FLOYD T. BRYAN; FLOYD T. BRYAN, M.D., P.A., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, CROSS-APPELLANTS,

v.

JAMES E. HOLMES REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, A/K/A HOLMES REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, CROSS-APPELLEE, RAYMOND A. ARMSTRONG, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF SURGERY, HRMC AND AS MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HRMC; RICHARD N. BANEY, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HRMC; MICHAEL J. FOLEY, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MEDICAL DIRECTOR, HRMC; MICHAEL V. GATTO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HRMC; JAMES E. GRAY, III, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HRMC; JOSEPH A. GURRI, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CHIEF OF THE MEDICAL STAFF, HRMC; MARTIN W. ISENMAN, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HRMC; DAVID M. JONES, MAJ. GEN. (RETIRED), INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TREASURER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HRMC; MICHAEL F. MAGUIRE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HRMC; FRED L. MCFARLIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HRMC; JOHN E. MILLER, PH.D., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECOND VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HRMC; BARRY A. MILLS, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, HRMC; LYLE SALTZMAN, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, HRMC; VAL M. STEELE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HRMC; LYNN STOLDT, R.N., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HEAD OPERATING ROOM NURSE, HRMC; RUSSELL P. SULLIVAN, JR., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HRMC; JOHN F. TURNER, JR., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS FIRST VICE CHAIRMAN OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HRMC; RITA WHEELER, R.N., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS OPERATING ROOM SUPERVISOR, HRMC, DEFENDANTS

TJOFLAT, Chief Judge: In this case, a Florida hospital, after completing a lengthy internal disciplinary process, terminated the clinical staff privileges of a staff physician.

The physician sued the hospital, alleging various state and federal causes of action and seeking money damages.

After an eleven-day trial, a federal jury concluded that the hospital had revoked the physician’s staff privileges in violation of its bylaws and awarded the physician nearly $4.2 million in damages for breach of contract.

The hospital appeals that judgment as well as the district court’s denial of its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, which contended that the hospital was immune from liability in money damages under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (“HCQIA”),⁴² U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and under Florida law, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 395.0193(5) (West 1993).

Because we conclude that the hospital was entitled to protection from monetary liability under HCQIA, we reverse. I.

Peer review, the process by which physicians and hospitals evaluate and discipline staff doctors, has become an integral component of the health care system in the United States.

Congress enacted the Health Care Quality Improvement Act to encourage such peer review activities, “to improve the quality of medical care by encouraging physicians to identify and discipline other physicians who are incompetent or who engage in unprofessional behavior.” H.R.Rep.

No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.², reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6384, 6384.

Congressional findings, recited in the text of the statute itself, note that “[t]he increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the need to improve the quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that warrant greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual State,”⁴² U.S.C. § 11101(1), and that these problems “can be remedied through effective professional peer review,” id. § 11101(3).

In furtherance of this goal, HCQIA grants limited immunity, in suits brought by disciplined physicians, from liability for money damages to those who participate in professional peer review activities.

Id. § 11111(a).

Prior to the passage of HCQIA, the specter of litigation seriously impeded the development and vigorous enforcement of hospital peer review procedures.

Congress found that “[t]he threat of private money damage liability under [state and] Federal laws, including treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective professional peer review.”

Id. § 11101(4).

Accordingly, HCQIA provides that, if a “professional review action” (as defined in the statute) meets certain due process and fairness requirements, then those participating in such a review process shall not be hable under any state or federal law for damages for the results.

Id. § 11111(a)(1).

Thus, “[d]octors and hospitals who have acted in accordance with the reasonable belief, due process, and other requirements of [HCQIA] are protected from damages sought by a disciplined doctor.” H.R.Rep. 903, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6885.

HCQIA is designed to facilitate the frank exchange of information among professionals conducting peer review inquiries without the fear of reprisals in civil lawsuits.

The statute attempts to balance the chilling effect of litigation on peer review with concerns for protecting physicians improperly subjected to disciplinary action; accordingly, Congress granted immunity from monetary damages to participants in properly conducted peer review proceedings while preserving causes of action for injunctive or declaratory relief for aggrieved physicians.

Because the statutory scheme is somewhat convoluted, we discuss the immunity provisions in detail.

The provision of HCQIA that limits the availability of damages for professional review actions provides as follows: If a professional review action (as defined in ... this title) of a professional review body meets all the standards specified in section 11112(a) of this title, ... (A) the professional review body, (B) any person acting as a member or staff to the body, (C) any person under a contract or other formal agreement with the body, and (D) any person who participates with or assists the body with respect to the action, shall not be liable in damages under any law of the United States or of any State (or political subdivision thereof) with respect to the action.

The standards that professional review actions must satisfy to entitle the participants to such protection are enumerated in section 11112(a) as follows: For purposes of the protection set forth in section 11111(a) of this title, a professional review action must be taken— (1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality-health care, (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter, (3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).

Id. § 11112(a).

Importantly, HCQIA also creates a rebuttable presumption of immunity: “A professional review action shall be presumed to have met the preceding standards necessary for the protection set out in section 11111(a) of this title unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.”

Id.

Section 11112(b) of HCQIA then enumerates the minimum, or “safe harbor” procedures that will, in every case, satisfy the adequate notice and hearing requirement of section 11112(a)(3).

Id. § 11112(b).

Organized in the form of a detailed checklist, the provision defines what hospitals conducting peer review disciplinary procedures must do to obtain the Act’s protections for itself and the members of its peer review bodies.

We discuss this checklist in more detail infra in part III.

Congress was careful to explain, however, that “[a] professional review body’s failure to meet the conditions described in this subsection shall not, in itself, constitute failure to meet the standards of subsection (a)(3) of this section.”

Id.

The legislative history of section 11112(a) indicates that the statute’s reasonableness requirements were intended to create an objective standard of performance, rather than a subjective good faith standard.

As the House Committee on Energy and Commerce explained: Initially, the Committee considered a “good faith” standard for professional review actions.

In response to concerns that “good faith” might be misinterpreted as requiring only a test of the subjective state of mind of the physicians conducting the professional review action, the Committee changed to a more objective “reasonable belief’ standard.

The Committee intends that this test will be satisfied if the reviewers, with the information available to them at the time of the professional review action, would reasonably have concluded that their action would restrict incompetent behavior or would protect patients. H.R.Rep.

No. 903, at 10, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6392-93.

See Austin v. McNamara, 979 F. 2d 728, 734 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that HCQIA reasonableness requirements create an objective standard, rather than a good faith requirement). A review of the facts of this case reveal that HCQIA’s limitations on monetary liability dictate the outcome of this appeal.

II.

The appellant, Holmes Regional Medical Center (“Holmes” or “the Hospital”), is a nonprofit corporation operating a private hospital in Melbourne, Florida.

The appel-lee, Dr. Floyd T.

Bryan, is a board-certified physician who specializes in general and vascular surgery.

Bryan became a member of the Holmes medical staff in 1976; he is generally acknowledged to be an excellent surgeon, often undertaking long, detailed vascular procedures that other physicians in the field avoid.

Bryan also has a reputation for being a volcanic-tempered perfectionist, a difficult man with whom to work, and a person who regularly viewed it as his obligation to criticize staff members at Holmes for perceived incompetence or inefficiency.

Hospital employees, however, often viewed Bryan’s “constructive criticism” as verbal — or even physical — abuse.

Because the Holmes board of directors found Bryan’s behavior inappropriate and unprofessional, it terminated his medical staff privileges in November 1990.

The means by which Holmes accomplished this termination is the subject of the dispute in this case. A.

The organizational structure at Holmes, as is the case at most hospitals, is bifurcated, reflecting the distinct roles of the Hospital administration and of the medical staff.

Holmes is governed by a board of directors, comprised mostly of non-physicians, that retains the ultimate responsibility for the operation of the facility.

The board employs a staff, led by a president and chief executive officer (“CEO”), to manage the hospital on a day-to-day basis.

The medical staff organization, which consists of all doctors with privileges to practice at Holmes, represents the physicians in the Hospital’s government.

The medical staff is led by an elected chief of staff who presides over the medical executive committee, which comprises the chairpersons of the various clinical departments as well as several officers elected by the staff at large.

The Holmes board of directors promulgates bylaws for the medical staff, by which all physicians receiving staff privileges at the Hospital agree to be bound.

The bylaws provide a detailed series of procedures for handling physician disciplinary actions.

Under those bylaws, the medical staff, through its executive committee, may recommend that the board of directors suspend or revoke the privileges of a physician.

Although the board retains the ultimate authority over staff privileges, the recommendations of the medical staff are given considerable weight.

This system, which is known as peer review, is designed to raise the quality of medical care by encouraging physicians to police themselves.

Florida law mandates that hospitals provide for peer review of their staff doctors.

Under the Holmes bylaws, certain hospital officials may request an executive committee investigation into a physician’s conduct if the medical staff member fails to comply with the ethics of the medical profession or with the Hospital’s bylaws, or if “the Staff appointee is unable to work harmoniously with others to the extent that it affects the orderly operation of the hospital or Medical Staff organization.”

Grounds for investigation also include questions regarding a physician’s clinical competence or his care and treatment of patients.

Once an investigation is initiated, the executive committee is charged with making a recommendation to the board of directors concerning the level of discipline that should be imposed.

The executive committee’s recommendation may range from a written warning to revocation of clinical privileges, but a recommendation involving the reduction, suspension, or revocation of clinical privileges entitles the physician to the extensive procedural hearing rights outlined in the bylaws.

The executive committee’s recommendation is forwarded to the CEO of the hospital, who notifies the physician under scrutiny.

The physician has twenty days from receipt of the notice to make a written request for a hearing.

If the physician waives his or her right to a hearing, the CEO forwards the recommendation (along with the supporting documentation) to the board of directors for a final disposition of the matter. When a physician requests a formal hearing, the executive committee appoints a hearing panel consisting of seven members of the medical staff who have not taken active part in consideration of the matter contested; mere knowledge of the matter does not preclude a staff member from serving on a hearing panel.

According to the bylaws, “[t]he purpose of the hearing shall be to recommend a course of action to those acting for the hospital.... [T]he duties of the Hearing Panel shall be so defined and so carried out.”

The medical staff bylaws contain detailed procedures governing the hearing process, including provisions for written notice of the time and place for the hearing, prompt scheduling, and lists of witnesses.

The physician requesting the hearing is entitled to representation, and has full rights of cross-examination and confrontation of witnesses.

The executive committee designates someone, who may be an attorney, to present the disciplinary recommendation that led to the hearing and to examine witnesses.

In addition, the CEO appoints a hearing officer, who must be an attorney, to preside over the hearing and to rule on the admissibility of evidence; the hearing officer must not act as a prosecuting officer or as an advocate for the hospital.

The bylaws recognize that all members of the hearing panel, as practicing physicians, cannot be present for all panel sessions and expressly provide that their absence will not disqualify them or invalidate the hearing.

The decision of the hearing panel is to be based on the evidence produced at the hearing, whether in the form of oral testimony of witnesses or documentary evidence.

The bylaws specifically provide that the evidence may include “any material contained in the hospital’s files regarding the [complained-against physician] who requested the hearing so long as this material has been admitted into evidence at the hearing and the [physician] who requested the hearing had the opportunity to comment on and, by other evidence, refute it.”

The “burden of proof’ is established as follows: “[T]he Hearing Panel shall recommend against the [physician] who requested the hearing unless it finds that said [physician] has proved that the recommendation which prompted the hearing was unreasonable, not sustained by the evidence, or otherwise unfounded.”

After reaching a decision, the hearing panel is to “render a recommendation, accompanied by a report, which shall contain a concise statement of the reasons justifying the recommendation made....”

The report is then forwarded to the executive committee for whatever modification, if any, it may wish to make in its original recommendation.

The executive committee’s decision on modification is purely discretionary.

Within fifteen days after the affected physician is notified of final adverse action by the executive committee, the doctor may make a written request for appellate review by the board of directors.

If appellate review is not requested within the fifteen-day period, the affected individual is deemed to have accepted the recommendation involved “and it shall thereupon become final and immediately effective.”

The terms of the bylaws limit the grounds upon which an adverse disciplinary recommendation may be appealed to the following: there was substantial failure on the part of the Executive Committee or Hearing Panel to comply with the hospital or Medical Staff Bylaws in the conduct of hearings and recommendations based upon hearings so as to deny due process or a fair hearing; or the recommendation was made arbitrarily, capriciously, or with prejudice; or the recommendation of the Executive Committee or Hearing Panel was not supported by the evidence.

Under time constraints imposed by the bylaws, the chairman of the board appoints a board review panel (consisting of three or more persons, including board members or “reputable persons outside the hospital”) to consider the record upon which the disciplinary recommendation was made.

The review panel may accept additional evidence, subject to the same procedural guarantees that apply to hearing panels, and both sides have an opportunity to present arguments.

The review panel then recommends action to the full board.

The board of directors may affirm, modify, or reverse the recommendations of either the appellate review panel or the executive committee, or, in its discretion, refer the matter for further review and recommendation.

When made, the board’s ultimate decision is final, immediately effective, and is not subject to further review under the bylaws. B.

Bryan’s disciplinary problems began shortly after he arrived at Holmes in 1976, and they continued throughout his tenure at the Hospital.

Indeed, prior to his termination, Bryan was the subject of more than fifty written incident reports involving unprofessional or disruptive behavior, usually complaints regarding Bryan’s abusive treatment of nurses, technicians, and even fellow physicians.

By December 1987, nurses in the intensive care unit at Holmes were refusing to care for Bryan’s patients on anything but a rotating basis for fear of becoming the object of his volcanic temper. For their part, surgical nurses complained that Bryan’s verbal abuse compounded an already stressful environment, precluding them from operating at peak performance.

At trial in this case, numerous employees who had either witnessed or suffered his outbursts described Bryan’s temperament; he was characterized as being “brutal” and “sharp” with subordinates, as engendering fear in the nursing staff, and as promoting a tense working atmosphere.

Bryan admitted both during the Holmes disciplinary process and at trial in federal court that he had a problem with his temper and that his behavior had, at times, been “disruptive” and “unprofessional.”

He also conceded that the incident reports describing his behavior were not fabrications.

At first, the Hospital and the medical staff attempted to deal with Bryan’s behavior informally.

Bryan’s conduct was the subject of periodic meetings and counseling by the executive committee, the chief of the medical staff, and even the CEO of the hospital.

The Hospital repeatedly warned Bryan that his confrontations with staff members could not be tolerated and insisted that he correct his disruptive behavior. In 1985, Bryan agreed to take a voluntary leave of absence and to seek counseling, first with his priest and then with a psychiatrist (who prescribed a number of medications) to control his temper. The incidents continued unabated, however, over the next three years, and Hospital officials gradually began to take a more active approach in dealing with the problem.

In August 1987, a group of three Holmes officials — the Hospital’s CEO, the chief of the medical staff, and the chairman of the department of surgery — advised Bryan that he would be brought before the executive committee for consideration of formal disciplinary action if further incidents occurred.

Following additional incident reports detailing a continued behavioral pattern, the executive committee appointed an ad hoc committee “to investigate Dr. Bryan’s long term pattern of behavior and look into rehabilitative possibilities and make a recommendation to the Executive Committee.”

In March, the ad hoc committee recommended that any future problems be the subject of graduated suspensions, beginning with a one-week suspension for the next significant incident.

The executive committee agreed to this proposal and informed Bryan in writing of its decision that any further incidents would result in disciplinary action of increasing severity.

According to the minutes from the executive committee’s March 14, 1988, meeting, “[t]he Committee felt that such specific guidelines would be an appropriate mechanism to help Dr. Bryan improve his behavior.”

Bryan did not contest this action.

In April 1988, just one month after the executive committee’s warning concerning graduated discipline, Bryan had an angry exchange with two anesthesiologists when an operation began three minutes behind schedule.

When the anesthesiologists attempted to explain why they were taking a few minutes to reexamine the patient’s medical records before administering the anesthesia to the patient on the operating table, Bryan told them that he “didn’t give a damn about incompetent people’s excuses.”

According to the anesthesiologists, he then launched into a tirade of insults in loud and angry tones in front of the still-conscious patient.

The executive committee recommended a one-week suspension as a result of the incident with the anesthesiologists; Bryan again accepted the punishment without objection.

Yet Bryan’s problems with his colleagues continued.

In October 1988, for example, Bryan falsely reported to a nurse supervisor that one of her patients had just hanged himself in his room; in fact, the patient was fine.

At trial, Bryan explained that he had intended the episode as a “joke” to teach the nurse “responsibility.”

After additional incidents during the fall of 1988, the executive committee met to consider disciplinary action.

Bryan was invited to this meeting, but he did not appear because, due to a miscom-munieation, he was waiting in his office to be called.

The executive committee reviewed the recent incident reports and, concluding that they included at least two new significant episodes, recommended a four-week suspension.

At this point, Bryan for the first time invoked his procedural rights under the bylaws, requesting that a peer review hearing panel evaluate the executive committee’s recommendation.

Bryan was represented by counsel at the proceedings, over which Dr. Dale Ryon presided.

The Ryon panel concluded that Bryan had in fact done the things alleged and that Bryan’s actions were inappropriate.

Nevertheless, it recommended that no suspension be imposed.

In its report, the panel expressed concern that the subcommittee monitoring Bryan’s behavior had not discussed the incident reports with Bryan before making a recommendation to the executive committee, and that the executive committee had recommended a four-week suspension without hearing from Bryan (as a result of the misunderstanding about the meeting).

Further, the Ryon panel suggested that the Hospital’s incident report system as a whole was flawed because a report might be filed without the affected individual having a contemporaneous opportunity to respond.

After receiving the Ryon panel’s report, the executive committee modified its original disciplinary recommendation, reducing the suggested suspension from four weeks to two.

Bryan appealed the executive committee’s recommendation to the board of directors, which decided that no suspension would be imposed.

On October 19, 1989, however, the board advised Bryan by letter that his abusive behavior could no longer be tolerated and that any further incidents of unprofessional behavior would result in the permanent revocation of his staff privileges.

Bryan acknowledged the board’s conditions by signing this “ultimatum” letter on December 19, 1989.

Above his signature, however, Bryan referred the board to his letter of December 13, in which he disputed that his behavior was disruptive and stated that, by signing the board’s letter, he was not waiving his “rights to due process of law or other civil rights as a medical staff member and American citizen.”

Despite the board’s warning, Bryan was involved in four additional incidents in the first five months of 1990; these four incidents led directly to the termination of Bryan’s medical staff privileges.

First, surgical technologist Tina Stark filed an incident report stating that, on March 7, Bryan slapped her hands — apparently as a reprimand for a perceived mistake in handling a catheter — while she was assisting him in an operation.

On April 9 and 16, 1990, the executive committee held meetings concerning the Stark incident and interviewed the various nurses and physicians who witnessed the events.

Given Bryan’s past pattern of conduct, the executive committee recommended that Bryan’s privileges be suspended for two weeks.

Bryan requested a peer review hearing.

Before a hearing panel could be appointed, however, Bryan was involved in a second physical incident.

On May 16, 1990, while nurse Michael Greene assisted Bryan on an operation, Bryan struck Greene’s hands with a surgical instrument; Greene claimed that his hand hurt for several minutes afterwards.

During the same period, Bryan twice ordered the wrong patient prepared for surgery, first in March of 1990 and then in May.

On both occasions, the mistake was caught by another physician after the patient had been transferred to the surgical intensive care unit in advance of the operation.

On May 29, 1990, the executive committee convened to interview the witnesses to the four recent incidents.

Bryan presented his version of events to the committee: He attributed what were perceived as slaps to the hands of the nurses as a form of “nonverbal communication” (the use of hand motions by a physician to give directions during surgery) to correct the nurses’ mistakes; similarly, although he admitted the misdirections of the patients for surgery, he minimized these mistakes because they were detected in time and no harm had come to the individuals involved.

After considering these latest incidents in light of Bryan’s history of disruptive behavior and the hospital’s varied attempts to correct such behavior — as well as the board’s explicit warning a few months before that further unprofessional conduct would result in Bryan’s dismissal — the executive committee recommended that Bryan’s staff privileges be permanently revoked.

Once again, Bryan requested that a peer review hearing panel be appointed.

Chaired by Dr. Joseph Chanda, the panel consisted of seven physicians, none of whom were vascular surgeons.

The Chanda panel held four sessions of hearings; Bryan was represented by counsel at the proceedings, and he had both the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses offered by the medical staff and to present witnesses and documentary evidence on his own behalf. A court reporter recorded the testimony at all of the hearing sessions.

Two panel members were absent from at least part of the hearings, but Chan-da testified at trial that the panel as a whole reviewed the testimony orally at the end of each session and during deliberations and that summarized what had transpired for the absent members.

The Chanda panel heard the testimony of a number of witnesses, including those directly involved in the four most recent incidents.

Bryan himself testified as well, explaining that all of his actions at the Hospital had been motivated by his concern for the care of his patients.

The panel also considered the earlier incident reports in Bryan’s file that had formed the basis for the board’s warning to that any additional disruptive behavior would result in the termination of Bryan’s privileges.

Much of Bryan’s defense was focused on a disparate treatment argument: Bryan contended that he had been written up for minor incidents that would have been ignored had they involved any other doctor on the Holmes staff.

Bryan also argued that his temper was not disruptive, and that many other physicians at the Hospital had similar or worse temper problems.

He further suggested that the disciplinary action was motivated principally by personal animosity on the part of hospital administrators and executive committee members.

After considering the evidence presented, the Chanda panel unanimously found that the most recent incidents, which prompted the executive committee’s investigation and disciplinary recommendation, “were amply supported by the record” and violated the admonitions in the board’s October 19, 1989, “warning” letter. The panel also concluded that Bryan had demonstrated a pattern of disruptive behavior extending over many years.

Because “the hospital behavior of [Bryan was] below acceptable standards and adversely impacted] upon patient care and adversely affect[ed] Hospital Staff’s ability to deliver quality patient care,” the panel recommended that Bryan’s clinical privileges be suspended for two years.

After considering the Chanda panel’s report, the executive committee stood by its recommendation that Bryan’s staff privileges be revoked.

Bryan appealed the executive committee’s recommendation to the board of the directors; pursuant to the bylaws, the board appointed a board review panel, which also recommended revocation of Bryan’s clinical privileges.

The full board then considered the three recommendations — the report of the executive committee recommending termination of Bryan’s clinical privileges, the report of the Chanda panel recommending that Bryan be suspended for two years, and the report of the board’s own review panel recommending termination.

In November 1990, the board unanimously voted to terminate Bryan’s clinical privileges at Holmes.

Members of the executive committee and the board who testified at trial agreed that the disciplinary action was taken after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts and in the reasonable belief that the severe sanction was imposed on Bryan in furtherance of quality patient care at Holmes.

Throughout the disciplinary process, neither Bryan nor the expert witnesses who testified on his behalf contended that the various incident reports that formed the basis for the disciplinary action were fraudulent fabrications.

Indeed, Bryan himself admitted that, in each instance, some sort of interaction occurred between himself and the author of the incident report.

Bryan merely disagreed both with the Hospital’s judgment concerning the propriety of his conduct and the severity of the sanction imposed. C.

On December 5,1990, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Bryan filed a complaint on behalf of himself and his professional association against the Hospital, the individual members of its board of directors, members of the medical staff executive committee, and two nurses.

The complaint included federal and state antitrust claims as well as state law claims for defamation, negligent supervision of the peer review process (against only the individual members of the board of directors), and breach of contract for failing to follow the medical staff bylaws during the disciplinary process (against the Hospital).

The complaint demanded damages and, only with respect to the count of negligent supervision, injunctive relief.

The central allegation in the complaint was that the defendants, “individually and in concert, acted in bad faith and with intentional fraud, resulting in the destruction of Dr. Bryan’s medical practice.”

Beginning with their answer denying liability on all counts, the Hospital and the other defendants consistently claimed immunity from monetary liability for their actions in terminating Bryan’s clinical privileges because they were functioning in this matter, individually and collectively, as a professional review body in a peer review process.

Later, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment, contending, inter alia, that they were immune from Bryan’s suit for damages under HCQIA,⁴² U.S.C. § 11111(a), and under Florida law, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 395.-0193(5).

In disposing of the defendants’ motions, the district court made the following rulings.

First, material issues of fact remained concerning whether the applicable standards for peer review actions had been met; therefore, a jury would have to decide the question of immunity.

Second, Bryan lacked standing to pursue antitrust claims for damages under either Florida antitrust law or section⁴ of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988), but Bryan could assert a claim for injunctive relief under sections¹ and² of the Sherman Act, Id. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. IV 1993).

The factual issues underpinning Bryan’s eligibility for in-junctive relief would be submitted to the jury, acting in an advisory role.

Third, the record did not support Bryan’s negligent supervision claim against the individual members of the board of directors.

In sum, the following claims remained for trial: the state law damages claims for breach of contract and defamation, as well as the section¹ and² Sherman Act claims as to which the jury’s verdict would be advisory.

This case was tried before a jury in June 1992.

At the close of Bryan’s case, the district court directed a verdict in favor of all of the individual defendants on the various counts against them because the evidence was insufficient to support liability.

The court concluded, however, that the evidence supported Bryan’s claims for breach of contract against the Hospital, and denied the Hospital’s motion for a directed verdict because material issues of fact remained concerning the federal and state peer review immunity statutes.

The court also found that the evidence supported Bryan’s antitrust claims against the Hospital and accordingly submitted those claims to the jury.

While the court’s oral jury instructions recited some of the language from the immunity statutes, the court did not explain to the jury that the immunity provisions created a threshold question concerning whether Bryan was entitled to damages at all.

Moreover, despite requests by counsel for Holmes, the special verdict form did not include any reference to the federal and state peer review immunity statutes.

Regarding the breach of contract claim, the special verdict form simply asked the jury to answer this question: “Did Holmes Regional Medical Center permanently terminate Dr. Bryan’s medical staff privileges in violation of its bylaws?”

If the jury answered “yes,” the verdict form then directed it to quantify the damages sustained by Bryan as a proximate result of the Hospital’s conduct.

Similarly, regarding the antitrust claim, the verdict form only asked the jury “[h]as Holmes violated state and federal antitrust laws?”

The jury returned affirmative answers to the verdict form interrogatories regarding whether the Hospital had terminated Bryan in violation of the bylaws and whether this breach proximately caused damages to Bryan; and awarded Bryan $4,181,242 in damages for these violations.

The jury also found that the Hospital had violated state and federal antitrust laws, thereby causing harm to Bryan; but the district court denied Bryan’s post-trial request for injunctive relief under the antitrust laws, concluding that Bryan’s remedy at law was adequate.

The Hospital appeals from the district court’s judgment awarding Bryan damages for the termination of his medical staff privileges.

Holmes first contends that the district court erred in failing to grant its motion for judgment on the state law damages claim based on immunity from liability under both state and federal laws governing the peer review process.

In the alternative, the Hospital argues that a new trial is required because the trial court gave erroneous jury instructions and used an improper special verdict form.

Bryan cross-appeals from the portion of the district court’s summary judgment order denying the plaintiffs standing to seek damages under federal antitrust law.

III. A.

HCQIA immunity is a question of law for the court to decide and may be resolved whenever the record in a particular case becomes sufficiently developed.

Congress clearly intended HCQIA to permit defendants in suits arising out of peer review disciplinary decisions to file motions to resolve the issues concerning immunity from monetary liability as early as possible in the litigation process.

As the House Committee explained, “these provisions allow defendants to file motions to resolve the issue of immunity in as expeditious a manner as possible.” H.R.Rep.

No. 903, at 12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6394.

Several courts have resolved the issue of HCQIA immunity from damages liability on summary judgment.

See, e.g., Harris v. Beilin Memorial Hosp., 13 F. 3d 1082, 1083 (7th Cir.1994); Austin, 979 F. 2d at 734-35; Islami v. Covenant Medical Center, Inc., 822 F.Supp. 1361, 1376-77 (N.D.Iowa 1992).

Of course, although immunity may be determined at the summary judgment stage, resolution of that issue may be deferred until or after trial if the standards of Rule 56 cannot be satisfied.

The substantive standards under HCQIA remain the same regardless of the point at which the immunity determination occurs.

In civil rights cases brought under⁴² U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), we have held that qualified immunity should not become a part of the jury instruction once the affirmative defense has been denied on a motion for summary judgment; the defense of qualified immunity should be decided by the court and should not be submitted for decision by the jury.

We conclude that the same procedure should be followed when considering a defendant’s immunity from damages liability under HCQIA. A district court should consider the issue of HCQIA immunity from damages at the summary judgment stage.

If it determines that the defendant is not entitled to such protection, then the merits of the ease should be submitted to the jury without reference to the immunity issue.

If there are disputed subsidiary issues of fact concerning HCQIA immunity, such as whether the disciplined physician was given adequate notice of the charges and the appropriate opportunity to be heard, the court may ask the jury to resolve the subsidiary factual questions by responding to special interrogatories.

Cf.

Stone, 968 F. 2d at 1166 (similar framework for section 1983 qualified immunity eases); see also Islami, 822 F.Supp. at 1378 (following Stone framework in HCQIA case).

Under no circumstances should the ultimate question of whether the defendant is immune from monetary liability under HCQIA be submitted to the jury.

In this case, we review the district court’s denial of the Hospital’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Like the district court in ruling on the motion for judgment, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

It is well established that “[¿judgment as a matter of law after the verdict may be granted only when, without weighing the credibility of the evidence, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment.” 5A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 50.-07 (1994).

Accordingly, “we must independently determine whether the facts and inferences point so overwhelmingly in favor of the movant ... that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.”

Ro-boserve, Ltd. v. Tom’s Foods, Inc., 940 F. 2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir.1991).

Moreover, “[t]he moving party is entitled to a [judgment as a matter of law] if the nonmoving party failed to make a showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he had the burden of proof.”

Smith v. United States, 894 F. 2d 1549, 1552 (11th Cir.1990) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

As the Ninth Circuit has explained, the rebuttable presumption of HCQIA section 11112(a) creates an unusual summary judgment standard that can best be expressed as follows: “Might a reasonable jury, viewing the facts in the best light for [the plaintiff], conclude that he has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendants’ actions are outside the scope of § 11112(a)?”

If not, the court should grant the defendant’s motion.

In a sense, the presumption language in HCQIA means that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the peer review process was not reasonable.

Of course, motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 bear a close relationship to motions for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50.

Courts frequently apply the same standards when ruling on the two motions, although a motion for judgment as a matter of law may be granted although a prior motion for summary judgment raising the same issues had been denied.

Therefore, we adopt the Ninth Circuit’s statement of the applicable standard in this case as well: “ur inquiry focuses on whether [Bryan] provided sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that he ha[d] overcome, by a preponderance of the evidence, the presumption that [the Hospital] would reasonably have believed” that it had met the standards of section 11112(a).

If a jury returns a verdict awarding damages to a disciplined physician but the evidence at trial conclusively demonstrates that the defendant has satisfied HCQIA standards for peer review procedures (thereby being entitled to immunity from monetary liability), then the court should grant a post-trial judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b).

We must examine the record in this case to determine whether Bryan satisfied his burden of producing evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the Hospital’s peer review disciplinary process failed to meet the standards of HCQIA. B.

Before determining whether the procedural standards for proper peer review proceedings were satisfied in this ease, we first note that the events and entities at issue here fall squarely within the definitions of HCQIA’s operative terms.

The disciplinary action at issue here is the November 1990 decision by the Holmes board of directors to revoke Bryan’s staff privileges.

The term “professional review action” is defined in HCQIA as follows: [A]n action or recommendation of a professional review body which is taken or made in the conduct of professional review activity, which is based on the competence or professional conduct of an individual physician (which conduct affects or could affect adversely the health or welfare of a patient or patients), and which affects (or may affect) adversely the clinical privileges ... of the physician.⁴² U.S.C. § 11151(9).

The revocation of Bryan’s staff privileges therefore qualifies as such a professional review action; the statute seems to contemplate inclusion of the recommendations upon which the board’s ultimate decision was based — here, the recommendations of the Chanda panel and the executive committee — within the scope of the relevant conduct. A “professional review body” is defined as “a health care entity and the governing body or any committee of a health care entity which conducts professional review activity, and includes any committee of the medical staff of such an entity when assisting the governing body in a professional review activity.”

Id. § 11151(11).

Furthermore, the term “health care entity” includes “a hospital that is licensed to provide health care services by the State in which it is located.”

Id. § 11151(4)(A)(i).

The Holmes decisionmakers in Bryan’s case fall within those categories.

As a result, the Hospital is entitled to immunity from monetary liability under section 11111(a) of HCQIA if the peer review process met the standards set forth in section 11112(a). C.

As stated above, a professional review action must satisfy the four standards of section 11112(a) in order to qualify for the immunity protections of section 11111(a).

We discuss each in turn and conclude that the Hospital’s termination of Bryan’s clinical privileges met HCQIA requirements.