DENA SPECTOR
v.
SETH SPECTOR
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A trial court's determination that an obligee is in a supportive relationship is reviewed de novo, but when deciding whether to terminate or reduce alimony based on that finding, the court must consider the statutory economic factors and its discretionary choice between termination and reduction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
[1] A trial court's interpretation of a settlement agreement is reviewed de novo.
[2] A trial court's factual findings regarding a supportive relationship are reviewed to determine if they are supported by competent substantial evidence.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“First, the circuit court must 'elicit the nature and extent of the relationship in question.' To accomplish this task, the circuit court must consider and make findings concerning the factors listed in section 61.14(1)(b)(2) and any other pertinent circumstances... In the third step, the circuit court must consider the relevant economic factors for determining an award of separate maintenance or alimony outlined in section 61.08(2).”
This establishes the required four-step analysis that trial courts must follow when determining whether to modify or terminate alimony based on a supportive relationship.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDena and Seth Spector divorced in 2013 pursuant to a mediated settlement agreement requiring durational alimony through June 2023, with a provision al…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 11, 2023. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D22-1400 Lower Tribunal No. 13-6518
________________
Dena Spector,
Appellant,
vs.
Seth Spector,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, David Young, Judge. Wasson & Associates, Chartered, and Roy D. Wasson, for appellant. Buckner, Shifrin, Etter, Dugan & Bradfute, P.A., and Emily M. Bradfute, for appellee. Before SCALES, HENDON, and MILLER, JJ. HENDON, J.
The former wife, Dena Spector (“Former Wife”), appeals from the trial
court’s Amended Final Judgment Granting Former Husband’s Verified
Supplemental Petition for Termination of Alimony or, in the Alternative,
Downward Modification of Alimony and Other Relief. In this order, the trial
court terminated Seth Spector’s (“Former Husband”) obligation to pay the
Former Wife monthly durational alimony pursuant to their Mediated
Settlement Agreement (“MSA”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm, in
part, reverse, in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I. Facts
The parties married in 1995. In May 2013, the parties entered into a
Mediated Settlement Agreement (“MSA”), which was incorporated into their
final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Pursuant to the MSA, the Former
Husband was required to pay the Former Wife specified amounts of
durational alimony until June1, 2023. Paragraph 12(d) of the MSA provides
that the Former Husband’s alimony obligation to the Former Wife may be
modified or terminated if the Former Wife is in a “supportive relationship” as
defined by Florida Statutes, or cohabitates.1
In April 2021, the Former Husband filed a “Verified Supplemental
Petition for Termination of Alimony or, in the Alternative, Downward
Modification of Alimony and for Other Relief” (“Supplemental Petition”),
relying on paragraph 12(d) of the MSA. The Former Husband asserted the
Former Wife was (1) in a supportive relationship with Seth Selesnow (“Mr.
Selesnow”), citing to section 61.14, Florida Statutes, which provides for the
termination or reduction of alimony when the obligee enters into a supportive
relationship subsequent to the granting of the divorce, and (2) cohabitating
with Mr. Selesnow, either of which would warrant a termination or
modification of alimony pursuant to paragraph 12(d) of the MSA.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Supplemental
Petition, during which Mr. Selesnow, the Former Wife, and the Former
Husband testified. The trial court entered an amended order granting the
Former Husband’s Supplemental Petition. In doing so, the trial court
addressed the “circumstances” that the trial court “shall” consider “in
determining the relationship of an obligee to another person,” set forth in
section 61.14(1)(b)(2)(a)-(k). Thereafter, the trial court ordered and
adjudged as follows:
2. Former Wife cohabitated with Mr. Selesnow and alimony shall be terminated, retroactive to the date of the Supplemental Petition;
3. Former Wife was in a supportive relationship with Mr. Selesnow and alimony shall be terminated, retroactive to the date of the Supplemental Petition[.] Moreover, the trial court ordered the Former Wife to repay all alimony paid
to her as of the date the Former Husband filed the Supplemental Petition.
The Former Wife did not file a motion for rehearing. This appeal follows.
II. Standards of Review
The trial court’s interpretation of the MSA is reviewed de novo. Helinski
v. Helinski, 305 So. 3d 703, 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). Further,
a review of a trial court's decision under section 61.14(1)(b) is a mixed question of law and fact that requires a mixed standard of review. The trial court must first make factual findings based on the evidence presented and then determine whether the facts establish the existence of a “supportive relationship,” which requires an interpretation of the statute and an application of the law to the facts. If the trial court concludes that a “supportive relationship” exists, it has the discretion to reduce or terminate the alimony obligation. Thus, we review the trial court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by competent substantial evidence; the trial court's interpretation and application of the law should be reviewed de novo; and the exercise of the trial court's discretion should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Murphy v. Murphy, 201 So. 3d 18, 21-22 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (internal
citations omitted). See also Klokow v. Klokow, 323 So. 3d 817, 821 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2021) (holding that factual findings are reviewed to determine if they
are supported by competent, substantial evidence, and a trial court’s legal
conclusion that a supportive relationship exists is reviewed de novo). Finally,
if a trial court finds the existence of a “supportive relationship” under section
61.14(1)(b), a trial court’s decision to reduce or terminate alimony is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. See Gregory v. Gregory, 128 So. 3d 926, 927
(Fla. 5th DCA 2013); Buxton v. Buxton, 963 So. 2d 950, 953 (Fla. 2d DCA
2007) (“If the trial court determines that a ‘supportive relationship’ exists, we
review the trial court’s decision to reduce or terminate alimony for abuse of
discretion.”).
II. Analysis
As explained by the Second District Court of Appeal in King v. King, 82
So. 3d 1124, 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), when a trial court addresses a
petition to terminate or reduce alimony under section 61.14(1)(b), the trial
court “must employ an analysis that may involve four steps.” The Second
District describes the analysis as follows:
First, the circuit court must “elicit the nature and extent of the relationship in question.” § 61.14(1)(b)(2). To accomplish this task, the circuit court must consider and make findings concerning the factors listed in section 61.14(1)(b)(2) and any other pertinent circumstances. Buxton v. Buxton, 963 So. 2d 950, 951-53 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). In the second step, based on its findings, the circuit court must determine whether the facts establish a supportive relationship. Id. If the circuit court concludes that a supportive relationship does exist, then it must decide whether to reduce or terminate the alimony obligation. Id. at 952-53. In the third step, the circuit court must consider the relevant economic factors for determining an award of separate maintenance or alimony outlined in section 61.08(2). Buxton, 963 So. 2d at 955-56. In the fourth step, having considered the
relevant economic factors, the circuit court must determine “whether to reduce or terminate the Former Wife's alimony and, if to reduce it, by how much.” Id. at 956. King, 82 So. 3d at 1129.
In the instant case, the trial court followed the first and second steps.
First, the trial court addressed all of the factors listed in section
61.14(1)(b)(2)(a)-(k). Based on a review of the trial transcript and evidence
introduced at the hearing, the trial court’s findings are supported by
competent, substantial evidence. Second, based on these findings, the trial
court concluded that the Former Wife was in a supportive relationship.
Based on our de novo review, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion
that the Former Wife was in a supportive relationship with Mr. Selesnow.2
See Murphy, 201 So. 3d at 24, 26 (affirming the determination that the former
wife and her boyfriend were in a supportive relationship and the reduction of
former wife’s alimony from $4,200 to $3,500 per month where the evidence
showed that the former wife and her boyfriend were in a monogamous,
romantic relationship, and he was living in the former wife’s house; the
boyfriend contributed only $150 per month, which was primarily used for his
and his children’s food; the former wife continued to pay all utilities, taxes,
and insurance related to the home; the boyfriend cut the grass, cleaned the
pool, periodically cleaned the former wife’s car, and helped with some
chores; and the former wife provided a separate bedroom in her home for
the boyfriend’s children to use during visitations, purchasing beds for that
room); Klokow, 323 So. 3d at 821-22 (holding trial court correctly determined
the former wife and her live-in boyfriend, Mr. Gutauckis, were in a “supportive
relationship” under section 61.14(1)(b) where Mr. Gutauckis moved into the
former wife’s home and made numerous improvements to her home, and
they have worked together to improve the value of the home; Mr. Gutauckis
contributes $900 of in-kind rent each month by paying certain expenses; and
“[t]hey support each other emotionally and are clearly involved in a serious
relationship”); Buxton, 963 So. 2d at 954 (“The facts presented at the hearing
show that the [f]ormer [w]ife and [her live-in boyfriend] are in a long-term,
committed relationship that provides both economic and social support
equivalent to that of a marriage. Under these circumstances, the evidence
established the existence of a ‘supportive relationship’ as contemplated by
section 61.14(1)(b).”).
Next, we address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating alimony rather than reducing it. As stated in King, if a trial court
concludes an obligee is in a supportive relationship, steps three and four of
the analysis requires the trial court to consider the relevant economic factors
for determining an award of separate maintenance or alimony outlined in
section 61.08(2), and thereafter, determine whether, based on those factors,
the obligee’s alimony should be terminated or reduced. King, 82 So. 3d at
1129.
In the instant case, the trial court followed step four—terminated
alimony—but prior to doing so, failed to comply with step three—consider the
relevant economic factors outlined in section 61.08.3 As a result of the trial
court’s failure to address the relevant economic factors, we cannot determine
if the trial court abused its discretion by terminating the Former Wife’s
alimony.4 Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the order on review
terminating the Former Husband’s obligation to pay alimony to the Former
Wife, and remand with instructions for the trial court to make the requisite
findings, and based on those findings, to reconsider whether alimony should
be terminated or reduced, and if the trial court determines that alimony
should be reduced, to determine the reduced amount.5
Any remaining arguments do not merit discussion.
Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part, and remanded for further
proceedings.
to section 61.075, Florida Statutes] by failing to specifically raise it in his motion for rehearing below. This type of error, however, is fundamental and is reviewable where the error is apparent on the face of the final judgment."). 5 We take no position as whether the Former Wife’s alimony should be terminated or reduced.
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