LAWRENCE TYLER HOWARD
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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A trial court may not impose a special probation condition prohibiting early termination of probation without the State's approval, as such a condition impermissibly prevents the circuit court from exercising its future authority to discharge the probationer.
[1] A trial court lacks authority to impose a probation condition that requires the State's approval for early termination, as such a condition impermissibly prevents the cir…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial judge is not authorized to divest the Department of Corrections of its authority to recommend early termination of probation or empowered to prevent the circuit court in the future from exercising its authority to discharge a probationer”
Explanation of why the condition was improper, quoting Baker v. State
Lawrence Tyler Howard pleaded no-contest to one count of leaving the scene of an accident involving death. The trial court imposed a special probation…
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DAMOORGIAN, J.
Lawrence Tyler Howard (“Defendant”) appeals his conviction and sentence for one count of leaving the scene of an accident involving death following an open plea of no-contest, and the denial of his rule 3.800 motion to correct sentencing error. Defendant raises several issues on appeal, only one of which has merit. He argues the trial court erred in imposing a special condition of probation prohibiting early termination of probation without the State’s approval. We agree and reverse.
By imposing the special condition prohibiting early termination of probation without the State’s approval, the trial judge effectively prevented the circuit court in the future from exercising its authority to discharge Defendant’s probation early. This is impermissible. See Baker v. State, 619 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (striking special condition providing the defendant could not be considered for early termination of probation “because a trial judge is not authorized to divest the Department of Corrections of its authority to recommend early termination of probation” or “empowered to prevent the circuit court in the future from
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exercising its authority to discharge a probationer”); Jones v. State, 666 So. 2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (striking condition which prohibited early termination of probation until the probationer completed a sex offender program because the condition was impermissibly calculated to divest the Department of Corrections of its authority to recommend early termination of probation and, consequently, to prevent the circuit court in the future from exercising its authority to discharge the probationer).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to strike the condition of probation prohibiting early termination of probation without the State’s approval. We otherwise affirm Defendant’s conviction and sentence.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. WARNER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.
* * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.