WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC., A CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF JACKSONVILLE, INC., A CORPORATION, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court took jurisdiction to correct a statement in the District Court of Appeal's opinion regarding the standard of proof required to establish a party's lack of primary fault in a negligence and indemnity case. The court quashed the problematic language while affirming the underlying decision.
The court held that the District Court of Appeal's statement regarding the required standard of proof was erroneous and conflicted with prior Florida precedent. The proper standard requires only moral conviction based on appropriate evidence, not proof excluding all possibility of the fact being otherwise.
“This position can be sustained only if the proof establishes without conflict that Winn-Dixie was itself without primary fault, that is to say, it had no actual as distinguished from constructive knowledge that the display was built in a dangerous and hazardous manner.”
The District Court of Appeal's problematic statement regarding the standard of proof for establishing primary versus secondary negligence, which the Supreme Court found conflicted with prior precedent.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePepsi-Cola Bottling Company delivered and stacked Pepsi-Cola bottles in Winn-Dixie's grocery store in an unsafe manner. One stack collapsed and injure…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Passive Negligence cases and more on FLexlaw
We assumed jurisdiction of this cause under Article V, Section 4(2), F.SA., because of the view that a statement by the District Court of Appeal in its opinion in Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, Fla.App., 153 So.2d 45, conflicted with an opinion of this court in Smith and Armstead v. Croom, et al., 7 Fla. 81.
The better to understand the point, we give a brief digest of the salient facts. The petitioner owns and operates a grocery store in which is sold, in bottles, a beverage known as Pepsi Cola. The bottler, respondent, delivered to petitioner’s place of business several cases of Pepsi Cola which were stacked by the respondent in petitioner’s store in an unsafe manner so that one of the stacks collapsed and fell injuring a customer. The injured person sued both petitioner and respondent and was awarded a judgment in substantial amount. Of course, the method of displaying the product in the store must have been obvious to the storekeeper who, upon occasion, had complained to the respondent about the failure to use “dividers” and substantial cartons and about the height to which the containers were stacked.
The original plaintiff sued petitioner on the theory that it negligently permitted the condition created by respondent to prevail, thereby creating an unsafe place for the plaintiff to shop, and the plaintiff proceeded against the respondent for negligently arranging the display.
The petitioner, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., filed a cross claim against its co-defendant, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., seeking indemnity on the theory that the latter breached its duty so to safely arrange its display that the customers of the former would not be injured and that Pepsi-Cola thereby became liable to Winn-Dixie for loss suffered by Winn-Dixie. When the trial court announced the intention of directing a verdict against Winn-Dixie on its cross claim for indemnity from Pepsi-Cola Winn-Dixie suffered an involuntary non-suit against it and appealed to the District Court of Appeal where the judgment against both petitioner and respondent was affirmed as was the ruling rejecting the cross claim of Winn-Dixie against Pepsi-Cola.
Reverting to the announcement made by us at the outset, we decided to take jurisdiction because of a statement, no doubt inadvertent, in the final, revised opinion of the District Court of Appeal with reference to the contention of Winn-Dixie anent its cross claim. That corporation was insisting that its liability to the original plaintiff resulted solely from its secondary or passive negligence in failing to discover and correct the faulty display fashioned by Pepsi-Cola. So, argued Winn-Dixie if, because of this “constructive negligence”, it is required to pay the plaintiff it should be indemnified for the amount since the negligence of Pepsi-Cola was “active” in contradistinction to “passive”.
Then came this pronouncement of the District Court of Appeal which we thought might create the confusion that the provision of the Constitution was designed to obviate: “This position can be sustained only if the proof establishes without conflict that Winn-Dixie was itself without primary fault, that is to say, it had no actual as distinguished from constructive knowledge that the display was built in a dangerous and hazardous manner.” We have italicized the words which point up what we consider a statement conflicting with our former decisions on the subject. The case we cited, Smith and Armstead v. Croom, was decided by this court 106 years ago and we are unaware of any modification of the rule there announced: “We do not understand the books which treat of the rules of evidence, as intending to mean that the certainty must reach that point which would exclude the possibility that the *104fact be otherwise; but only that it should be of such a degree, induced by appropriate evidence as will produce moral conviction.”
We repeat that in our opinion the statement quoted was doubtless inadvertently made and once deleted, the decision of the District Court will be harmonious in all its parts and will correctly determine the cause.
The sentence quoted is quashed; the opinion otherwise is not disturbed.
DREW, C. J., and O’CONNELL, CALDWELL and HOBSON (Ret.), JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979)…Taylor, 332 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Florida Power & Light Co. v. General Safety Equipment Co., 213 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963), modified by elimination of one sentence, 160 So. 2d 102 (Fla.1964). Florida Wire asserts that the only way to classify a tortfeasor’s negligence as active or passive is to weigh the relative fault of the tortfeasor. To agree with Florida Wire’s reasoning, however, would be to repudiate our recent holdin…
-
Univ. Plaza Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Stewart, 272 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1973)…lict jurisdiction, without so holding or intimating, that the barber’s death was caused solely by the negligence of the landlord, i. e., indemnitee. . Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla.App. 1st 1963), modified on other grounds, 160 So. 2d 102 (Fla.1964); and Florida Power & Light Co. v. General Safety Equip. Co., 213 So. 2d 486 (Fla.App.3d 1968). .■ 41 Am.Jur.2d, Indemnity, § 15 at p. 700. . Ibid., pp. 700-702. . United States v. Seekinger, 397 U.S. 203, 90 S.Ct. 880, 25 L.Ed.2d 224 (…
-
The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson Aircraft Tire Corp., 353 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…rican District Electric Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932), Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45, at 49-50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963), modified sub nom Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of Jacksonville, Inc., 160 So. 2d 102 (Fla.1964). See also Stuart v. Hertz Corporation, supra, at 190-01. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act specifically states that “this act does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law,”4 and the right of a passive tortfeasor…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81 (Fla. 1857)