RYAN KEHOE

v.

KELLY KEHOE

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

RYAN KEHOE,

Appellant,

v.

KELLY KEHOE, ROGER KEHOE, and SANDRA KEHOE, Appellees.

No. 2D22-3031

December 27, 2023

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Rex Martin Barbas, Judge. Ryan Kehoe, pro se.

Kelly Kehoe, Roger Kehoe, and Sandra Kehoe, pro se. KELLY, Judge.

Ryan Kehoe appeals from the order denying him a prejudgment writ of replevin to recover certain possessions from his parents, Roger and Sandra Kehoe.¹ We affirm the order but remand for the trial court to

Analysis

Chapter 78, Florida Statutes, governs replevin actions. Ryan filed his complaint for "ordinary replevin" under section 78.01, which states that "[a]ny person whose personal property is wrongfully detained by any other person . . . may have a writ of replevin to recover said personal property and any damages sustained by reason of the wrongful taking or detention." An ordinary replevin action "provides an avenue of relief for obtaining possession of the personal property after a trial on the merits and the entry of final judgment." McMurrain v. Fason, 584 So. 2d 1027, 1030 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

Ryan also filed a motion for a prejudgment writ of replevin under section 78.068(2). The prejudgment writ of replevin is a summary procedure for the limited purpose of obtaining possession of property before trial to secure it against the "danger of destruction, concealment, waste, removal from the state, removal from the jurisdiction of the court, or transfer to an innocent purchaser during the pendency of the action." McMurrain, 584 So. 2d at 1030 (quoting § 78.068(2)). Sections 78.065 and 78.067 describe the procedures to obtain a prejudgment writ of replevin.

It appears from the record provided to this court that Ryan failed to meet the statutory requirements to obtain immediate relief under sections 78.065 or 78.067. As such, the trial court correctly denied Ryan's motion for a prejudgment writ. However, the denial of a prejudgment writ is not a final adjudication of the merits of the action. Ryan still has a right to a trial on the merits of his complaint for ordinary replevin. See Coastal Palms Holdings, LLC v. Paxton, 110 So. 3d 36, 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (stating that regardless of the outcome of a preliminary hearing on a prejudgment writ of replevin the trial court must still adjudicate the party's claims); Brown v. Reynolds, 872 So. 2d 290, 296 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that, after the denial of a pretrial writ of replevin, "the trial court must still make a final adjudication of the claims of the parties in accordance with the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure").

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying the emergency motion for a prejudgment writ of replevin. However, we remand for further proceedings to allow the court to rule on any pending motions and then to proceed to trial on the claims in Ryan's complaint. At trial Ryan may present evidence to support his allegations that his parents still possess his property or to establish the value of any lost property. The court must then make a final adjudication of the claims in Ryan's complaint based on the evidence presented at trial. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

LUCAS and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.