A.O., A JUVENILE
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA
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Sufficient evidence supported the juvenile's conviction, and any hearsay error in the trial court's judgment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
[1] The standard of review applicable to a motion for judgment of dismissal in a juvenile case is de novo review, the same standard applied to motions for judgment of acquitt…
[2] Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession knew or should have known the p…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“courts should not grant a motion for judgment of acquittal unless the evidence is such that no view which the [trier of fact] may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite party can be sustained under the law”
Lynch v. State, establishing the standard for reviewing motions for judgment of dismissal in juvenile proceedings
A juvenile was charged in Miami-Dade County. The trial court entered judgment against the juvenile.…
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PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See L.J. v. State, 971 So. 2d 942, 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“The standard of review applicable to a motion for judgment of dismissal in a juvenile case is the same as the standard for a motion for judgment of acquittal in a criminal case, de novo review.” (quoting A.A.R. v. State, 926 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006))); Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1974) (“[C]ourts should not grant a motion for judgment of acquittal unless the evidence is such that no view which the [trier of fact] may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite party can be sustained under the law.”); § 812.022(2), Fla. Stat. (“[P]roof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.”); Melton v. State, 404 So. 2d 798, 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (“The statement attributed to the deceased placing defendant at scene of crime was inadmissible hearsay but harmless error where defendant’s presence at scene of the crime was established by other competent evidence.”); Wright v. State, 510 So. 2d 1159, 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (holding police officer’s hearsay testimony was harmless error because “under the standards of State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986), no prejudice appears.”).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1974)
- Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Verner, 926 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
- L.J. v. State, 971 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
- Melton v. State, 404 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Wright v. State, 510 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)