MELISSA AZRACK, ETC.
v.
JOHN M. MCDONALD, ETC.
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Melissa Azrack petitioned for a writ of prohibition seeking disqualification of the trial judge under Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.330(e). The Third District Court of Appeal granted the petition, finding that the allegations of judicial prejudice or bias met the legal sufficiency standard, though the court withheld issuance of the writ expressing confidence in the trial judge's compliance.
The court granted the petition for writ of prohibition, finding the allegations legally sufficient to meet the standard requiring disqualification. The court withheld issuance of the writ, expressing confidence that the trial judge would comply with the disqualification requirement.
[1] A motion to disqualify a judge is legally sufficient if the facts alleged, taken as true, would cause a reasonably prudent person to fear that they will not receive a fai…
[2] When ruling on the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify, the judge against whom the motion is directed may only determine the legal sufficiency and shall not pass…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the party reasonably fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically described prejudice or bias of the judge”
States the legal standard for disqualification under Florida Rule 2.330(e)(1)
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA trial judge was the subject of a motion to disqualify based on allegations of prejudice or bias. The petitioner alleged facts that, if taken as true…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Prejudice Of Judge cases and more on FLexlaw
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed May 10, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-0642 Lower Tribunal No. 21-2070-CP-02
________________
Melissa Azrack, etc.,
Petitioner,
vs.
John M. McDonald, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition. The Ferraro Law Firm, and Leslie B. Rothenberg; Barry S. Franklin & Associates, P.A., and Barry S. Franklin, for petitioner. Kluger, Kaplan, Silverman, Katzen & Levine, P.L., and Bruce A. Katzen, Lauren S. Fallick, and Madeleine E. Gross; Samson Appellate Law, and Daniel M. Samson, for respondents. Before SCALES, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ. LINDSEY, J.
Before us is a petition for writ of prohibition seeking disqualification of the trial judge. Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration
2.330(e) sets forth the grounds for a motion to disqualify. Relevant here is the following: “the party reasonably fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically described prejudice or bias of the judge . . . .” Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(e)(1). “The judge against whom an initial motion to disqualify under subdivision (e) is directed may determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion and shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged. . . . If the motion is legally sufficient, the judge shall immediately enter an order granting disqualification and proceed no further in the action. Such an order does not constitute acknowledgement that the allegations are true.” Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(h). The test for legal sufficiency is whether the facts alleged, taken as true, would cause a reasonably prudent person to fear that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing. See Casner v. Fury Mgmt., Inc., 324 So. 3d 1029, 1029 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2021). “[T]he standard is the reasonable effect on the party seeking disqualification, not the subjective intent of the judge.” Id. at 1030 (quoting
Haas v. Davis, 37 So. 3d 983, 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)). We take no position on the allegations other than to acknowledge them as true for purposes of ruling on this petition. And a trial judge’s determination similarly extends no further than to do the same. Given this standard, the allegations, no matter how inflammatory or salacious, are not necessarily a reflection on the trial judge as they cannot be responded to, examined in the context of the motives of the trial judge, nor challenged via cross-examination.
Accordingly, based on the record before us, we are compelled to grant the petition, but we withhold issuance of the writ as we are confident the trial judge will comply.
Petition granted.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Haas v. Davis, 37 So. 3d 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)
- Casner v. Fury Mgmt., Inc., 324 So. 3d 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)