CHRISTOPHER LYNN KOPPE
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. 5th DCA | 2023-03-03
No. 22-3069
Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2023)

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Holding

A trial court has absolute discretion to determine an appropriate sentence following an open plea and probation revocation, and forfeiture of gain time is a collateral consequence requiring no specific advance warning.


Headnotes

[1] An open plea entered without a plea agreement vests the trial court with absolute discretion to determine the appropriate sentence.

[2] Forfeiture of gain time in connection with a prison sentence imposed upon revocation of probation is a collateral consequence that does not require advance warning to the…

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Key Quotes

“[F]orfeiture of gain time is a collateral consequence, and . . . neither the circuit court nor counsel was required to forewarn the defendant about that collateral consequence.”

Court's citation to Brown v. State for the proposition that gain time forfeiture requires no advance warning

Facts & Procedural History

Christopher Lynn Koppe appealed his sentencing in a probation revocation case (LT Case No. 2008-CF-043786-A) from the Circuit Court for Brevard County…

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Opinion of the Court

3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County, Tesha Scolaro Ballou, Judge.

Christopher Lynn Koppe, Avon Park, pro se.

No Appearance for Appellee. PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Wagner v. State, 177 So. 3d 695, 697 (Fla. 5th DCA

2015) (recognizing that when a defendant enters an open plea, there is no plea agreement between the defendant and the State, and the trial court has the absolute discretion to determine the appropriate sentence); Jacoby v.

State, 215 So. 3d 168, 171–72 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (recognizing that if a

DCA 2017))); State v. Rodriguez, 990 So. 2d 600, 606–07 (Fla. 3d DCA

2008) (“[T]here is no requirement that a defendant be given a specifically quantified amount of time that he is expected to serve in prison.”).

LAMBERT, C.J., MAKAR and BOATWRIGHT, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
2 defendant is sentenced to a new prison sentence upon the revocation of the probationary term of a probationary split sentence, the defendant is not entitled to credit for the full amount of the original sentence if he obtained an early release due to gain time—he is entitled to credit for the time he actually served in prison); Brown v. State, 268 So. 3d 177, 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (“[F]orfeiture of gain time is a collateral consequence, and . . . neither the circuit court nor counsel was required to forewarn the defendant about that collateral consequence.” (citing Ortiz v. State, 227 So. 3d 682, 684 (Fla. 3d

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