IRICK, III
v.
JONES

Fla. 2d DCA | 2024-06-21
No. 2023-1638
Mooney
389 So. 3d 753 2024 FL 7592 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2024)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Andrew Irick appeals a trial court judgment finding him contractually and primarily liable for debt incurred by his coworker Dustin Jones, and denying him equitable subrogation relief. The appellate court affirmed the judgment because Irick failed to provide a trial transcript to challenge the trial court's factual findings regarding his status as primary obligor versus mere guarantor.

Holding

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Without a trial transcript, the appellate court could not disturb the trial court's factual finding that Irick was primarily liable, and thus he was not entitled to equitable subrogation, which requires that the subrogee not be primarily liable for the debt.

Headnotes

[1] Equitable subrogation is generally inappropriate where the subrogee was primarily liable for the debt.

[2] The burden is on the appellant to provide a complete record to the reviewing court, and failure to supplement an incomplete record is ordinarily fatal to the appellant's…

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Facts & Procedural History

Irick and his coworker Jones incurred debt, with Irick apparently making payments on Jones's behalf. Irick claimed he was merely a guarantor of loans …

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Topics
Guarantor Primary Liability Equitable Subrogation Appellate Review

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Opinion of the Court

June 21, 2024 Appeal from the County Court for Hillsborough County; J. Logan Murphy, Judge. Andrew G. Irick, III, pro se. No appearance for Appellee. ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.

Andrew Irick appeals from a final judgment in which the trial court determined that he was contractually and primarily liable for debt that his coworker, Dustin Jones, had incurred and was not entitled to recover against Jones as an equitable subrogee. On appeal, Irick claims that he was entitled to equitable subrogation because he had merely been the guarantor of loans made to Jones. In the final judgment, however, the court indicated that Irick had agreed—presumably at the bench trial— that he was contractually and primarily liable for Jones's debt.

We have no transcript of the bench trial or of the ensuing hearing on Irick's motion for rehearing; consequently, we have no basis to evaluate the factual underpinnings of the trial court's facially correct legal conclusion that Irick was not entitled to equitable subrogation.1 See Kvinta v. Kvinta, 277 So. 3d 1070, 1075–76 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) ("When 'there is no transcript of the testimony presented to the trial judge,' an appellate court should 'give utmost credence to his fact findings, and assume there was the best imaginable evidence adduced to support them.' " (quoting Hudson Pest Control, Inc. v. Westford Asset Mgmt., Inc., 622 So. 2d 546, 547 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993))); see also Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 646 (Fla. 1999) ("Equitable subrogation is generally appropriate where, . . . [among other things,] the subrogee was not primarily liable for the debt . . . .").

Although we in no way condone the conduct by Jones that apparently gave rise to this action, we are constrained to affirm.

Affirmed. MORRIS and BLACK, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

Footnotes
1 This appeal was originally set for oral argument, but this panel canceled the argument—plainly, we could not have engaged in any fact finding of our own. See Hall v. State, 541 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 1989) ("Appellate courts are reviewing, not fact-finding, courts."), receded from on other grounds by Coleman v. State, 64 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 2011). Instead, we gave Irick the opportunity to supplement the record with any transcripts or filings pertinent to his claim on appeal that contrary to the trial court's findings, he had merely been a loan guarantor. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(f)(2) ("If the court finds the record is incomplete, it must direct a party to supply the omitted parts of the record. No proceeding will be determined, because of an incomplete record, until an opportunity to supplement the record has been given."). He did not avail himself of that opportunity. See Esaw v. Esaw, 965 So. 2d 1261, 1264–65 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("The appellant has the burden of providing a proper record to the reviewing court, and the failure to do so is 'usually fatal' to the appellant's claims." (quoting Casella v. Casella, 569 So. 2d 848, 849 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990))); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(e) ("The burden to ensure that the record is prepared and transmitted in accordance with these rules will be on the petitioner or the appellant.").

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