IN RE TOM C. COOPER AND, ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANY, INC., PETITIONERS
BY THE COURT: The petition for a writ of mandamus is GRANTED.
The district court is DIRECTED to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 4(j). The complaint in this employment discrimination suit was filed on November 27, 1991. The plaintiffs indisputably failed to serve the complaint on the defendants within the 120 days allowed by the federal rules. See id.
Accordingly, dismissal was required unless the plaintiffs demonstrated “good cause.” Id.
The district court not only ruled that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate good cause, but explicitly found “neglect[]” on the part of the plaintiffs. District Court Order of July 28, 1992, at 2.
Moreover, the district court stated that the plaintiffs had shown a “repeated disregard for timely prosecution of [their] claims.” Id. at 3.
Therefore, the district court was required to dismiss the action. The federal rules and the Eleventh Circuit cases are unequivocal on this point. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j) (“the action shall be dismissed ”); Prisco v. Frank, 929 F. 2d 603, 604 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (“the complaint must be dismissed ”); Schnabel v. Wells, 922 F. 2d 726, 728 (11th Cir.1991) (“dismissal is mandatory ... unless good cause is shown”); id. at 729 (“dismissal without prejudice was mandated by Rule 4(j)) (all emphasis added).
Despite finding a clear Rule 4(j) violation, the district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss “in the interest of justice.” District Court Order of July 28, 1992, at 3. This ruling was flatly inconsistent with the federal rules and with binding Eleventh Circuit precedent. Under the mandatory language of Prisco and Schnabel, a district court has no discretion to salvage an action once the court has found a violation of Rule 4(j) and a lack of good cause. Prisco, 929 F. 2d at 604; Schnabel, 922 F. 2d at 728-29.
Accordingly, the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss was clear error. Mandamus is appropriate in this case because the district court committed a clear abuse of discretion by exceeding the limits of its judicial power. In re Fink, 876 F. 2d 84, 84 (11th Cir.1989) (per curiam); In re Paradyne Corp., 803 F. 2d 604, 612 (11th Cir.1986) (per curiam). Specifically, mandamus lies because the district court violated the federal procedural rules by purporting to exercise discretion that it did not have. SEC v. Krentzman, 397 F. 2d 55, 59 (5th Cir.1968); In re Watkins, 271 F. 2d 771, 775 (5th Cir.1959); see also In re Smith, 926 F. 2d 1027, 1030 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (granting mandamus because the district court disapproved settlement when “it had no discretion to do so”).
Furthermore, we find that-the defendants have established that they have no other adequate remedy. See Paradyne Corp., 803 F. 2d at 612. The only conceivable alternative remedy — inevitable reversal by this court after the defendants have been forced to endure full discovery, full litigation, and a full trial — is “scarcely ... adequate.” Watkins, 271 F. 2d at 775.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1997)…The only conceivable alternative [to mandamus relief]— inevitable reversal by this court after the defendants have been forced to endure full discovery, full litigation, and a full trial — is scarcely adequate” to redress this injury. In re Cooper, 971 F. 2d 640, 641 (11th Cir.1992) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the order was entered almost six months prior to the court’s decision to certify the Jackson class and to refer the Petaccia plaintiffs’ motion for class certification to a magistrate ju…
-
Horenkamp v. VAN Winkle & Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 1129 (11th Cir. 2005)…rary is misplaced as they were decided prior to the 1993 amendment, or applied the pre-1993 rule without addressing the issue. See, e.g., Hunt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 29 F. 3d 583 (11th Cir.1994) (dismissing complaint under Rule 4(j)); In re Cooper, 971 F. 2d 640 (11th Cir.1992); Prisco v. Frank, 929 F. 2d 603 (11th Cir.1991); Schnabel v. Wells, 922 F. 2d 726 (11th Cir.1991). . District courts in circuits that have not addressed this issue have also held that Rule 4(m) grants discretion to extend the time f…
-
Brown v. Evans J. Nichols, M.D., 8 F.3d 770 (11th Cir. 1993)…buse of discretion. See McGinnis v. Shalala, 2 F. 3d 548 (5th Cir.1993). Eleventh Circuit precedent makes clear that a district court must dismiss an action “once the court has found a violation of Rule 4(j) and a lack of good cause. ” In re Cooper, 971 F. 2d 640, 641 (11th Cir.1992) (emphasis added); see also Schnabel v. Wells, 922 F. 2d 726, 728-29 (11th Cir.1991). However, in dismissing the John and Jane Doe claims, the district court made no finding that Brown’s failure to serve Webb and Saless lacked g…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In re Watkins, 271 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1959)
- In re Paradyne Corp., 803 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1986)
- In re Smith, 926 F.2d 1027 (11th Cir. 1991)
- Schnabel v. Wells, 922 F.2d 726 (11th Cir. 1991)
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Honorable Ben Krentzman, 397 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1968)
- Prisco v. Frank, 929 F.2d 603 (11th Cir. 1991)
- In re David Stuart Fink, M.D., 876 F.2d 84 (11th Cir. 1989)