ROBERT JENKINS
v.
STATE

Fla. | 1935-06-04
Whitfield, C. J., and Ellis, Terrell and Brown, J. J., concur., Buford, J., dissents.
120 Fla. 26 Florida Supreme Court (1935) Caution
Also reported at: 161 So. 840
Cited by 38 cases

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Synopsis

Robert Jenkins was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for killing a woman. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence of premeditated design was insufficient where the defendant's uncontradicted account described the killing as occurring during mutual combat and the only inference of premeditation was the temporary concealment of the body.


Holding

The court held that the conviction must be reversed because the evidence of premeditated design was insufficient. Where a defendant's uncontradicted account describes a killing under circumstances that would constitute murder in the second degree or manslaughter at most, and no other facts, circumstances, or credible testimony contradicts this account, a first-degree murder verdict cannot be sustained.


Key Quotes

“where there is a total absence of any other evidence except the defendant's own account of a killing in which he admits giving the fatal wound to the deceased, but states it to have been under circumstances that would have made out murder in the second degree or manslaughter at the most, and there is no other fact or circumstances, nor testimony of witness legally sufficient to contradict the defendant's account of the transaction, a verdict for premeditated murder will not be sustained.”

Establishes the legal standard that an uncontradicted defense account describing lesser culpability cannot support a first-degree murder conviction.

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Facts & Procedural History

Jenkins was charged with murdering a woman. Jenkins admitted to the killing but claimed it occurred during a fight with the woman, who had bitten his …

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Opinion of the Court
Davis, J.

Davis, J.

From a sentence of death the plaintiff in error appeals to this Court, assigning as' error the inconclusive nature of the evidence as to premeditated design in a prosecution brought against him for murder in the first degree of which he was found guilty.

Like Moses, the Biblical character, whose justifiable killing of the Egyptian (Exodus' 2: 11-15) was followed by *27the concealment of the victim’s body in order to avoid arrest and execution for his deed, the defendant in this case, in his version of the homicide, which is uncontradicted, admitted that after the killing the negro woman with whom he was at the time having a personal encounter, he became afraid and “looked this way and that way, and when he saw that there was no man he slew (his vittim) and hid her in the sand,” but that the killing was in the course of a fight between him and the slain woman, his wife, and that the cutting occurred with a knife with which the woman herself first attacked him, after biting his arm and otherwise demonstrating that she intended to inflict serious bodily injuries on him.

A majority of the Court are of the opinion that the present case is within the rule of Holton v. State, 87 Fla. 65, 99 Sou. Rep. 244, wherein this Court approved a rule to the effect that where there is a total absence of any other evidence except the defendant’s own account of a killing in which he admits giving the fatal wound to the deceased, but states it to have been under circumstances that would have made out murder in the second degree or manslaughter at the most, and there is no other fact or circumstances, nor testimony of witness legally sufficient to contradict the defendant’s account of the transaction, a verdict for premeditated murder will not be sustained.

■ In cases where capital punishment" has been exacted by a jury’s verdict in a first degree murder conviction, the evidence of the premeditated design ought to be supported by something more than guesswork and suspicion, especially where the account of the homicide, as given by the accused, indicates a slaying in mutual combat under circumstances not making out a case of premeditation and there is no evidence from which to infer premeditation except the *28bare fact of the concealment of the whereabouts of the body of the victim for a short time, followed by its voluntary disclosure to the officers, who testify they employed no duress or other unlawful means to induce the defendant to tell about the occurrence.

Reversed for a new trial.

Whitfield, C. J., and Ellis, Terrell and Brown, J. J., concur.

Buford, J., dissents.

Buford, J.

(dissenting). — The writ of error is to review a judgment of conviction of murder in the 'first degree.

It is’ contended that the evidence is not sufficient to establish venue in Orange County, Florida, and is also insufficient to prove the element of premeditated design. I find sufficient substantial evidence to warrant the jury in concluding that the homicide occurred in Orange County, Florida. See Lowman v. State, 80 Fla. 18, 85 Sou. 166.

I also think all the circumstances surrounding the homicide, the nature of the fatal wound, the conduct of the accused, who admitted the killing and the unreasonableness of the version of the homicide as detailed by the accused when testifying as a witness in his own behalf, were sufficient to convince the jury that the accused was guilty of murder in the first degree.

The judgment should be affirmed.

Dissent
Buford, J.

Buford, J.

(dissenting). — The writ of error is to review a judgment of conviction of murder in the 'first degree.

It is’ contended that the evidence is not sufficient to establish venue in Orange County, Florida, and is also insufficient to prove the element of premeditated design. I find sufficient substantial evidence to warrant the jury in concluding that the homicide occurred in Orange County, Florida. See Lowman v. State, 80 Fla. 18, 85 Sou. 166.

I also think all the circumstances surrounding the homicide, the nature of the fatal wound, the conduct of the accused, who admitted the killing and the unreasonableness of the version of the homicide as detailed by the accused when testifying as a witness in his own behalf, were sufficient to convince the jury that the accused was guilty of murder in the first degree.

The judgment should be affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Mayo v. State, 71 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1954)
    …the death Of the deceased as told by the accused as a witness 'in his .own behalf is uncontradicted,” the defendant being the only witness as to the beginning of the fracas and the infliction of fatal wounds. Again, in Jenkins v. State, 120 Fla. 26, 161 So. 840, we reversed a first-degree murder conviction where the defendant’s version [*904] of the killing was not contradicted. There we said, “the'evidence of the premeditated design-ought to be supported by something more than-guess work and suspicion, es…
  • Cochran v. State, 547 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1989)
    …the state’s proof fails to exclude a reasonable hypothesis that the homicide occurred other than by premeditated design, a verdict of first-degree murder cannot be sustained. Hall v. State, 403 So. 2d 1319 (Fla.1981); Jenkins v. State, 120 Fla. 26, 161 So. 840 (1935); Tien Wang v. State, 426 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 434 So. 2d 889 (Fla.1983). In Hall, two would-be convenience store robbers shot and killed a deputy sheriff in a parking lot behind the store. Two eyewitnesses testified they…
  • Sie Dawson v. State, 139 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1962)
    …, rape, robbery [or] burglary, * * * it shall be murder in the third degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding twenty years.” F.S. Sec. 782.04, F.S.A. . Mayo v. State, Fla.1954, 71 So. 2d 899; Jenkins v. State, 120 Fla. 26, 161 So. 840. . § 782.04, F.S., paragraph 3, F.S.A. . § 782.04, F.S., paragraph 1, F.S.A. . Brown v. State, Fla., 124 So. 2d 481, citing Sec. 918.10(4), F.S., and earlier decisions on the point. . Id., at 486-488. . F.S. Sec. 919.14, F.S.A., no…

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