PAN AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, A LOUISIANA CORPORATION, DOING BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ABRAHAM RAIJ, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1963-05-21
No. 62-671
Before CARROLL, BARKDULL and HENDRY, JJ.
156 So. 2d 785 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1963) Negative Treatment
Cited by 3 cases
Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, defendant in the trial court, appeals a summary final decree adjudicating that a certain policy of insurance issued by it [an American concern] to a Cuban national was still in full force and effect in accordance with its terms, and that the company was required to accept premiums in United States currency and required to pay amounts due under the contract in United States currency.

This action of the trial judge is affirmed upon the authority of Pan American Life Insurance Company v. Agustin Goytisolo Recio, Fla.App., 1963, 154 So.2d 197.1

Affirmed.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant has filed a petition for rehearing, pointing out that, in rendering the opinion in this cause, the court overlooked and failed to consider its contention that this transaction was governed by the Bretton Woods Agreement relating to tire International Monetary Fund and the Federal legislation pertaining thereto. See: 22 U.S.C.A. § 286 et seq. At the time of the original opinion in this cause, this Agreement was considered and deemed to be not applicable, for the reason that the contract involved was a contract with an American company, made in the United States, payable in United States Dollars; that premiums had been accepted in United States Dollars since 1942, and that the effect of the chancellor’s decree was only to require the appellant to continue to accept premium payments in United States Dollars. Not only were we of the opinion that the Bretton Woods Agreement was not applicable to the contract in the instant case, we were further of the opinion that the Bretton Woods Agreement pertained only to contracts “involving the currency of any member” of the Fund and that an American contract, upon which payments were to be made to or by the appellant in United States currency, was not an unenforceable contract within the provisions of Article VIII, § 2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement.1a

Denied.

Other
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant has filed a petition for rehearing, pointing out that, in rendering the opinion in this cause, the court overlooked and failed to consider its contention that this transaction was governed by the Bretton Woods Agreement relating to tire International Monetary Fund and the Federal legislation pertaining thereto. See: 22 U.S.C.A. § 286 et seq. At the time of the original opinion in this cause, this Agreement was considered and deemed to be not applicable, for the reason that the contract involved was a contract with an American company, made in the United States, payable in United States Dollars; that premiums had been accepted in United States Dollars since 1942, and that the effect of the chancellor’s decree was only to require the appellant to continue to accept premium payments in United States Dollars. Not only were we of the opinion that the Bretton Woods Agreement was not applicable to the contract in the instant case, we were further of the opinion that the Bretton Woods Agreement pertained only to contracts “involving the currency of any member” of the Fund and that an American contract, upon which payments were to be made to or by the appellant in United States currency, was not an unenforceable contract within the provisions of Article VIII, § 2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement.1a

Denied.

1a

. “ ‘Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations' of that member' maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member.’ ”

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Cahill v. Cooney, 182 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
    …e part of the defendant and, therefore, find the smmary judgment to have been correctly entered by the trial court. See: Griffis v. DuBow, Fla.App. 1959, 114 So. 2d 207; Harper v. Mangel, Fla.App.1963, 151 So. 2d 346; Lake v. Stiegler, Fla.App.1963, 156 So. 2d 785. The appellants also urge error in the failure of the trial court to grant them additional time to locate and depose another investigating officer. The court’s ruling on this motion clearly indicates that same came too late, as the following is fou…
  • PAN Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Botana, 163 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
    …he view that the opinion and judgment of this court filed on April 10, 1964 (not reported) should be vacated and withdrawn, and the judgment of the circuit court affirmed on the authority of Pan American Life Insurance Company v. Raij, Fla.App.1963, 156 So. 2d 785, and Pan-American Life Insurance Company v. Recio, Fla.App.1963, 154 So. 2d 197. Accordingly, the previous opinion and judgment of this court is hereby vacated and withdrawn, and the judgment of the circuit court appealed from will now stand affirm…
  • PAN Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Raij, 164 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1964)
    …PER CURIAM. Conflict certiorari is granted. The decision of the District Court of Appeal herein, 156 So. 2d 785, having been found to be in conflict with Confederation Life Ass’n v. Ugalde, 164 So. 2d 1, 3, recently decided by this court, is quashed and the cause remanded for disposition not inconsistent with the views expressed in the Ugalde case, supra. It…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw