ANDRADE

v.

DADE COUNTY

Citator

Cited By

• Cent. Home Tr. Co. OF Elizabeth v. Lippincott, 392 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
  …that the note was accelerated. Under the terms of this note, Central had the option of accelerating if a default occurred. Default by the makers alone could not accelerate the indebtedness. Baader v. Walker, 153 So. 2d 51 (Fla.2d DCA), cert. denied 156 So. 2d 858 (Fla.1963). To constitute an acceleration after default, where the holder has the option to accelerate, the holder or payee of the note must take some clear and equivocal action indicating its intent to accelerate all payments under the note, and su…
• KRC Enters., Inc. v. Soderquist, 553 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
  …n, prevails over the language in the note. Grier v. M.H.C. Realty Corp., 274 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). Therefore, the five year statute of limitations had not run. Appellee relies on Baader v. Walker, 153 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 156 So. 2d 858 (Fla.1963), in which the court held that an acceleration clause identical to the clause in the note here was automatic. Appellee’s reliance, however, is misplaced because Baader concerned the construction of a single acceleration clause, not reconci…
• Pici v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla., 621 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
  …ately due and payable without giving [the mortgagor] any advance notice.” First Union’s contractually expressed right to accelerate is not a self-executing type as was the one described in Baader v. Walker, 153 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 156 So. 2d 858 (Fla.1963). Rather, the acceleration clause at hand requires after a default that First Union “take some clear and equivocal [sic] action indicating its intent to accelerate all payments under the note, and such action should apprise the maker of th…

Authorities Cited

• Areta Gary DAY also known as Areta Garey Day v. Cleo E. Destin, 151 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)