SAMUEL HENRY YANT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Samuel Henry Yant was convicted by jury of robbery and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. He appeals contending that the trial court erred in permitting witnesses to testify to circumstances beyond identification and in failing to suppress evidence obtained from an allegedly illegal search of his home.
The court affirmed the conviction, finding no reversible error. The trial court properly permitted circumstantial testimony to help the jury evaluate the credibility and reliability of the identification witnesses, and the search was legal because the defendant voluntarily consented to it after being advised of his rights.
“In order for the jury to properly evaluate the degree of reliance to be placed upon the witnesses' identification of the defendant as one of the participants in the robbery, it was necessary that they be apprised of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense and the opportunities available to the witnesses to observe the participants.”
Establishes why testimony beyond identification was properly admitted despite the stipulation that the crime occurred.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA robbery was committed by unidentified persons. Police officers arrested Yant and testified he orally consented to a search of his home after being a…
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The defendant appeals from a jury verdict, finding him guilty of the offense of robbery, and a sentence of fifteen years confinement in the state penitentiary.
*909Prior to trial counsel for the state and for the defendant stipulated that the robbery in question had been committed by some persons, and left it for the jury to determine whether the defendant was one of the guilty persons.
Two of the police officers testified that after the defendant’s arrest, and while the defendant was at the police station, the defendant orally consented to their searching his home. The police officers stated that this consent was voluntarily given after they had advised the defendant that they would get a search warrant. The testimony of the defendant and his wife, who was present at the time, was that no consent was given to the search. Certain items of clothing were taken from the defendant’s premises which items he stated were his. The items were introduced into evidence and identified by the witnesses as having been worn by one of the robbers. Four witnesses positively identified the defendant as being one of the persons who participated in the robbery.
The defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in permitting the witnesses to testify to matters other than those relating solely to the identification of the defendant as one of the participants in the robbery, in view of the stipulation that the crime had been committed and (2) that the court erred in failing to suppress certain evidence (the items of clothing taken from the defendant’s bedroom) because they were obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure.
As to the defendant’s first contention, we find no error committed on the part of the trial judge. In order for the jury to properly evaluate the degree of reliance to be placed upon the witnesses’ identification of the defendant as one of the participants in the robbery, it was necessary that they be apprised of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense and the opportunities available to the witnesses to observe the participants. The testimony can not be said to have been prejudicial to the defendant.
As to the defendant’s second contention, we find no reversible error in the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress and the subsequent admission of the items of clothing into evidence. Two police officers testified that the defendant, after being advised that his home could be legally searched with his permission or through the issuance of a search warrant, voluntarily consented to having his home searched. They further testified that the defendant’s wife was with them during the search and gave them a paper bag in which to place the clothing.
In Jackson v. State, Fla.1961, 132 So.2d 596, our Supreme Court held that consent to a search need not be in writing and if freely and voluntarily given by the defendant, such search is legal and the fruits thereof are admissible as evidence.1
While the defendant and his wife denied that consent was given by the defendant, there was sufficient testimony from which it could be found that consent had been given.2
The defendant relies heavily upon the case of Judd v. United States, 89 U.S.App. D.C. 64, 190 F.2d 649 (1951). The facts of that case are distinguishable from the instant case. The sole question there was whether the consent had been given free of duress and coercion. In our case the defendant denied giving his consent.
It follows that the judgment appealed must be, and is hereby, affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Citator
Cited By
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Davis v. State, 226 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)…the voluntariness and completeness of appellant’s oral consent. In Florida written consent is not necessary in order to waive the privilege against having one’s home searched. Jackson v. State, Fla. 1961, 132 So. 2d 596; Yant v. State, Fla.App.1963, 154 So. 2d 908. Later, - at the police station, appellant again orally consented to allow one of the officers to search his apartment. He was specifically advised by the police that anything seized in this search could be used against him in a subsequent criminal…
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Roush v. State, 203 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)…f their search for the money, which the state contends, and we [*634] agree, was invited, impliedly if not expressly, by the statements made by the appellant when arrested. See Jackson v. State, Fla.1961, 132 So. 2d 596; Yant v. State, Fla.App.1963, 154 So. 2d 908; Bretti v. State, Fla.App.1966, 192 So. 2d 6. On the facts of this case we conclude, as did the able trial judge, that the search was not unreasonable. Affirmed.…
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Yant v. State, 224 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)…, 33 F.S.A. motion, which motion was denied after a full evidentiary hearing with court appointed counsel. In 1962 Yant was convicted of robbery and given a fifteen year sentence. This conviction was affirmed on appeal. Yant v. State, Fla.App.1963, 154 So. 2d 908. In 1963 Yant and a co-defendant, Nathaniel Henderson, were convicted of a second robbery. No appeal was originally taken by Yant from the 1963 conviction, but this court, on an appeal by Henderson, ordered that Henderson be given a Rule 1.-850 “de…
Authorities Cited
- Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
- Longo v. State, 157 Fla. 668 (Fla. 1946)
- Powell v. State, 175 So. 213 (Fla. 1937)
- N. Inv. Corp. v. Cora Alice Cannon, 173 So. 273 (Fla. 1937)
- Jackson v. State, 132 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1961)
- Slater v. State, 90 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1956)
- Starks v. State, 108 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)