ROBERT E. PENTON, SR., PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
POMPANO CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., AND FUTCH LEASING, INC., DEFENDANTS, FUTCH CONSTRUCTION, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

11th Cir. | 1992-05-29
No. 90-5469
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, and DYER, Senior Circuit Judge.
963 F.2d 321 Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (1992) Caution
Cited by 9 cases
Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM:

PER CURIAM: We lack jurisdiction in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1990) because we do not have a final judgment terminating the case as to all of the claims and parties. Williams v. Bishop, 732 F. 2d 885, 886 (11th Cir.1984). Specifically, the district court did not dispose of the plaintiffs, Robert E. Penton, Sr.’s (Penton), claims against one of the three defendants, Pompano Construction Company, Inc.

The district court did dispose finally of Penton’s claims against the appellant, Futch Construction, Inc. (Futch), awarding him $210,000 in damages.

The district court, however, did not enter this judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (1990), so as to render the judgment appealable under section 1291. Rather than dismiss this appeal, we stay our hand to permit Penton to obtain from the district court a final judgment against Futch, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). We give Penton, or Futch in his stead, thirty days to obtain that judgment. If a Rule 54(b) judgment is entered within that time and Futch takes a new appeal, this court shall consolidate that appeal with the instant appeal and, without further briefing, forthwith dismiss the current appeal and dispose of the new appeal on the merits. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Constr. Aggregates, Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 1998)
    …wer than all the claims, the district court — for proper appellate jurisdiction — must certify, under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(b), that no just reason exists for delay and expressly direct an entry of judgment. See Penton v. Pompano Constr. Co., Inc., 963 F. 2d 321, 321-22 (11th Cir.1992). No rule 54(b) certification is present in this case. For another means of making a district court order appealable even when it is not final, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). . FCC claims that the notice of appeal in Ryan also ca…
  • Hunt v. Hawthorne Assocs., Inc., 119 F.3d 888 (11th Cir. 1997)
    …t as having terminated Count VII of Hunt’s amended complaint, we have a final judgment before us that is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the judgment has adjudicated all claims against all parties. See, e.g., Penton v. Pompano Constr. Co., 963 F. 2d 321, 321-22 (11th Cir.1992). Hunt’s amendment of his complaint, which deleted ALPA and O’Connor from the action, operated to dismiss those parties from the suit. See supra note 42. The amendment, however, did not operate to dismiss Eastern from the ca…
  • Haney v. City OF Cumming, 69 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1995)
    …, as is the case here, the district court’s ruling is merely interlocutory and not an appealable final decision over which we have jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see Mesa v. United States, 61 F. 3d 20 (11th Cir.1995); Penton v. Pompano Constr. Co., 963 F. 2d 321 (11th Cir.1992); Charles A. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 102, at 756 (5th ed. 1994). The Plaintiffs and the Forsyth County Defendants argue that we have the authority to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the remaining claims since they are pe…

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