CODY CIOFFI AND CYNTHIA CIOFFI
v.
MICHAEL MIKOWITZ
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A defendant's report to the sheriff's office is protected by qualified privilege against defamation, and to overcome this privilege, the plaintiff must prove the statements are false and made with express malice, defined as the primary motive to injure the plaintiff's reputation.
[1] Reports of allegedly suspicious behavior made to law enforcement are protected by qualified privilege against defamation liability, and to overcome such privilege, the pl…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[I]ncidental gratification of personal feelings of indignation is not sufficient to defeat the privilege where the primary motivation is within the scope of the privilege.”
The court cited this principle when analyzing whether the defendant's hostility toward the neighbors could establish express malice to overcome the qualified privilege.
Appellants Cody and Cynthia Cioffi sued appellee Michael Mikowitz for defamation based on a report Mikowitz made to the sheriff's office regarding all…
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Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Indian River County; Janet Carney Croom, Judge; L.T. Case No. 312020CA000764.
Alan D. Sackrin of Sackrin & Tolchinsky, P.A., Hallandale Beach, for appellants.
Geoffrey Pfeiffer of the Lopez Law Group, Saint Petersburg, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We affirm the final summary judgment on appellants’ complaint for defamation for a report appellee made regarding appellants to the sheriff’s office. Although the trial court appears to have considered appellee’s report to the sheriff’s office of allegedly suspicious behavior on the part of appellants to be absolutely privileged, appellee has only a qualified privilege against any defamation he may have made in the report. See Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1992). To overcome the qualified report privilege, a defamation plaintiff must show that the statements are false and made with express malice, i.e., “that the defendant’s primary motive in making the statements was the intent to injure the reputation of the plaintiff.” Id. We have examined the summary judgment evidence and conclude that none of the evidence submitted shows that appellee’s “primary motive” was to injure the reputation of appellants. “[I]ncidental gratification of personal feelings of indignation is not sufficient to defeat the privilege where the primary motivation is within the scope of the privilege.” Pomfret v. Atkinson, 137 So. 3d. 1161, 1164 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 812 (Fla.
2
1984)). The hostility between these neighbors is insufficient to show express malice. See Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 811–12. Affirmed. WARNER, DAMOORGIAN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.
* * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1992)
- Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984)