STEFAN E. BRODIE
v.
BAYSIDE VILLAGE EAST CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.
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Statements made on a conditionally privileged occasion are not actionable for defamation unless the plaintiff proves express malice was the primary motivation for the statements.
[1] When statements are published on an occasion that confers conditional privilege, malice is not presumed by law; instead a presumption of good faith arises, and the plaint…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Only if the Plaintiff demonstrates the primary motivation for the statements uttered was express malice, is the privilege overcome.”
From Boehm v. American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc., establishing that generalized hostility is insufficient; express malice must be shown.
Stefan Brodie appealed a circuit court judgment in a defamation action against Bayside Village East Condominium Association and others. The lower cour…
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PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Geddes, 960 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“[O]ne who publishes defamatory matter concerning another is not liable for the publication if the matter is published upon an occasion that makes it conditionally privileged and the privilege is not abused.”); Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. Reakes, 840 So. 2d 277, 280 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“The issue of whether this qualified privilege exists is not a jury question when the circumstances surrounding the communication are undisputed; the question should be decided by the court.”); Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 810 (Fla. 1984) (“The determination that a defendant’s statements are qualifiedly privileged eliminates the presumption of malice attaching to defamatory statements by law. The privilege instead raises a presumption of good faith and places the upon the plaintiff the burden of proving express malice . . . .”); Lewis v. Evans, 406 So. 2d 489, 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (“[T]he mere fact that a defamatory statement was made does not imply that the speaker was motivated by malice if the statement was made on a privileged occasion, and therefore malice will not be presumed as a matter of law, even though the statement . . . is otherwise defamatory per se.”); Boehm v. Am. Bankers Ins. Grp., Inc., 557 So. 2d 91, 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (“It is insufficient that the speaker have generalized feelings of hostility and malice towards the Plaintiff. Only if the Plaintiff demonstrates the primary motivation for the statements uttered was express malice, is the privilege overcome.”) (emphasis in original).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984)
- Shem Lewis v. Evans, 406 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Geddes, 960 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
- Boehm v. Am. Bankers Ins. Grp., Inc., 557 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Cape Publ'ns, Inc. v. Reakes, 840 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)