YOUNG
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Adrian Young appeals from judgments and sentences imposed pursuant to a global plea agreement resolving five cases. The Florida Second District Court of Appeal reverses the trial court's denial of Young's postsentencing motion to withdraw his plea, holding that the trial court erred by failing to offer appointed counsel before summarily denying the motion.
The court held that a Rule 3.170(1) motion to withdraw a plea constitutes a critical stage of proceedings at which an indigent defendant is entitled to court-appointed, conflict-free counsel. Because the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel before summarily denying the motion, reversal is required, regardless of the facial sufficiency of the motion.
[1] A defendant is entitled to court-appointed counsel at a postsentencing motion to withdraw a plea, which is considered a critical stage of the proceedings.
[2] A waiver of the right to counsel applies only to the specific stage of proceedings for which it was made and must be renewed at each subsequent crucial stage.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[A] rule 3.170(1) motion to withdraw a plea is a critical stage of the proceedings during which an indigent defendant is entitled to court-appointed, conflict free counsel.”
Establishes the legal principle that plea withdrawal motions are critical stages requiring appointed counsel under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceYoung was on probation in three unrelated cases when the State filed two new charges arising from separate controlled cocaine buys. Representing himse…
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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
ADRIAN YOUNG,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
Nos. 2D2023-1507, 2D2023-1508
CONSOLIDATED
December 20, 2024
Appeals from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Barbara Twine Thomas, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Richard P. Albertine, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Krystle Celine Cacci, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. NORTHCUTT, Judge. In this consolidated appeal, Adrian Young appeals from his judgments and sentences imposed pursuant to a plea agreement. He raises several issues on appeal across both cases, but we reverse only the denial of his postsentencing motion to withdraw his plea. Young was already on probation in three unrelated cases when the State filed two new charges against him, arising from separate controlled cocaine buys.1 Young represented himself with the assistance of standby counsel. He ultimately negotiated a global plea agreement that resolved all five matters: he pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of simple delivery in the two pending cases, and he admitted violating his probation in the three previous cases. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent five-year prison sentences in each case, with credit for 502 days.
After sentencing, Young filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l). Finding the motion legally insufficient, the trial court summarily denied it without first offering Young appointed counsel. This was error. A defendant may waive the right to counsel at each crucial stage of the proceedings so long as defendant gives the waiver in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d). See Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 968 (Fla. 1992). A waiver of counsel applies only to that stage of the proceedings and must be renewed at each subsequent crucial stage at which the defendant remains unrepresented. Id. at 968. Accordingly, if the trial court accepts a waiver of counsel at any stage, rule 3.111(d)(5) requires the court to renew the offer of counsel "at each subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the defendant appears without counsel."
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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- Vermont Smith v. State, 849 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- J.M.B. v. State, 776 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Rickardo Stephens v. State, 141 So. 3d 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)