DIXON
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The State's evidence was legally inadequate to prove that Dixon had the conscious intent that the crimes be committed and performed an act or utterance that incited, caused, encouraged, assisted, or advised another person to actually commit the crimes.
[1] Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to establish liability as a principal; the State must prove both the defendant's conscious intent that the crime be…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[I]n order to be a principal in a crime, one must have a conscious intent that the crime be done and must do some act or say some word which was intended to and does incite, cause, encourage, assist, or advise another person to actually commit the crime.”
Court statement of the legal standard for principal liability, citing State v. Tovar.
Dixon was convicted by jury of second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder as a principal to both crimes. Following the verdict, Dixon fil…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Principal In The First Degree cases and more on FLexlaw
Naldrec Dixon appeals from his judgment and sentences for second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder. The jury found Dixon guilty as a principal to both crimes. Following the verdict, Dixon filed a motion for judgment of acquittal arguing that the State's evidence failed to establish that he acted as a principal. Dixon's motion was well-taken and should have been granted. "[I]n order to be a principal in a crime, one must have a conscious intent that the crime be done and must do some act or say some word which was intended to and does incite, cause, encourage, assist, or advise another person to actually commit the crime." See State v. Tovar, 110 So. 3d 33, 36 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting L.J.S. v. State, 909 So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)). In this case, the State's evidence was legally inadequate as to both elements. Cf. Rocker v. State, 122 So. 3d 898, 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("In order to convict Rocker as a principal, the State had to prove two elements: (1) that Rocker intended for the robbery to be committed and (2) that Rocker assisted Banks in the commission of the offense."); Hanks v. State, 43 So. 3d 917, 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("Mere presence at the scene of an offense is not sufficient to support a principals instruction."); Rocker, 122 So. 3d at 906 (Northcutt, J., concurring) ("[I]ntent cannot be circumstantially proved unless one or more of the circumstances demonstrate knowledge."). Accordingly, we reverse Dixon's judgment and sentences and remand for entry of an order granting Dixon's motion for judgment of acquittal and for his discharge. Reversed and remanded.
KHOUZAM and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Rocker v. State, 122 So. 3d 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
- State v. Tovar, 110 So. 3d 33 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
- Cleveland Hanks v. State, 43 So. 3d 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)
- L.J.S. v. State, 909 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)