CAROL WYKE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF SHAWN DAVID WYKE, A MINOR DECEASED, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
POLK COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, MAX LINTON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PRINCIPAL OF MCLAUGHLIN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL OF POLK COUNLY, AND JAMES BUTLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS VICE-PRINCIPAL OF MCLAUGHLIN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL OF POLK COUNTY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS; CAROL WYKE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF SHAWN DAVID WYKE, A MINOR DECEASED, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, V. POLK COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, MAX LINTON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PRINCIPAL OF MCLAUGHLIN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL OF POLK COUNTY, AND JAMES BUTLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS VICE-PRINCIPAL OF MCLAUGHLIN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL OF POLK COUNTY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
PER CURIAM: In our earlier opinion in this matter, Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 129 F. 3d 560 (11th Cir.1997), we certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: Does Florida’s comparative fault statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.81 West 1997 Supp.), require the allocation of “fault” between both negligent and intentional tortfeasors? Following our certification the Supreme Court of Florida decided the eases of Merrill Crossings Assoc. v. McDonald, 705 So. 2d 560, 22 Fla.
L. Weekly S739,(Dec. 4, 1997), and Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, 702 So. 2d 232 (Fla.1997). It appearing that the opinions rendered in these cases provided a clear answer to the question certified, we withdraw the certification with the consent of the Supreme Court of Florida.
The trial court in this matter refused to include the name of Shawn David Wyke on the verdict form. That court ruled that the jury could not apportion liability to Shawn since he had not committed a negligent act but rather an intentional one (suicide). This ruling was in accord with what is now the clear law of Florida under Florida Statute § 768.81.
Having resolved all the issues presented in these matters, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.
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Jones v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 723 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…errill Crossings, section 768.81, Florida Statutes, does not permit allocation of fault between both negligent and intentional tortfeasors. See Wal-Mart v. Coker, 714 So. 2d 423 (Fla.1998); Merrill Crossings. See also Wyke v. Polk County School Bd., 137 F. 3d 1292 (11th Cir.1998). In Stellas, the car rental company attempted to apportion fault between itself and an unknown intentional tortfeasor who attacked the rental vehicle and occupants. Rejecting the rental company’s argument, the supreme court explaine…
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Vantran Indus. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 890 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…pellants correctly argue that McCracken’s act of committing suicide by jumping in front of a fifty-thousand pound tractor-trailer traveling at seventy miles per hour was an intentional, rather than a negligent, act. See Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 137 F. 3d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir.1998) (affirming the trial court’s refusal to -include the name of a teenage boy who committed suicide on the verdict form because the boy’s suicide constituted an intentional act). Therefore, McCracken’s name should not have been, a…
Authorities Cited
- Merrill Crossings Assocs. v. McDONALD, 705 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1997)
- Wyke v. Polk Cnty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560 (11th Cir. 1997)
- Rachelle M. Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 702 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1997)