AMPARO DENIS

v.

SEASONS GARDENS SENIOR RESIDENCE, LLC

1 Although the reasoning set forth in the trial court’s written order was aimed only at the judicial default, because the order grants Seasons Gardens’ motion, which sought to set aside and vacate both the clerk’s default and the judicial default, and the trial court orally pronounced that the case would proceed to the merits, we conclude the order on appeal set aside both the clerk’s default and the judicial default. See, e.g., Cancino v. Cancino, 273 So. 3d 122, 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (stating that “a trial court’s oral pronouncement controls over its written order”). reply brief addressing Seasons Gardens’ jurisdictional argument, or otherwise. Seasons Gardens’ jurisdictional argument has merit. Each of the defaults entered against Seasons Gardens is a non-final, non-appealable order. Specifically, “[c]lerk’s defaults are not independently appealable.” Fascetti v. Fascetti, 795 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); see also Kudriaszow-Zwerle v. Stopper, 29 So. 3d 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (table) (dismissing appeal from clerk’s default). Likewise, an order entering a judicial default is not a final appealable order, as it does not put an end to judicial labor in the case, nor is such an order included in the schedule of appealable, non-final orders set forth in rule 9.130(a)(3). Valledor Co. v. Decky, 338 So. 3d 956, 958 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (explaining that judicial default is neither final order nor appealable non-final order under rule 9.130(a)(3)). This latter proposition holds true even when the judicial default constitutes a default judgment as to liability. See id. at 958; Pineside Condo. Ass’n v. Rey, 342 So. 3d 741, 741 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (dismissing appeal of default judgment as to liability only as one taken from non-final, non-appealable order and stating that “orders determining the issue of liability only are not appealable until a final judgment has been entered”); Medeiros v. Firth, 200 So. 3d 121, 122 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (“Florida law makes no provision for a ‘final judgment as to liability.’ . . . A default judgment entered against a defendant as to liability is not a final judgment; rather, it is a non-final, non-appealable order.”); Kogan v. Mildenberger, 127 So. 3d 831, 832 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). Because the underlying default orders were non- final, the trial court’s order setting aside those defaults is also a non-final, non-appealable order. See Carbajal v. De La Caridad Paz, 719 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (dismissing appeal from order vacating default and default judgment on liability “as the order is not an appealable nonfinal order under Fla. R. App. P. 9.130”); Collins v. Penske Truck Leasing, 668 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“It is well established that an order of a trial court which sets aside a clerk’s default is not appealable as a non-final order.”). The fact that Seasons Gardens moved to set aside and vacate the defaults under rule 1.540(b) does not alter our conclusion that we are without jurisdiction to review the challenged order. Rule 9.130(a)(5) provides for appellate review of “[o]rders entered on an authorized and timely motion for relief from judgment.” However, a 1.540(b) motion for relief from judgment, decree, or orders is “authorized” only when it is directed toward a final order. Fabre v. 4647 Block, LLC, 2024 WL 4219455, *2, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D1914 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 18, 2024) (“By its plain text, Rule 1.540(b) only applies to final orders. ‘The rule does not . . . authorize a trial court to grant relief from a non-final order.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Garcia v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 224 So. 3d 339, 340 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017))); Bennett’s Leasing, Inc. v. First St. Mortg. Corp., 870 So. 2d 93, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (“[R]ule 1.540 authorizes motions seeking relief only from “a final judgment, decree, order, or proceeding.”); Bryant v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 182 So. 3d 927, 930 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (noting “that a motion to vacate pursuant to Rule 1.540(b) cannot be directed toward non-final orders”). Here, because Seasons Gardens’ 1.540(b) motion sought to set aside or vacate non-final orders, the motion was not authorized. We therefore lack appellate jurisdiction to review the resulting order under rule 9.130(a)(5).2 See Fabre, 2024 WL 4219455 at *2, 49 Fla. L. Weekly at D1914 (holding that because motion for relief from judgment filed under rule 1.540(b) was not authorized, this court lacked jurisdiction under rule 9.130(a)(5) to review order denying motion); Bennett’s Leasing, Inc., 870 So. 2d at 98 (“An order entered on a motion to vacate a non-final order, even where the motion mislabels the non-

2 That Seasons Gardens’ motion to set aside and vacate was unauthorized under rule 1.540(b) does not mean that the trial court lacked inherent authority to reconsider its non-final order granting a judicial default. Silverstrone v. Edell, 721 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1998) (stating that “the trial court retains inherent authority to reconsider and, if deemed appropriate, alter or retract any of its nonfinal rulings prior to entry of the final judgment or order terminating an action”); AC Holdings 2006, Inc. v. McCarty, 985 So. 2d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“[A] trial court has inherent authority to reconsider and modify its interlocutory orders.”). final order as final, is not reviewable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(5).”). Accordingly, because the trial court’s non-final order setting aside the non-final default orders entered against Seasons Gardens is neither appealable under rule 9.130(a)(3)’s schedule of appealable non-final orders nor under rule 9.130(a)(5), this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appeal dismissed.