DAPHNE WAKELEY
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Daphne Wakeley appeals from a trial court's order designating her a habitual felony offender. The appellate court affirms, finding no arguable issues and holding that Wakeley cannot challenge the trial court's grant of her own motion for judgment of acquittal since that ruling was favorable to her.
Wakeley cannot appeal from the grant of her own motion since that ruling was favorable to her. Additionally, no arguable sentencing issues exist, and the trial court's order designating Wakeley as a habitual felony offender is supported by the record.
[1] A defendant lacks appellate standing to challenge a trial court order granting his own motion for judgment of acquittal because such an order is not adverse to him within…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The state may appeal from: . . . A ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict.”
Establishes that only the state, not defendants, can appeal acquittal rulings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWakeley was convicted and the trial court designated her as a habitual felony offender under Florida Statute § 775.084(1)(a). The trial court subseque…
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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________
No. 1D2023-0245 _____________________________
DAPHNE WAKELEY,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v. STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County. Wesley R. Douglas, Judge.
November 20, 2024 PER CURIAM.
An Anders* review of the record in Daphne Wakeley’s case reveals no arguable issues on appeal. Wakeley did not preserve any sentencing error by making a contemporaneous objection or by filing a rule 3.800(b) motion. See Moore v. State, 768 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Even so, the record supports the trial court’s order designating Wakeley as a habitual felony offender. See § 775.084(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
* Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
2
Wakeley argues, in a pro se brief, that the trial court erred in granting his motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. Such a claim is not authorized. Section 924.07(1)(j), Florida Statutes, provides that “[t]he state may appeal from: . . . A ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict.” But section 924.06, which provides the orders from which a defendant may appeal, does not include an order granting a judgment of acquittal. See § 924.06, Fla. Stat.
Moreover, “[t]he general rule on appeal to review proceedings of an inferior court is that a party to the cause may appeal only from a decision in some respect adverse to him.” Credit Indus. Co. v. Remark Chem. Co., 67 So. 2d 540, 541 (Fla. 1953). See also Earl v. State, 276 So. 3d 359, 361–62 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (dismissing appeal from the trial court’s denial of a rule 3.800(a) motion asserting imposition of an illegal sentence because “that illegality is in appellant’s favor” and “[i]t is not adverse to him,” and concluding appellant was not aggrieved by the judgment). The trial court granted Wakeley’s renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, which was in his favor. He cannot now challenge the court’s decision to grant his own motion.
AFFIRMED.
ROWE, KELSEY, and LONG, JJ., concur.
_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
_____________________________
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Kasey Helms Lacey, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant/Cross- Appellee. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Travis W. Munden, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee/Cross- Appellant.
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- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967)
- Moore v. State, 768 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
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- Elliott Vargas v. State, 188 So. 3d 915 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)