L.T.G., A JUVENILE
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A juvenile's right to be physically present at an adjudicatory hearing requires a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver, which cannot be satisfied by mere technical difficulties during remote participation.
[1] A juvenile's waiver of the right to be physically present at an adjudicatory hearing must be personal, not through counsel, and must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntar…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an "accused child is required to be physically present at all hearings held under the juvenile rules, except when there has been a waiver of the right to be present or the court makes specific findings regarding the child's physical or mental condition that precludes physical presence."”
Court articulating the foundational requirement for a juvenile's presence at adjudicatory proceedings
L.T.G. appeared remotely via Zoom on his cell phone during an adjudicatory hearing while the judge, witnesses, and attorneys were physically present i…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process cases and more on FLexlaw
MILLER, J.
L.T.G., the respondent below, challenges an adjudication of delinquency rendered following a hybrid adjudicatory hearing. During the hearing, L.T.G. appeared remotely through his cell phone via the Zoom videoconferencing platform, while the trial judge, witnesses, and attorneys were physically present in the courtroom. On appeal, L.T.G. contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after he was disconnected numerous times throughout the proceedings.1 It is axiomatic an “accused child is required to be physically present at all hearings held under the juvenile rules, except when there has been a waiver of the right to be present or the court makes specific findings regarding the child’s physical or mental condition that precludes physical presence.” R.R. v. Portesy, 629 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (footnote omitted); see also Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.255(b)(1); Fla. R. Juv. P. 8100(c). “This waiver must be personal, not one by the juvenile’s counsel.” S.M. v. State, 138 So. 3d 1156, 1160 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Concluding L.T.G. did not voluntarily absent himself from the proceedings and his conduct did not amount to a “knowing, intelligent, and
3
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited (11 total)
- Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (U.S. 1974)
- Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (U.S. 1972)
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (U.S. 1983)
- Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (U.S. 1973)
- Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (U.S. 1986)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (U.S. 1992)
- Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (U.S. 1986)
- Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (U.S. 1992)
- California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (U.S. 2000)
- Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (U.S. 1997)