ORLANDO CHILLON HERNANDEZ
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA
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A habeas corpus petitioner who is released from custody during the pendency of the petition cannot demonstrate a significant restraint on liberty and therefore is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.
[1] A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus must demonstrate that they are in custody.
[2] A writ of habeas corpus is unavailable if the petitioner is no longer subject to a significant restraint on their liberty.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOrlando Chillon Hernandez sought a writ of habeas corpus to be released from the Dade County Jail pending trial on alleged domestic violence charges. …
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Opinion filed February 7, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-0063 Lower Tribunal No. F24-523
________________
Orlando Chillon Hernandez,
Petitioner,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Respondent.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Habeas Corpus. Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, for petitioner. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. Before EMAS, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ. MILLER, J. Petitioner, Orlando Chillon Hernandez, seeks a writ of habeas corpus granting his release from the Dade County Jail under the supervision of an approved pretrial service program. The trial court denied nonmonetary release because section 907.041(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2023), prohibits granting such release to alleged perpetrators of domestic violence at a first appearance hearing. Hernandez contends section 907.041(5)(b) is indistinguishable from its predecessor, section 907.041(4)(b), which was invalidated as unconstitutionally infringing upon the rulemaking authority of the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Raymond, 906 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2005).
It is well-settled that a petitioner seeking relief in habeas corpus must demonstrate he or she is in custody. See Lambertson v. State, 479 So. 2d 773, 774 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“A petitioner who is not in custody is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.”); Starr v. Smith, 77 So. 2d 834, 834 (Fla. 1955) (quashing writ of habeas corpus because defendant was not in custody when relief was granted); see also Mortimer v. State, 922 So. 2d 1104, 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (dismissing petition for writ of habeas corpus because petitioner failed to show illegal restraint of liberty or no other adequate legal remedy); Anglin v. Mayo, 88 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 1956) (explaining purpose of habeas corpus is to test legality of restraint on liberty). Because here, Hernandez was released from custody during the pendency of the petition, he is unable to demonstrate there is “a significant restraint imposed on [his] liberty.” Lambertson, 479 So. 2d at 774. Accordingly, we are constrained to deny the petition.
Petition denied.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (52 total)
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Kerfert Butler Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1959)…harged under [*668] the wrong statute does not entitle him to discharge from custody in a habeas corpus proceeding when he has, in fact, been charged with and has plead guilty to an offense denounced by another statute. See Anglin v. Mayo, Fla.1956, 88 So. 2d 918; Johnson v. Mayo, Fla.1954, 75 So. 2d 287; Hodges v. Mayo, Fla.1953, 65 So. 2d 750. Here, the petitioner was charged with and plead guilty to an offense denounced by § 847.01, supra. It is true that the charge was inartificially and, perhaps, defec…
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Renard v. Dade Cnty., 261 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1972)…s of a petitioner as a ‘party aggrieved’ to bring certiorari to review the determination of a board of appeals or adjustment. The difference, if any, relates only to the forum and form of the remedy." (Emphasis supplied.) . City of Miami v. Hollis, 77 So. 2d 834 (Fla.1959) ; City of Jacksonville v. Imler, 235 So. 2d 526 (Fla.App.1st 1970). . See e. g., Rhodes v. City of Homestead, 248 So. 2d 674 (Fla.App.3rd 1971) ; Knowles v. Town of Kenneth City, 247 So. 2d 748 (Fla.App.2d 1971).…
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Savage v. State, 156 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)…ed, the order appealed is affirmed. CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and RAWLS, J., concur. . Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799. . Sedell v. Sedell, (Fla.App.1958) 100 So. 2d 639; City of Miami v. Hollis, (Fla.1955) 77 So. 2d 834 . Berkman et al. v. Miami National Bank, et al., (Fla.App.1962) 143 So. 2d 535. . Siesta Properties, Inc. v. Hart, (Fla.App.1960) 122 So. 2d 218, 219, 224. . Escarra v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., (Fla.1961) 131 So. 2d 483.…
Previewing 3 of 52 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Marti Cassandra Raymond, 906 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2005)
- Anglin v. Mayo, 88 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 1956)
- Starr v. Smith, 77 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1955)
- Lambertson v. State, 479 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- Mortimer v. State, 922 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)