person filing the notice a written statement of the insurer’s agreement to pay for such treatment in accordance with the notice and to pay a penalty of 10 percent, subject to a maximum penalty of $250, when it pays for such future treatment in accordance with the requirements of this section. To the extent the insurer determines not to pay any amount demanded, the penalty is not payable in any subsequent action. For purposes of this subsection, payment or the insurer’s agreement shall be treated as being made on the date a draft or other valid instrument that is equivalent to payment, or the insurer’s written statement of agreement, is placed in the United States mail in a properly addressed, postpaid envelope, or if not so posted, on the date of delivery. The insurer is not obligated to pay any attorney fees if the insurer pays the claim or mails its agreement to pay for future treatment within the time prescribed by this subsection. § 627.736(10)(d), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). We find these sections clearly provide that under the PIP statute payment shall be treated as being made on the date a check or other valid instrument is placed in the mail. See §§ 627.736(4)(b)5., 627.736(10)(d), Fla. Stat. CHC asserts this Court should ignore this statutory language, arguing it only applies to determinations of whether a payment is overdue. CHC, instead asks this Court to define payment as being made when a check or other valid instrument sent to an insured is deposited. First, it is a “‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.’” Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 323–24 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132, (1993)). Under the PIP statute, section 627.736(4) outlines how and when an insurer makes payment of benefits and section 627.736(10) details how an insurer receives notice of allegedly overdue claims. Thus, in the context of the PIP statute, these sections provide the procedure an insurer must follow in order to make proper payment of PIP benefits. Application of this definition of when payment is made to the PIP statute as a whole is appropriate—particularly as the PIP statute itself imposes strict deadlines on insurers for making payments. Importantly, this section of text in the PIP statute defines when payment is overdue. Florida courts have long recognized the significance of defining when payment of benefits is overdue because it triggers other provisions contained in the PIP statute. See United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 808 So. 2d 82, 86–87 (Fla. 2001) (noting an insurer has thirty days to verify a claim and becomes subject to specific penalties for an overdue payment, which are “intended to promote the prompt resolution of PIP claims”); Amador v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 748 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“If the insurer does not pay by the statutory 30–day period, on the 31st day, the insurer is itself in violation of the PIP statute and the insured is free to initiate a lawsuit to have the case determined on the merits.”); Dunmore v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 301 So. 2d 502, 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (“The insurance company has thirty days in which to verify the claim after receipt of an application for benefits. There is no provision in the statute to toll this time limitation.”). Given the significance of overdue payments as delineated in the PIP statute, the plain language of this section should guide our analysis in defining when payment is considered made. Second, this is further supported by the explicit legislative directive of the PIP statute. “The purpose of ss. 627.730-627.7405 is to provide for medical, surgical, funeral, and disability insurance benefits without regard to fault, and to require motor vehicle insurance securing such benefits.” § 627.731, Fla. Stat. The Florida Supreme Court has stated “[w]ithout a doubt, the purpose of the no-fault statutory scheme is to ‘provide swift and virtually automatic payment so that the injured insured may get on with his [or her] life without undue financial interruption.’” Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So. 2d 679, 683–84 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 512 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)). CHC’s construction of the term “payment” would undermine this explicit directive as it would prevent “swift and virtually automatic payment.” It would place insurers in a no-win situation. An insurer would be forced to either: (1) continue issuing checks— even while some previously issued checks remained undeposited—and risk paying more than the $10,000 statutory limit; or (2) wait to issue checks until all prior checks have been deposited and thereby risk violating the statutory requirement to make payment within thirty days.4 We reject such a construction as absurd. To adopt it would violate the plain language of the statute and render much of its remaining language superfluous.

4 We further note that utilizing CHC’s proposed definition of payment would render an insurer’s ability to satisfy its obligation to make timely payment entirely reliant on actions over which it has no control—namely, the provider or insured’s acceptance or deposit of payment.