MARGARET ROEBLING
v.
DONALD ROEBLING
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Margaret Roebling appealed interlocutory orders denying her motion to dismiss and motions for amendment in a divorce bill alleging extreme cruelty. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that extreme cruelty can be established through a pattern of conduct over time rather than single acts, and that the plaintiff need not expressly negate condonation in the pleading.
Extreme cruelty may be established through a constant, studied course of conduct consisting of many incidents over time that evidence repulsion, hatred, or contempt, even if no single incident would suffice alone. The plaintiff need not expressly negate condonation in the bill, as condonation is an affirmative defense that must be specially pleaded by the defendant.
“Just as it is the constant dropping of water that wears away the stone, so a constant, studied course of conduct, consisting of many incidents over a period of months or years, may so thoroughly evidence the repulsion, hatred or contempt of one spouse for the other as to seriously injure and endanger the health of such other, though not a lick be struck nor a bone broken”
Establishes that extreme cruelty can be based on cumulative conduct causing mental injury, not just single violent acts
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMargaret Roebling filed a bill for divorce against Donald Roebling, alleging extreme cruelty as grounds. The bill described a course of conduct and se…
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This case has been well argued and ably briefed, but as the orders appealed from are interlocutory, we do not deem it necessary to set out in detail the facts alleged in the bill, nor discuss at any length the reasons why we hold that the lower court was free from error in upholding the sufficiency of the appellee’s bill as against the mo*769tion to dismiss, and the motions to require amendment so as to state the plaintiff’s case with greater particularity.
The recent chancery practice statute commands that all pleadings in equity shall be expressed “in as brief and succinct terms as reasonably practicable.” We understand the gist of the bill, in so far as this subject of “extreme cruelty” is concerned, to charge a course of conduct, or a series of acts of misconduct, which amounted to extreme cruelty as defined in Prall v. Prall, 58 Fla. 496, 50 So. 867, though perhaps no single instance of such conduct, standing alone, would have been sufficient to sustain the charge. Just as it is the constant dropping of water that wears away the stone, so a constant, studied course of conduct, consisting of many incidents over a period of months or years, may so thoroughly evidence the repulsion, hatred or contempt of one spouse for the other as to seriously injure and endanger the health of such other, though not a lick be struck nor a bone broken, and this may go to such an extent as to render it impracticable for the one so injured to discharge with reasonable safety the marital relations. The case above cited recognizes the fact that such injury or danger may be mental as well as physical.
As' to condonation, the general rule is that it is an affirmative defense which must be specially pleaded. We are not clearly convinced that the Chancellor was wrong in applying the general rule to the bill filed in this case, and in holding that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to expressly negative condonation in the bill. See 9 R. G. L. 386, and Newton v. Newton (N. J.), 97 Atl. 297, Fekany v. Fekany, 160 Sou. Rep. 192.
Affirmed.
Whitfield, C. J., and Brown and Davis, J .J., concur.
*770Ellis, P. J., and Terrell, and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
Rehearing Denied.
The bill of complaint contains allegations under which extreme cruelty may be shown. As to the other ground for divorce alleged in the bill, as to which appellant claims the bill shows condonation because the parties continued thereafter to live together as husband and wife for some nine months, the bill does not show when the complainant became aware of the alleged commission of such acts so alleged as constituting such ground, and as there could be no condonation without knowledge, we cannot say that the court below was clearly in error in sustaining the sufficiency of the bill when the same is considered in the light of'the authorities cited in our former' opinion.
Rehearing denied.
• Whitfield, C. J., and Terrell, Brown, Buford, and Davis, J. J., concur.
Ellis, J., dissents.
Rehearing Denied.
Per Curiam.
The bill of complaint contains allegations under which extreme cruelty may be shown. As to the other ground for divorce alleged in the bill, as to which appellant claims the bill shows condonation because the parties continued thereafter to live together as husband and wife for some nine months, the bill does not show when the complainant became aware of the alleged commission of such acts so alleged as constituting such ground, and as there could be no condonation without knowledge, we cannot say that the court below was clearly in error in sustaining the sufficiency of the bill when the same is considered in the light of'the authorities cited in our former' opinion.
Rehearing denied.
• Whitfield, C. J., and Terrell, Brown, Buford, and Davis, J. J., concur. Ellis, J., dissents.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Clutter v. Clutter, 171 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)…int stated a cause of action in that it alleged a course of conduct which the chancellor could find constituted extreme cruelty because it rendered further cohabitation intolerable and impaired plaintiff’s health. Roebling v. Roebling, 119 Fla. 768, 161 So. 715 (1935); Diem v. Diem, 141 Fla. 260, 193 So. 65 (1940) ; Lentz v. Lentz, Fla.App.1960, 120 So. 2d 815. The second ground presented goes to the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant’s attack is two-fold in that she urges (a) that the evidence was pa…
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Baldwin v. Baldwin, 151 Fla. 341 (Fla. 1942)…urse of conduct calculated to torture complaining spouse’s mental or emotional nature and affecting her bodily health. See Gratz v. Gratz, 137 Fla. 709, 188 Sou. 580. See also Henderson v. Henderson, 137 Fla. 770, 189 Sou. 724; Roebling v. Roebling, 119 Fla. 768, 161 Sou. 715; Diem v. Diem, 141 Fla. 260, 193 Sou. 65; Gratz v. Gratz, 127 Fla. 605, 173 Sou. 442; Walstrom v. Walstrom, 124 Fla. 366, 168 Sou. 532; Curry v. Curry, 120 Fla. 28, 162 Sou. 52; Nolan v. Nolan, 121 Fla. 130, 163 Sou. 401. It is also r…
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Gratz v. Gratz, 127 Fla. 605 (Fla. 1937)…defendant toward complainant, within the meaning and intent of paragraph 4, Section 4983, C. G. L., 3191 R. G. S., prescribing extreme cruelty as a ground of divorce. This is so, because we have heretofore announced the view in Roebling v. Roebling, 119 Fla. 768, 161 Sou. Rep. 715, that a continued and. persistent course of ruthless acts of connubial misbehavior purposely exhibited by one spouse toward the other with an associated force calculated to inhibit the injured spouse from discharging with reasonab…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Prall v. Prall, 58 Fla. 496 (Fla. 1909)
- Fekany v. Fekany, 118 Fla. 698 (Fla. 1935)