GJR INVESTMENTS, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

COUNTY OF ESCAMBIA, FLORIDA, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, LISA MINSHEW, DEFENDANTS, W.A. LEE, A.K.A BUCK LEE, WILEY C. PAGE, BENNIE KENNEY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS; GJR INVESTMENTS, INC. PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. COUNTY OF ESCAMBIA, FLORIDA, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT, LISA MINSHEW, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, W.A. LEE, A.K.A. BUCK LEE, WILEY C. PAGE, BENNIE KENNEY, DEFENDANTS

COX, Circuit Judge: This case concerns a highly politicized dispute over plaintiff-appellee GJR Investments, Inc.’s desire to construct an RV campground on its property on Perdido Key in Escambia County, Florida.

Escambia County eventually granted GJR a permit to build the campground, although GJR had to submit four separate applications, and filed two state court lawsuits in the process.

GJR then sued the county and several county officials and employees under⁴² U.S.C. § 1983 for damages caused by the delay in approving the permit, alleging that the county and the named defendants had violated GJR’s constitutional rights by delaying the permit approval process.

GJR contends that the individual defendants-appellants intentionally threw up procedural roadblocks during the permit approval process in an attempt to delay or deter its construction of an RV park on Perdido Key.

GJR argues that these actions violated its rights both to due process and to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and further that the delay in effect accomplished a taking of its property without just compensation for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.

In the district court the defendants moved to dismiss GJR’s claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the ground of qualified immunity.

The court denied the motions, and defendants appealed.

For the reasons stated below, we reverse the district court’s ruling.

I.

ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

A complete copy of the complaint is made an appendix to this opinion.

Accepting all allegations in the complaint as true, and construing facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Harper v. Thomas, 988 F. 2d 101, 103 (11th Cir.1993), we summarize the allegations as follows.

Appellee GJR Investments, Inc. is a Texas corporation that is the “beneficial owner,” (R.l-1 at 3), of certain real property on Perdido Key in Escambia County, Florida.

The property is located in an area designated by Escambia County Ordinance Code (the “Code”) 89-6 as a commercial “C-l” zoning district.

GJR sought to develop the property as an RV campground despite strident opposition from the residents of Perdido Key.

In October 1992 GJR filed its first application to develop the property as a campground.

On the advice of the staff of the Escambia County Department of Growth Management Services that the proposed campground was not a “permitted use” in a C-l district, GJR applied to develop the property as a special exception and planned use development (“PUD”).

GJR withdrew its application in December of 1992, upon further advice from the Growth Management Services staff that the application still did not comply with the Code.

In May 1993 GJR submitted a second application, this time to develop the campground as an amusement/recreational facility and a PUD.

The Escambia County Zoning Board of Adjustment denied this application, and GJR appealed to the Escambia County Board of County Commissioners, which affirmed the decision.

GJR subsequently appealed the county commissioners’ decision to the Florida state courts.

While its appeal was pending, GJR filed a third application, this time for permission to develop the campground as a permitted use under the Code.

This application also was denied.

Subsequently, GJR filed a suit for declaratory judgment, asking the Florida courts to declare that development of the property as a campground is a permitted use under the Code.

In-March 1994, the parties settled the dispute regarding the permit: The county agreed to approve a fourth application from GJR to develop the property as a campground as a permitted use, and in return GJR dismissed both of its pending state lawsuits.

In its complaint, GJR calls attention to various actions on the part of the individual defendants that GJR alleges violated its constitutional rights:

A.

BENNIE KENNEY

Kenney is an assistant to W.A. “Buck” Lee, an Escambia County, Commissioner. Kenney is a resident of Perdido Key who opposed the construction of the campground and was involved in á citizens’ group that organized to oppose the project.

GJR alleges that at defendant Wiley C.

Page’s invitation, Kenney attended a Growth Management Services staff meeting pertaining to GJR’s second application, even though attendance at such a meeting does not fall within Kenney’s job responsibilities and she had never previously been invited to attend one.

GJR also alleges that before the appeal of its second application to the Board of County Commissioners, Kenney asked Lee to order a U.S. Department of Agriculture soil analysis of GJR’s property at the behest of another Perdido Key resident who opposed the project.

The resident had attempted to obtain such an analysis on his own, but was informed that only the landowner or a county commissioner could request one.

GJR claims that Kenney asked Lee to order such an analysis&#x²⁷; at the request of the resident. B. W.A. “BUCK” LEE Defendant Lee is an Escambia County Commissioner. Lee neither represented nor resided on Perdido Key, but he spoke out against the project at the Zoning Board hearing on GJR’s second application despite the fact that as a county commissioner he would hear any appeal of the Zoning Board’s decision.

Lee also ordered a Department of Agriculture soil analysis of GJR’s property, the results of which he then distributed to his fellow commissioners.

GJR also alleges that Lee distributed numerous letters from Perdi-do Key residents opposed to the project to his fellow county commissioners, and only recused himself from the appeal proceeding at GJR’s objection.

C.

WILEY C.

PAGE

Page is the director and supervisor of the Escambia County Department of Growth Management Services (“GMS”).

GJR alleges that before the submission of its first application for development Page directed the GMS staff to misrepresent the development requirements for a C-l district and to inform GJR that it could develop a campground on the property only as a special exception and PUD, not as a permitted use.

GJR also alleges that in response to the significant public outcry against the project, Page directed the GMS staff to review GJR’s first application more strictly than other development applications filed in Escambia County.

Regarding the second application, GJR alleges that Page expressly invited Kenney to attend the GMS staff meeting, knowing that she opposed the project and that attendance at such a meeting did not fall within her responsibilities as Lee’s assistant.

Following the meeting, Page informed GJR that even though the GMS staff recommended approval of the second petition, he would recommend that the Zoning Board deny the application.

He further informed GJR that in order to obtain a permit, it would have to appear before the Zoning Board in person to plead its case and persuade the Board to award the permit.

GJR claims that Page inappropriately presented county commissioners with additional letters from Perdido Key residents opposed to the project as part of the record on appeal and invited BCC members to contact him for further information regarding residents’ remarks about the&#x²⁷; project.

Finally, GJR asserts that Page “administratively ‘rejected’ ” its third application out of hand. (R.l-1 at 16.)

D.LISA MINSHEW

Minshew is an attorney retained by Es-cambia County for land use matters.

GJR alleges that Minshew initially advised the GMS staff to reject GJR’s application, stating that GJR was an “out-of-state developer” and noting the Perdido Key residents’ considerable hostility to the project.

GJR contends that Minshew gave the GMS staff erroneous and misleading instructions regarding the prerequisites for approval of GJR’s petition.

Further, GJR avers, it was “standard procedure” to submit incomplete permit applications to the Zoning Board for approval, but Minshew advised the GMS staff not to do so with GJR’s incomplete permit application.

GJR also asserts misconduct on Minshew’s part at the Zoning Board hearing, alleging that Minshew coerced a GMS staff member into making false statements to the Board regarding the applicable criteria for approval of the project.

In addition, GJR contends that after the formal presentation and comment period, Minshew engaged in an &#x²⁷; ex parte communication with Zoning Board members which prompted them to “summarily reject” the second application.

Finally, GJR alleges that Minshew attempted to introduce erroneous and misleading material into the official record at the BCC appeal and knowingly misstated the applicable law to the commissioners.

II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following the approval of its fourth application, GJR filed this suit against Escambia County, Minshew, Lee, Page, and Kenney.

GJR’s “First .Cause of Action” alleges that the defendants individually violated GJR’s constitutional rights, asserting claims under⁴² U.S.C. § 1983.

Its “Second Cause of Action” contends that the defendants conspired to violate the same rights and also seeks relief under § 1983.

The “Third Cause of Action” alleges that Escambia County took GJR’s property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

GJR claims as damages unnecessary fees, taxes and insurance premiums, lost profits, and increased costs resulting from the delay it incurred in getting its permit application approved.

All defendants moved to dismiss, claiming, inter alia, qualified immunity from GJR’s suit.

The district court turned to Resti-gouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter,⁵⁹ F. 3d 1208 (11th Cir.1995), which enumerates four possible types of constitutional challenges applicable to a zoning decision: “(1) just compensation takings, (2) due process takings, (3) substantive due process, ... and (4) equal protection.”

Id. at 1211 n. 1 (citing Bide v. Sarasota County, 908 F. 2d 716, 720 (11th Cir.1990)).

The court concluded that allegations supporting any one of these four claims would defeat a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6).

The district court divined an equal protection claim from two allegations buried in the middle of GJR’s exhaustive and rambling recitation of the events: an allegation that GJR’s development applications had been subjected to stricter analysis vis-it-vis other unspecified development applications filed in Escambia County, and an allegation that GJR had been required to present its application to the Zoning Board directly, unlike other developers in Escam-bia County. Básed on these allegations, the district court held that it could not conclude as a matter of law that defendants’ actions did not violate GJR’s equal protection rights, and denied defendants’ 12(b)(6) motions.

The district court reviewed the defendants’ qualified immunity arguments with respect to the equal protection claim it found in its 12(b)(6) analysis.

It concluded that GJR had alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional “right to be treated equally in its application for a development permit,” (R.2-83 at 10), finding authority for the existence of such a right in Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F. 2d 716 (11th Cir.1990).

However, the district court stated that it could not determine whether a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether GJR’s rights in this respect had been violated.

It therefore denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss and permitted discovery with respect to the qualified immunity question.

Page subsequently moved for reconsideration or clarification of the district court’s, order with respect to other claims in the complaint, specifically substantive due process.

On reconsideration, the court dismissed GJR’s substantive due process claim with prejudice.

Kenney, Lee, Minshew, and Page appeal from the district court’s order denying their motions to dismiss with respect to the equal protection claim.

III.ISSUE ON APPEAL

The issue we address on appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing defendants’ motions to dismiss on the ground of qualified immunity, based on its determination that GJR’s complaint alleged a violation of a clearly established equal protection “right to be treated equally in its application for a development permit.” (R.2-83 at 10.)

IV.CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Primarily, the defendants contend that the district court erred in holding that GJR’s complaint alleged an equal protection violation.

The court analyzed GJR’s claims under a “rational basis” standard applicable to facial challenges to legislation, but the defendants argue that GJR’s complaint at most makes out an “as applied” challenge.

They contend that the court instead should have determined whether the complaint sufficiently alleged the discriminatory application of a facially neutral law, see E & T Realty v. Strickland, 880 F. 2d 1107 (11th Cir.1987), and that GJR’s complaint fails so to allege.

Only Minshew addresses GJR’s Fifth Amendment takings claim, arguing that it fails in two respects: (1) GJR failed to exhaust its available state court remedies, and (2) the denial of the development permit did not constitute a taking, as it did not deprive GJR of all viable economic use of the Perdido Key property.

Finally, the defendants contend that the failure of GJR’s substantive claims dooms its § 1983 conspiracy claim, as a plaintiff may only maintain a § 1983 conspiracy action if it first demonstrates an underlying constitutional violation.

In . the alternative, defendants argue that the allegations supporting the existence of a conspiracy are conclusory at best, and the district court should have dismissed the conspiracy claim on this basis regardless of its determination of the merits of the substantive claims.

GJR agrees that any equal protection claim in its complaint should be analyzed as an “as applied” challenge, but contends that its pleading sufficiently makes out such a claim.

GJR argues that its complaint alleges that it is situated similarly to all other owners of C-l zoned property who have applied for a permit to develop their land for a permitted use.

In addition, it contends that the complaint “adequately identified [GJR] as part of a group against which [the defendants] purposefully discriminated — nonresidents of Florida.”

Appellee’s Brief at 28.

As to the Fifth Amendment takings claim, GJR asserts that this claim is only against the county, and not any of the individual defendants.

The county is not a party to this appeal, thus, GJR argues, any resolution of the merits of the just compensation claim is improper at this stage of the litigation.

Finally, GJR argues that the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the conspiracy claim, as the complaint sufficiently alleged both substantive constitutional violations and a conspiracy among the defendants.

V.DISCUSSION

A.

JURISDICTION

Before turning to the merits of this appeal, we briefly address the issue of-this court’s jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.

We earlier requested the parties to brief the jurisdictional question; after receiving the parties’ responses, we ruled that the issue would be carried with the case.

Upon further consideration we find that this court has jurisdiction over the appeal.

While it is true that the district court could not determine whether a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law, that conclusion alone does not preclude interlocutory appellate review of the denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.

The Supreme Court clarified this issue in Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (limiting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995)), rejecting the contention that the existence of material issues of fact in itself bars interlocutory review of accompanying issues of law.

See id. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 842.

We reiterated this point in Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F. 3d 1480 (11th Cir.1996), stating, “[A]s clarified by Behrens, Johnson [v. Jones ] does not affect our interlocutory jurisdiction in qualified immunity cases where the denial is based even in part on a disputed issue of law.”

Id. at 1485.

In addition to finding that issues of material fact existed, the district court found that GJR’s complaint alleged the violation of a clearly established “right to be treated equally in its application for a development permit.” (R.2-83 at 10.) This is an issue of law disputed by the parties on appeal, and we therefore have jurisdiction to review the district court’s ruling on this issue under Behrens and Cottrell.

Cf.

Bennett v. Parker, 898 F. 2d 1530, 1532 (11th Cir.1990) (petitioner failed as a matter of law to sufficiently allege a constitutional violation, therefore existence of disputed issues of material fact does not affect interlocutory jurisdiction).

However, our appellate jurisdiction in matters such as this extends only to the legal issues surrounding the district court’s denial of defendants’ motions to dismiss, i.e., issues concerning whether GJR’s complaint sufficiently alleged the violation of a clearly established right.

See Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F. 2d 783, 791 n. 15, 792 n. 16 (11th Cir.1988).

B.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

1.

Background Law Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity from GJR’s claims.

The defense of qualified immunity represents a balance between the need for a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens and the need for government officials to be able to carry out their discretionary functions without the fear of constant baseless litigation.

The defense embodies an “objective reasonableness” standard, giving a government agent the benefit of the doubt unless her actions were so obviously illegal in the light of then-existing law that only an official who was incompetent or who knowingly was violating the law would have committed them.

Qualified immunity thus represents the rule, rather than the exception: “Because qualified immunity shields government actors in all but exceptional cases, courts should think long and hard before stripping defendants of immunity.”

Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University, Bd. of Trustees,²⁸ F. 3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir.1994).

Under the qualified immunity doctrine, government officials performing discretionary functions are immune not just from liability, but from suit, unless the conduct which is the basis for suit violates “clearly established [federal] statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

For a right to be “clearly established,” previous case law must have developed it in a concrete factual context so as to make it obvious to a reasonable government actor that his actions violate federal law.

See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

At this stage in the proceedings, the qualified immunity inquiry and the Rule 12(b)(6) standard become intertwined.

See Wooten v. Campbell,⁴⁹ F. 3d 696, 699 (11th Cir.), reh’g denied,⁵⁸ F. 3d 642 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. ——, 116 S.Ct. 379, 133 L.Ed.2d 302 (1995).

The Supreme Court has held that a “necessary concomitant” to the question of whether a plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established federal right is “the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.”

Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 282, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991) (emphasis added).

If a plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a violation of any constitutional right, it is axiomatic that the plaintiff likewise has failed to allege the violation of a “clearly established” right.

The determination of whether a complaint sufficiently states a claim is a matter of law that we review de novo.

See Harper v. Thomas, 988 F. 2d 101, 103 (11th Cir.1993).

In so doing, we use the same standard as the district court, accepting all allegations as true and construing facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See, e.g., Stephens v. Department of Health & Human Sens., 901 F. 2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir.1990).

However, while Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 allows a plaintiff considerable leeway in framing its complaint, this circuit, along with others, has tightened the application of Rule 8 with respect to § 1983 cases in an effort to weed out nonmeritorious claims, requiring that a § 1983 plaintiff allege with some specificity the facts which make out its claim.

See Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F. 2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir.1992) (citing Arnold v. Bd. of Educ., 880 F. 2d 305, 309 (11th Cir.1989)).

Some factual detail in the pleadings is necessary to the adjudication of § 1983 claims.

This is particularly true in cases involving qualified immunity, where we must determine whether a defendant’s actions violated a clearly established right.

Accordingly, when reviewing a district court’s disposition of a motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds, we are guided both by the regular 12(b)(6) standard and by the heightened pleading requirement.

See id.

2.

GJR’s Equal Protection Claim We conclude that GJR’s complaint fails to pass the first part of the qualified immunity inquiry.

It simply fails to state an equal protection claim, even without the additional hurdle of the heightened pleading standard.

The words “equal protection” do not appear anywhere in the complaint.

GJR’s claims for relief under § 1983 do not allege unequal treatment or discriminatory motive on the part of the defendants.

Even when viéwed in the light most favorable to GJR, the most the complaint alleges is that GJR had to jump through a few more procedural hoops than unspecified other permit applicants before it eventually received its permit.

As we conclude that the complaint fails to allege that GJR’s equal protection rights were violated at all, we need not focus on the conduct of the individual defendants.

All of the parties contend, and we agree, that the complaint challenges Escambia County’s zoning regulations not on their face, but as applied to GJR. Therefore, the district court’s use of the “rational basis” standard was improper; it should have determined whether GJR sufficiently alleged (1) that it was treated differently from similarly situated persons, and (2) that the defendants unequally applied thé Escambia County zoning laws for the purpose of discriminating against GJR. See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 6, 64 S.Ct. 397, 401, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944); Strickland v. Alderman, 74 F. 3d 260, 264 & n. 4 (11th Cir.1996).

GJR’s complaint fails’ on both counts.

With regard to the “similarly situated” prong, the complaint does not present a single instance in which a similarly situated developer was granted a permit; it merely alleges that nameless, faceless “other” permit applicants were given better treatment.

Bare allegations that “other” applicants, even “all other” applicants, were treated differently do not state an equal protection claim; a complaint must attempt to show in some fashion that these “other” applicants were situated similarly to the plaintiff.

In its brief GJR attempts to cure the defects in its complaint by arguing that the complaint can be read to state that GJR was treated differently from all other owners of C-l property.

We decline to accept such a tortured reading of the complaint.

GJR’s argument is neither persuasive nor timely; a motion to dismiss attacks a complaint on its face, and on the plain face of GJR’s complaint we find no such allegations of dissimilar treatment.

GJR’s allegations of discriminatory intent are deficient in much the same way, using many broad pejorative words to describe the defendants’ intentions without giving any specifics.

In its brief GJR cites Snowden v. Hughes for the proposition that a practice need not be systematic or long-continued to constitute discrimination.

While this is true, immediately following the passage cited in GJR’s brief the Snowden Court also noted: The lack of any allegations in the complaint ... tending to show a purposeful discrimination ... is not supplied by the opprobrious epithets “willful” and “malicious” ..., or by characterizing [the defendant’s actions] as an unequal, unjust, and oppressive administration of the laws....

These epithets disclose nothing as to the purpose or consequence of [the defendant’s actions]_ Such allegations are insufficient under our decisions to raise any issue of equal protection of the laws....

Snowden, 321 U.S. at 10, 64 S.Ct. at 402.

GJR’s allegations that the defendants’ actions were “arbitrary and capricious in that [they] acted with an improper motive, without reason, or upon a reason that was merely pretextual,” (R.l-1 at 18), are uncannily similar to those the Supreme Court rejected in Snowden, and are insufficient for much the same reason.

The district court’s error in finding an equal protection claim probably stemmed at least in part from the difficulty in deciphering GJR’s complaint, which unfortunately is a classic example of what is referred to in this circuit as a “shotgun pleading.”

See, e.g., Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F. 2d 1481, 1483-84 (11th Cir.1992); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F. 2d 1466, 1518 (11th Cir.1991).

The complaint presents scores of allegations regardless of their relevance and incorporates them in their entirety into several counts asserting discrete claims for relief, each of which contains several references to haphazardly described constitutional “rights.”

For example, the “First Cause of Action” of the complaint refers to GJR’s “general right to be free from abuses of governmental power worthy of constitutional protection,” (R.l-1 at 18), but fails to identify where in the Constitution this particular right may be found.

In another instance, GJR accuses the defendants of “conspiring] to use unlawfully legal processes to prevent Plaintiffs development of its Property.” (R.l-1 at 19; emphasis added.) In analyzing the complaint, we are confronted as the district court was with the difficulty of ascertaining the outlines of GJR’s claims; it is unclear from the complaint exactly which of GJR’s constitutional rights it feels the defendants have violated.

Determining which factual allegations are relevant to which claim is practically impossible,,as is matching specific acts of the defendants to violations of GJR’s rights.

We stress at this point, as we did in Olad-einde, see 963 F. 2d at 1485, that the heightened pleading requirement is the law of this circuit.

The district court was too lenient with GJR’s shotgun complaint; application of the heightened pleading standard is one way to deal summarily with pleadings of this kind.

Although the Supreme Court has held that courts may not impose a heightened pleading requirement in § 1983 cases involving municipalities, see Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167-68, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1162, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993), the Court specifically declined to extend its holding to cases involving individual government officials, see id at 167, 113 S.Ct. at 1162, and we likewise decline to do so here.

Having given up, it seems, on determining which claims GJR actually raised in its complaint, the district court turned to Resti-gouche, which lists four possible constitutional challenges to a zoning decision: “(1) just compensation takings, (2) due process takings, (3) substantive due process, ... and (4) equal protection.”

Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter,⁵⁹ F. 3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir.1995).

The court stated that “[a]negations showing that any one of the four grounds may have been violated will defeat a motion to dismiss,” (R.2-83 at 7-8), and found that GJR’s complaint successfully alleged an equal protection claim.

In doing so, the district court went beyond the permissible boundaries of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, in effect supplying GJR with an equal protection claim when none was evident on the face of the complaint.

Rule 8 requires that federal courts give pleadings a liberal reading in the face of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

This admonition is particularly true when the parties are proceeding pro se.

Courts do and should show a leniency to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of á legal education.

See, e.g., Powell v. Lennon, 914 F. 2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir.1990).

Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, see Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F. 2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir.1991), or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action, see Pontier v. City of Clearwater, 881 F.Supp. 1565, 1568 (M.D.Fla. 1995).

GJR was represented by counsel; it was not necessary for the court to:, read GJR’s complaint with such indulgence.

Reading complaints with this level of indulgence is particularly troublesome when defendants raise the issue of qualified immunity.

As we mentioned earlier, qualified immunity protects officials not just from liability, but from suit and its attendant burdens, allowing them to perform their official functions without the threat of retaliatory nuisance suits.

Every successive stage to which a suit progresses reduces the effectiveness of the defense, requiring officials to spend time at the courthouse rather than the statehouse.

The defense becomes useless if an official’s motion to dismiss covers all of the claims reasonably apparent from a plaintiffs complaint, but the district court divines another claim by which the plaintiff may defeat qualified immunity.

The Supreme Court noted the hazards of this approach: Plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights. [.Harlow v. Fitzgerald’s rule] would be transformed from a guarantee of immunity into a rule of pleading.

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

We also have recognized&#x²⁷;this danger, noting that “a plaintiff must not be permitted, through the use of the kind of ‘shotgun’ pleading tactic evident here, to strip government officials of the protection provided by the official immunity doctrine.”

Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F. 2d 783, 792 (11th Cir.1988). “Among the cardinal principles of our Anglo-American system of justice is the notion that the legal parameters of a given dispute are framed by the positions advanced by the adversaries, and may not be expanded sua sponte by the trial judge.”

Doubleday & Co. v. Curtis, 763 F. 2d 495, 502 (2d Cir.1985). A district court may not infer claims other than those that plainly appear on the face of the complaint to defeat a defense of qualified immunity.

To do so. is to ignore both the heightened pleading standard for § 1983 claims that is the law of this circuit and the Supreme Court’s call for a “firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” in cases where qualified immunity is asserted.

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978).

The district court transgressed both of these principles in divining an equal protection claim from GJR’s complaint.

3.

GJR’s Other Claims The district court also erred in declining to determine whether the defendants had immunity from all of GJR’s claims against them.

In analyzing GJR’s complaint, the district court stated that “ [allegations showing that any one of the four grounds [identified in Restigouche for challenging a zoning decision] may have been violated will defeat a motion to dismiss.” (R.2-83 at 7-8.) While it is true that allegations sufficient to overcome a qualified immunity defense will keep a case in court, this did not entitle the district court to limit its analysis to an equal protection claim.

The court should have proceeded to determine whether the individual defendants had qualified immunity with respect to GJR’s remaining claims.

As we previously stated, qualified immunity is a defense not only from liability, but from suit, which makes it important for a court to ascertain the validity of a qualified immunity defense as early in the lawsuit as possible.

See Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Detention Ctr.,⁴⁰ F. 3d 1176, 1184 (11th Cir.1994). A district court’s refusal to address claims possibly barred by qualified immunity effectively denies defendants immunity from suit on those claims.

Cf.

Collins v. School Bd., 981 F. 2d 1203, 1205 (11th Cir.1993) (defendants entitled to immediate appeal from denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity, even if plaintiff has other claims pending).

Thus, we now address the rest of GJR’s complaint.

Upon further examination, the only claims against the defendants that even come close to being sufficient are: (1) a substantive due process claim and (2) a Fifth Amendment just compensation claim.

The district court dismissed the substantive due process claim with prejudice upon reconsideration, and GJR does not challenge this ruling on appeal.

As for the just compensation claim, in its “First Cause of Action” GJR alleges that it has a “right not to have its property taken without payment of just compensation,” (R.l-1 at 18), after which it claims that the actions of all defendants deprived it of “rights,- privileges or immunities secured to [it] by the U.S. Constitution.” (R.l-1 at 18.) This would seem to intimate a just compensation claim against the defendants; Minshew, in fact, attempted to answer such a claim in her brief.

However, in its brief GJR asserts that the complaint does not assert a just compensation claim against the individual defendants.

See Appellee’s Brief at 45.

We will not address a claim that the plaintiff itself claims does not exist in its complaint.

GJR’s “Second Cause of Action,” also a § 1983 claim, alleges a conspiracy among the defendants to violate GJR’s constitutional rights.

See generally Strength v. Hubert, 854 F. 2d 421, 425 (11th Cir.1988) (stating theoretical basis of and requirements for stating a claim under § 1983 of conspiracy to violate constitutional rights).

However, to sustain a conspiracy action under § 1983, as distinguished from § 1985, a plaintiff must show an underlying actual denial of its constitutional rights.

See Slavin v. Curry, 574 F. 2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir.), modified on denial of r’hrg, 583 F. 2d 779 (5th Cir.1978).

As we have stated, GJR’s complaint does not sufficiently allege that any of its constitutional rights have been violated.

Moreover, the complaint fails to make any particularized allegations that a conspiracy existed, another prerequisite of a § 1983 conspiracy claim.

See Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F. 2d 782, 784 (11th Cir.1984).

As we can find no sufficiently pled federal claims in the complaint that could serve to abrogate defendants’ qualified immunity, it follows that the district court erred in denying defendants’ motions to dismiss on those grounds.

CONCLUSION

At oral argument, counsel for GJR stated that the events surrounding GJR’s attempt to build an RV park on Perdido Key represented the most egregious abuse of zoning law he had seen in his 30-year career. Whether or not that is so, the allegations of this complaint entitle GJR to no relief against these individual defendants.

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that the district court erred in finding that GJR’s complaint sufficiently alleged a violation of its constitutional rights.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial of the individual defendants’ motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds and remand to the district court with instructions to enter judgment dismissing with prejudice the damage claims against the individual defendants.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

APPENDIX

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PENSACOLA DIVISION

GJR Investments, Inc., Plaintiff, vs. Escambia County, A Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Lisa Minshew, W.A. “Buck” Lee, Wiley C.

Page, and Bennie Kenney, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 96-30380/LAC.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW Plaintiff GJR Investments, Inc. (“Plaintiff’) in the above-entitled and numbered cause complaining of Defendants Escambia County, A Political Subdivision of the State of Florida (“Escambia County”), Lisa Minshew (“Minshew”); W.A. “Buck” Lee (“Lee”), Wiley C.

Page (“Page”), and Bennie Kenney (“Kenney”), and for causes of action would respectfully show untó this Honorable Court as follows: I.Preliminary Statement and Jurisdiction

1.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to⁴² U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendants deprived Plaintiff of its right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to substantive due process and its right under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution not to have its property taken without just compensation.

In the alternative, and without waiver of the foregoing, Defendant Escambia County violated Plaintiffs rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by denying and delaying Plaintiffs application for a permit to develop Plaintiffs property resulting in an impermissible taking of Plaintiffs property without just compensation.

2.

Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to²⁸ U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and²⁸ U.S.C. § 1343.

II.

Party Plaintiff

3.

Plaintiff GJR Investments, Inc. is a Texas corporation having its principal place of business at 1240 Blalock, Houston, Texas 77055.

III.

Parties Defendant

4.

Defendant Escambia County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida and may be served with process by serving Barry R. Evans, the County Administrator, and David Tucker, the County Attorney, at 232 Palafox Place, Pensacola, Florida 32597-1591.

5.

Defendant Lisa Minshew-is an individual residing in Escambia.

County, Florida, and may be served with process at her place of employment 600 Barracks Street, Suite 201, Pensacola, Florida 32501.

6.

Defendant W.A. “Buck” Lee is an individual residing in Escambia County, Florida, and may be served with process at his place of residence 1540 Bayshore Lane, Pensacola, Florida 32507.

7.

Defendant Wiley C.

Page is an individual residing in Escambia County, Florida, and may be served with process at his place of residence 8050 North 9th Avenue, Apt. 144, Pensacola, Florida 32514.

8.

Defendant Bennie Kenney is an individual residing in Escambia County, Florida, and may be served with process at her place of residence 16501 Perdido Key Drive, Pensacola, Florida 32507.

IV.

Statement of Facts

A.

Background Facts

9.

Plaintiff is a Texas corporation.

Its principal offices are in Houston, Texas.

Plaintiff acquires, owns, develops and operates real property.

10.

Perdido Beach Limited, a Louisiana limited partnership, and Yenavlum, Inc., a Texas corporation, are the holders of legal title of certain real property (“Property”) located on Perdido Key, in Escambia County, Florida, which is more particularly described in Exhibit “A” attached hereto and incorporated herein for all purposes as if fully set out verbatim.

Plaintiff is the beneficial owner of the Property.

At all times relevant hereto, Perdido Beach Limited, a Louisiana limited partnership, and Yenavum, Inc., a Texas corporation, have held legal title to the Property as agents and nominees of Plaintiff.

11.

The Property is located in a commercial zoning district (“C-l District”) under the applicable zoning regulation, Escambia County Ordinance Code 89-6, as amended (the “Code”).

Plaintiff sought to develop and operate the Property to provide rental sites or pads as temporary living quarters for recreational vehicles (a “Campground”) which under the Code is a permitted use in a C-l District.

12.

In February, 1992, Plaintiff met with employees of the Escambia County Department of Growth Management Services (the “Staff”) concerning Plaintiffs development plan for the Property.

At such meeting and at all times relevant hereto, Defendant Page was the director and supervisor of the Es-cambia County Department of Growth Management Services.

During such meeting, the Staff, at the direction and control of Defendant Page, knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to Plaintiff the development requirements of Escambia County under the Code for land located in a C-l District.

Plaintiff was informed by the Staff that in order to develop and operate a Campground on the Property, Plaintiff could do so only as a special exception (“Exception”) and planned unit development (“PUD”) but could not do so as a permitted use.

B.

Plaintiffs First Application

13.

Plaintiff, in reliance on Staffs information and requirements, filed in October, 1992, its initial application to develop the Property as an Exception and PUD under the Code.

Immediately after filing such application, substantial public opposition arose to Plaintiffs development of the Property as a Campground.

The Staff, at the direction and control of Defendant Page, processed, reviewed and analyzed Plaintiffs application in a discriminatory manner and more strictly than other development applications filed in Escambia County.

14.

In December, 1992, Plaintiff withdrew its initial application for development of the Property since the Staff continued to advise Plaintiff that its development did not comply with Escambia County’s purported Exception and PUD requirements.

At the time Plaintiffs initial development application was withdrawn, the Staff, under the direction and control of Defendant Page, prepared a Special Exceptions Criteria Worksheet and recommended denial of Plaintiffs initial development application.

To determine what additional information, if any, was required to satisfy the purported Exception and PUD requirements, Plaintiff requested a copy of the review from Defendant Page on at least four occasions between December, 1992, and February, 1993.

Despite the fact that Plaintiff previously paid the requisite fee to obtain such a review, Defendant Page and the Staff refused to provide such review to Plaintiff.

C.

Plaintiffs Second Application

15.

On May 7, 1993, Plaintiff submitted its second application for development of the Property to the Escambia County Department of Growth Management Services.

Staff, under the direction and control of Defendant Page, caused Plaintiff to submit its second development application for the Property.

Its second application requested two special exceptions: (1) one for an amusement/recreational facility; and (2) another for a PUD.

16.

On May²⁶,1993, the Staff held a pre-development meeting to discuss Plaintiffs second development application.

Defendant Kenney, an Escambia County employee for nineteen years, attended the May²⁶, 1993, pre-development meeting at the express invitation of Defendant Page.

Defendant Kenney worked as an assistant to Defendant Lee who was an Escambia County Commissioner at all relevant times hereto.

Defendant Kenney resided at Perdido Key.

Defendant Kenney had not attended a pre-development meeting during the nineteen years she worked for Defendant Escambia, and she had never been personally notified or invited to do so until such meeting.

Defendant Page arranged for Defendant Kenney to attend the meeting knowing that (a) she was an employee of Escambia County and worked for Defendant Lee, (b) she had no responsibility, authority or duty in her job capacity with Escambia County which entitled her to attend such meeting, (c) she openly opposed Plaintiffs development, (d) she lived on Per-dido Key, and (e) she was acting in concert with other property owners on Perdido Key to oppose Plaintiffs development.

17.

During the meeting, Staff disclosed its intent to recommend approval of Plaintiffs second application but Defendant Page told Plaintiff that he recommended denial of Plaintiffs second development application despite the fact that his own staff recommended its approval.

In order to obtain a development permit, Defendant Page told Plaintiff that Plaintiff would be required to present its application itself to the Escambia County Zoning Board of Adjustment (“ZBA”) and convince the ZBA that Plaintiff met the criteria.

No previous applicant had ever been required to make such a presentation to the ZBA. 18.

During the May²⁶, 1993, pre-devel-opment meeting, Defendant Minshew, an attorney employed by Defendant Escambia County, advised the Staff to reject Plaintiffs second application.

Defendant Minshew stated that Plaintiff is an out-of-state developer and that the residents of Escambia County opposed a Campground on Perdido Key.

Defendant Minshew offered that Plaintiffs development was a “political issue” and that Staff should protect the citizens of Per-dido Key, Florida, by denying Plaintiffs application.