MARY VASQUEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
LINDA LEE STARK AND CHARLES N. STARK, APPELLEES
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Vasquez sued Stark for injuries from a rear-end collision. The trial court denied Vasquez's motion for directed verdict and the jury ruled for Stark. The appellate court reversed, holding that Stark's explanation (brake failure) was insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence arising from the rear-end collision, and that directed verdict should have been granted on liability.
The court held that Stark's explanation was insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence. The fact that Stark did not take action to stop until she was only 2 car lengths from the vehicle, combined with her brakes functioning sufficiently to lock the wheels, distinguished this case from true brake failure. Directed verdict should have been granted on liability.
“the explanation given by the defendant, as to how the accident occurred, was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence which arose because of the rear end collision”
Establishes the court's core holding that Stark's brake-locking explanation failed to overcome the presumption of negligence from rear-end collisions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVasquez was riding in a vehicle that stopped due to traffic interference on Biscayne Boulevard in drizzling rain. Stark, driving behind Vasquez's vehi…
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The appellant brought the instant action in the trial court, seeking to recover damages for a personal injury allegedly received when the vehicle in which she was riding [which had come to a stop because of interference in traffic] was struck from the rear by a vehicle being driven by appellee Linda Lee Stark. Linda Lee Stark was the only witness to testify as to how the accident occurred. She stated she was driving south on Biscayne Boulevard in the drizzling rain, following the vehicle in which the appellant was riding, approximately 6 car lengths back. As she approached Northeast 52nd Street, she saw a car pulling out of a parking lot to the west of the street, so she started to decelerate as she knew the appellant’s vehicle had to stop. When she was 2 car lengths back, she “jammed” on her brakes, but her car would not stop as the brakes “locked”, and she struck the appellant’s vehicle in the rear. The cause went to the jury, which returned a verdict for the appellees. It is from the judgment entered, pursuant to that verdict, that this appeal is taken.
The principal point relied on by the appellant for reversal of the final judgment, was the failure of the trial court to direct a verdict at the conclusion of all the evidence, upon the basis that the defendant’s explanation of how the accident occurred was not substantial enough to rebut the presumption of negligence which arose from the rear end collision. See: Kimenker v. Greater Miami Car Rental, Inc., Fla.App.1959, 115 So.2d 191; Sheehan v. Allred, Fla.App.1962, 146 So.2d 760. The appellees urge that the trial judge was correct in denying the directed verdict, upon the authority of Pensacola Transit Co. v. Denton, Fla.App.1960, 119 So.2d 296.
We conclude that the explanation given by the defendant, as to how the accident occurred, was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence which arose because of the rear end collision, and that the trial judge was in error in failing to direct a verdict at the conclusion of all the evidence. The case of Pensacola Transit Co. v. Den-ton, supra, relied on by the appellees, does not appear to be applicable in the instant situation, in that it was specifically pointed out in that opinion that the reason for the inability of the bus to stop was the failure of the bus’s brakes to operate, plus the testimony of the bus driver that its air brakes “simply did not function”. In this case, although the Appellee Linda Lee Stark was about 6 car lengths behind the automobile in which the appellant was riding, she took no action to bring her vehicle to- a complete stop until she was only 2 car lengths from the vehicle she struck, and then “jammed” on her brakes and they functioned sufficiently to “lock” the wheels of her car and caused her to skid on the wet street into the rear of the stopped vehicle.
The judgment for the defendant is therefore reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court, with directions to enter an order granting plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict upon the issue of liability and granting plaintiff’s motion for a new trial upon the issue of damages.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Gulle v. Purley L. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1965)…icle will or will not stop within a certain distance. An additional factor which appears to us to generate jurisdictional conflict is the reliance which the Court of Appeal in the instant case placed upon its own prior decision in Vasquez v. Stark, 155 So. 2d 905. The decision in Vasquez, however, was quashed by this Court in Stark v. Vasquez, 168 So. 2d 140. In Kimenker v. Greater Miami Car Rental, Inc., 115 So. 2d 191, relied upon by the District Court, there was a total absence of any explanation of the…
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Purvis v. Inter-County Tel. & Tel. Co., 173 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1965)…nded this case for a new trial not only upon the issue of liability of the defendant-respondent, but also on the issue of damages. [*681] Petitioner also contends there is conflict between the decision below and Vasquez v. Stark (Fla.App.3rd, 1963), 155 So. 2d 905. Inasmuch as this Court quashed the decision in Vasquez v. Stark, supra, and directed that the issue of liability therein be determined by a jury (see Stark v. Vasquez, Fla., 168 So. 2d 140), this contention concerning conflict need not be considere…
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Baker v. Enid I. Deeks, 176 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)…ist that “the evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court,” and that the “explanation advanced by the defendant was not legally sufficient to affect the presumption of negligence.” They rely oh Vasquez v. Stark, Fla.App.1963, 155 So. 2d 905, and Boggs v. Gulle, Fla.App.1964, 162 So. 2d 286. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs failed to move for a directed verdict at the close of the defendant’s case, we cannot pass on the question. It is well settled that the sufficiency of the evidence is not…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pensacola Transit Co., Inc. v. Denton, 119 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)
- Sheehan v. Renne Emsley Allred, 146 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)
- Kimenker v. Greater Miami CAR Rental, Inc., 115 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)